Pacific Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Christianson
| Decision Date | 14 November 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 50375,50375 |
| Citation | 111 N.W.2d 679,253 Iowa 241 |
| Parties | PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. Harold CHRISTIANSON, Howard Kramer, Donald Kramer d/b/a Kramer Shoe Repair Shop, Arthur A. Neu and Arthur N. Neu, Executors of the Estate of Adda Beverly, Deceased, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Vincent F. Powers, Omaha, Neb., James Furey, Carroll, for appellant.
Wunschel & Schechtman, Carroll, for Harold Christianson, appellee.
Leighton A. Wederath, Carroll, for Donald Kramer, d/b/a Kramer Shoe Repair Shop, appellee.
Edward S. White, Carroll, Page & Nash, Denison, for Arthur A. Neu and Arthur N. Neu, executors of the estate of Adda Beverly, deceased, appellees.
This is an action for a declaratory judgment under which plaintiff asks the court to construe a policy of liability insurance issued to Kramer Shoe Repair Shop, located in a basement known as 407 1/2 Main Street in Carroll. The question is whether Donald Kramer, who had leased and was operating the repair shop, was insured under the one-year liability policy issued by plaintiff on November 14, 1959.
Harold Christianson and the Executors of the Estate of Adda Beverly, deceased, owners of the property, were made parties to the suit, because Mr. Christianson filed a petition on June 22, 1960, in the District Court of Carroll County, Iowa, claiming $52,467.65, damages against Donald Kramer d/b/a Kramer Shoe Repair Shop and against the Estate of Adda Beverly. He claimed he suffered serious injury to his left hand and wrist through falling on the steps going down to the basement shoe repair shop. The District Court entered order staying trial of the Christianson case until this action is concluded.
The trial court entered findings, conclusions, and judgment holding that Donald Kramer as operator of the Kramer Shoe Repair Shop was insured by the liability policy issued by plaintiff. Plaintiff has appealed.
Plaintiff assigns three errors relied upon for reversal. 1. The trial court erred in placing the burden of proof upon plaintiff, as to the question of who, if anyone, is the named insured under the policy. 2. The decision of the trial court is contrary to law and unsupported by the evidence. 3. The trial court erred in rejecting evidence of the plaintiff which tended to show an intent on the part of plaintiff's agent to insure Howard Kramer.
I. Appellant cites some cases which hold that in a declaratory judgment action the burden of proof is upon the party claiming coverage under the policy. Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Greenough, 88 N.H. 391, 190 A. 129, 109 A.L.R. 1096; Preferred Accident Insurance Co. of New York v. Grasso, 2 Cir., 186 F.2d 987, 23 A.L.R.2d 1234.
On the other hand appellee cite cases to the effect that the burden of proof in a declaratory judgment action is controlled by the same rules and considerations as arise in legal proceedings of other types. In other words, plaintiff, who makes the allegations as to a question concerning the insured in a policy, has the burden of proving who is insured. Reliance Life Insurance Co. v. Burgess, (8th C.A.Mo.) 112 F.2d 234; Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corporation (9th C.A.Cal.) 178 F.2d 541.
An early case was Travelers Insurance Co. v. Drumheller (D.C.Mo.) 25 F.Supp. 606, 607. In this case the court stated:
(1) 'One who comes into court asking a judgment against another, whether it be a declaratory judgment only or one capable of immediate enforcement,' has the burden of proving 'that he is entitled to that judgment.'
(2) 'If an insurance company, * * * desires, for the sake of certain advantages, to initiate' a proceeding for a declaration of nonliability, 'it must assume the ordinary burdens of a plaintiff,' including the burden of proof of nonliability.
(3) The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A § 2201 et seq., in vesting the federal courts with power to 'declare * * * rights * * * of any interested party seeking for such declaration' creates a situation in which the petitioner (under the principle in point one above) must plead and prove the facts which entitle him to relief inasmuch as he is affirmatively seeking a judgment to establish his 'rights.'
The trial court did not specifically refer to the question of burden of proof in its findings. The court analyzed the testimony and upon such analysis decided that Donald Kramer was insured under plaintiff's policy. The question of the burden of proof is not too important in the instant case, nor is it decisive. The testimony is so clear and so definite that there is no question about the correctness of the trial court's decision.
II. Under the very general assignment of error of appellant as to the decision being contrary to law and unsupported by the evidence, we will analyze the facts in the case.
Howard Kramer had established a shoe repair shop in a basement in the business district of Carroll some years prior to this action. He purchased liability insurance for his place of business from Mr. Louis M. Gnam, a local insurance agent in Carroll. A liability policy had been protecting the same business for a...
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General Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Hines
...party has the burden of proof.' See also Sanborn v. Maryland Cas. Co., 255 Iowa 1319, 1321, 125 N.W.2d 758; Pacific Ins. Co., etc. v. Christianson, 253 Iowa 241, 243, 111 N.W.2d 679; Fortgang Brothers, Inc. v. Cowles, 249 Iowa 73, 76, 85 N.W.2d 916; 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 148, pa......
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Christianson v. Kramer
...liability, if any, to plaintiff was insured by a certain liability policy. That case was also appealed. Pacific Insurance Co. v. Christianson et al., 253 Iowa 241, 111 N.W.2d 679. There was one step between the sidewalk along the front of the building in question and a platform leading to t......
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