Pacific Typesetting Co. v. International Typographical Union

• Decision Date: 05 June 1923
• Docket Number: 17197.
• Parties: PACIFIC TYPESETTING CO. v. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

216 P. 358

125 Wash. 273

PACIFIC TYPESETTING CO. v. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION et al.

No. 17197.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 5, 1923

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Everett Smith, Judge.

Action by the Pacific Typesetting Company against the International Typographical Union, a voluntary organization, Philo Howard organizer and executive agent thereof, and others. From orders granting motion to quash service and sustaining demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and remanded with directions.

Pemberton J., dissenting.

Poe &amp Falkner and Ralph H. Higgins, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Clay Allen, of Seattle, and Homer T. Bone, of Tacoma, for respondents.

MACKINTOSH J.

The amended complaint of the appellant contains these allegations: That the plaintiff was the owner of a linotype, monotype, and printing plant, valued at about $30,000, and in the operation of the plant employs a number of workmen, who were members of the International Typographical Union; that the business was increasing in volume, a substantial portion of which consisted of furnishing printing establishments with linotyping and monotyping; that the respondent International Typographical Union was a voluntary association, with many members, and that it was impracticable to bring all of them before the court; that the respondent Philo Howard was an organizer and executive agent thereof, residing in Seattle, where he represented the International Typographical Union; that the respondent Seattle Typographical Union No. 202 was a voluntary association of this state, associated with the other respondent International Typographical Union; that the members of the local union were numerous, and it was impracticable to bring them all before the court; that the other named respondents were officers and members of the local union; that in May, 1921, the respondents called out the members of the local union and ordered them to cease work in various printing establishments of the city of Seattle, with whom the appellant had contracts under which appellant was furnishing these establishments with linotyping and monotyping, and that the reason for this calling out of the members of the local union was the failure of these printing establishments to grant to the members the '44-hour week'; that the International and local unions, for the purpose of compelling and forcing these printing establishments whose employees had been called out to grant to said employees a 44-hour week, called out and caused to cease work for the appellant all of the employees of the appellant who belonged to the local union, and that such employees did obey the call can cease their employment; that these printing establishments from whom the respondents had demanded a 44-hour week were dependent upon the linotyping and monotyping concerns for their metal and type necessary for their printing, and that the appellant was one of such concerns upon which these printing establishments so depended; that the purpose and object of the calling out of the employees of appellant who belonged to the local union was not to better hours, wages, or working conditions of said employees, but to hinder, injure, and embarrass the printing establishments dependent on appellant for their metal or type in carrying on their business, and to prevent appellant from furnishing such printing establishments the material necessary to the successful conduct of their business; that this call was contrary to the wishes and desires of the employees of appellant, who were called out and ceased work because of fear of suspension, fine, or reprimand from the local union to which they belonged, and not because such employees desired any improvement in hours, wages, or working conditions, and there was no controversy between appellant and the employees on these matters; that highly skilled labor is necessary in the operation of linotype and monotype machines, and that it was impossible for the appellant to replace the employees called out from its establishment with satisfactory substitutes; that the respondents knew these facts and knew that great damage would be occasioned to the appellant by calling out and requiring its employees to cease work; that the calling out of appellant's employees resulted in great damage to the appellant; and that its business has been demoralized and damage has been occasioned it in the sum of $20,000, which is prayed for.

The International Typographical Union appeared specially and moved that the service upon it be quashed. This motion was accompanied by the affidavit of Philo Howard, which stated that a copy of the complaint had been served on him as a representative of the International Typographical Union, at the time of service he was not authorized to receive or accept service, and that his only authority from that union was to employ all lawful means to secure and induce the employing printers to adopt the 44-hour week scale of employment. The other defendants filed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The motion to quash service as to the International Typographical Union having been granted, and the demurrer of the other defendants to the complaint having been sustained, this appeal followed.

Two questions require answers: First, was the service upon Howard sufficient to bring the International Typographical Union into the case; and, second, does the complaint state a cause of action.

First. Varying facts have produced varying results in cases involving the validity of service upon foreign corporations or associations, but where these foreign corporations or associations are doing business within this state, and have an agent herein, service upon such agent is sufficient. Section 226, Rem. Code 1915, subd. 9. It becomes necessary to determine whether this association, the International Typographical Union, was doing business within this state. It can hardly be argued that it was not, for among the important activities of an association such as this is the securing of what its members deem proper hours of labor for them in their trade, and the adoption of satisfactory working conditions and pay. These constitute the major purposes and the principle activities of such organizations. They are created primarily to attain these results, and the effort in any community to secure from their employers the adoption of any or all of these beneficent standards of employment is engaging in the very business for which they continue their existence. Therefore, when the International Typographical Union authorized Howard to employ all lawful means to secure the adoption of the 44-hour week in the printing trade in Seattle, it authorized him to carry on the business of the association to that important extent.

The next question is whether the International Typographical Union, being engaged in business in this state, the respondent Howard became its agent. It is, of course, to be conceded that service upon a mere servant or employee would not suffice, and that if Howard's status was merely that then the service was not adequate. His affidavit shows that he was to use such lawful means as were necessary to accomplish the purpose of the International Union. As far as that association was doing business within the state, he had the entire direction and control of it; his authority was coextensive with the association's activity. The standard laid down in many cases of commercial organizations requiring the agent to have authority to enter into contracts, make binding agreements and so forth, can have little weight in determining the question of the extent of Howard's authority. For this was not a commercial organization. Its lines of endeavor were restricted, but within those lines Howard exercised full authority and control.

The case of Rich v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 34 Wash. 14, 74 P. 1008, held that a railroad corporation was not doing business in the state by merely advertising. Arrow Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Union P. R. Co., 53 Wash. 629, 102 P. 650, held that a railroad was not doing business by distributing advertising matter and soliciting freight. In Macario v. Alaska Gastineau Mining Co., 96 Wash. 459, 165 P. 73, L. R. A. 1917C, 1152, it was held that a mining company located in Alaska was not doing business in this state by purchasing and forwarding operations here. In Alaska Pacific Navigation Co. v. Southwark F. & M. Co., 104 Wash. 346, 176 P. 357, it was held that a person was not an agent who was merely employed as a mechanical engineer of a foreign corporation for the purpose of installing a piece of machinery. In Watson v. Oregon Moline Plow Co., 113 Wash. 110, 193 P. 222, it was held that a foreign corporation was not doing business in this state through an agent, where the person who it was claimed was an agent was merely buying machinery from the foreign corporation and selling it here on his own account. These represent the class of cases where service has been quashed. In Grams v. Idaho Harvester Co., 105 Wash. 602, 178 P. 815, it was held that a foreign corporation was doing business in this state where it had a warehouse in which were kept extras and repair parts of machinery sold by them, and that an employee of such manufacturing company is an agent for the service of process where he had been sent to this state to check up and take possession of the stock of goods in such warehouse. In Barrett Mfg. Co. v. Kennedy, 73 Wash. 503, 131 P. 1161, this court reviewed a number of cases from this and other courts on this subject and said:

'The words of the statute 'any agent' were intended to have a broad meaning, and must be liberally construed to effectuate

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