Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.
| Decision Date | 31 December 1979 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, a non-profit California Corporation, Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant, Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Civ. 18239. |
Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, Sandra M. Robertson, Sacramento, for plaintiff, respondent and cross-appellant.
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Carol Hunter, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendant, appellant and cross-respondent.
The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board) appeals from a judgment of Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) brought this action to review the Board's determination, and cross-appeals from that portion of the judgment which denies it recovery for attorney fees.
the superior court which invalidated a Board decision awarding Thurman Carroll unemployment insurance benefits. The basis of the court's decision was its finding that Carroll had not genuinely sought work and was therefore ineligible for benefits.
This court has previously determined that PLF has standing to bring the main action. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 150, 157-158, 141 Cal.Rptr. 474.)
Thurman Carroll was unemployed from February to August 1975. He previously had been employed as a gardener or ranch caretaker and had only a 7th grade education. On June 2, 1975 he went to the office of the Employment Development Department (EDD) in Marysville to register and be interviewed for unemployment insurance benefits.
The interview revealed that: (1) Carroll was 64 years of age and on social security; (2) he wanted a job as a gardener or caretaker where his wife could do some housework; and (3) he was seeking a job that paid $200 per month and provided living quarters so that he would not lose any social security benefits, or alternatively, one that paid $500 a month so he could forego his social security benefits. In the questionnaire he filled out, he checked the box indicating he thought his chances of finding work were poor. During the interview, Carroll was told to seek work in farming. He was also told not to limit his search to live-in jobs and to register with the "employment service;" that he must seek farm work to be in the labor market.
A June 16, 1975 interview disclosed that on June 12 Carroll had gone to Quincy with his brother-in-law, who was going there to see about a job in a mill. While there, Carroll thought he might find a job as a caretaker, and filed an application with the employment office, but he was apparently not offered employment. The interviewer noted that despite instructions to look for farm work, Carroll did not contact any farmers, had looked in only three newspapers, and responded to only three newspaper ads. The interviewer denied benefits for the period in question (the weeks ending June 7 and June 14, 1975) on the ground that Carroll's "minimum efforts to find work indicate that you are not genuinely in the labor market and . . . you are not available."
Carroll appealed the denial of benefits. At the administrative hearing the administrative law judge affirmed the denial upon the basis that Carroll had not made sufficient independent efforts to find work and therefore was not genuinely attached to the labor market and available for work. The administrative record further discloses that as Carroll put it "the farmers I knew wasn't hiring nobody and then on top of that I didn't have gas enough to go out and run around." He had contacted John Douglas, a former employer in San Rafael, for whom he had worked as a caretaker, and asked Douglas if he would look for a job for him. In response to a newspaper ad, he called, without success, a private employment agency in Marysville, and also went to a "place where they wanted a set-up man on in the molding machine," but was told that a young man was desired. He confirmed that he had been told not to restrict his search to caretaker or other live-in arrangements, and to seek farm work. He testified, however, that at a time not specified, he had contacted a state employment office regarding a ranch job, and "they" told him that there would be no farm work "until the tomatoes started" in the Yuba-Sutter area. 1
Carroll appealed the decision of the administrative law judge to the Board. In a 3-2 decision (Precedent Benefit Decision No. P-B-292), the Board determined that Carroll was not disqualified for benefits under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1253, subdivisions (c) and (e), 2 notwithstanding his minimal efforts to seek work in compliance with or beyond the directions given him by EDD. The Board reasoned that subdivisions (c) and (e) set forth separate eligibility requirements. As stated in the Board decision,
In a forceful opinion, the two dissenting members of the Board pointed out that The dissent reasoned that Carroll had not acted diligently because tomato harvesting is a late summer crop, preceding the early autumn harvesting of melons and pumpkins; that prior to the tomato harvesting there come the picking, transporting, canning, drying, and marketing of two other principal crops: apricots and peaches.
After the decision of the Board granting Carroll benefits, PLF named the Board as defendant in this action for declaratory relief and succeeded in obtaining a judgment holding the Board action invalid, and Carroll ineligible for benefits. The trial court, although concluding that the Board had erred in awarding benefits, determined that Carroll would not be held liable for the amount of the benefits received (for the weeks ending June 7 and June 14, 1975) pursuant to the Board's ruling. 3
After entry of the judgment, PLF moved for an award of attorney fees. The trial court denied the motion, and PLF appeals from the order. The Board appeals from the judgment invalidating its decision. The parties have stipulated to share the costs on appeal.
The Board contends, as it did in the trial court, that the "available for work" requirement of section 1253, subdivision (c), is distinct and separate from the requirement of section 1253, subdivision (e) that the claimant conduct "a search for suitable work in accordance with specific and reasonable instructions of a public employment office." The crux of the argument is that while a claimant's failure to seek work may be considered along with any restrictions or limitations placed by him on acceptable work in determining whether he is available for work, such failure alone cannot form the basis for a determination of unavailability.
We cannot agree with an interpretation which treats the requirements of section 1253 as separate and disjunctive. The Board's reasoning as to the separability of subdivisions (c) and (e) centered largely upon the 1961 amendment of section 1253. That amendment changed the prior version of the section which had read, in pertinent part:
". . . (c) He was able to work and available for work that week, And had made such effort to seek work on his own behalf as may be required in accordance with such regulations as the director shall prescribe." (Stats.1953, ch. 308, p. 1501.) (Emphasis added.)
As our subsequent discussion will demonstrate, the 1961 amendment was not the result of legislative intent to make the section disjunctive rather than conjunctive.
The Legislative Counsel's Digest to the 1961 amendment (Stats.1961, ch. 2208, § 1 (AB 1744) indicates that the purpose of the amendment was not to enable claimants to qualify for unemployment insurance benefits by merely satisfying one of the provisions of section 1253, but rather to provide that the claimant's search ". . . be directed to suitable work, and that it be conducted pursuant to specific reasonable local office instructions rather than those of the Director of Employment." (See 1961 Leg.Sess., AB 1744.)
Second, examination of other sections of the code dealing with unemployment insurance benefits indicates that had the Legislature been desirous of allowing claimants to qualify by merely satisfying one of the provisions of section 1253, different phraseology would have been used.
We note that where (1) the Unemployment Insurance Code makes provision for the payment of benefits, (2) lists nonobvious mutually exclusive categories, and (3) there is an intent to qualify or allow exclusions on account of only some of the enumerated requirements, the phrase "any of" is inserted before the words "the following conditions." 4 It appears, therefore, that the Legislature's omission of the phrase "any of the following" is a significant factor militating against the Board's interpretation of section 1253.
Third, the EDD's own regulations indicate the section has been construed by the administrative agency charged with administering the system of unemployment insurance benefits to provide that a claimant must satisfy each part of section 1253.
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