Pack v. Crossroads Inc.

Decision Date26 July 2001
Citation53 S.W.3d 492
Parties(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001) DONNA PACK, ANN BOWLING, AND LINDA PEARSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES WATSON, APPELLANTS v. CROSSROADS, INC. A/K/A WAY OF THE CROSS, INC. D/B/A WATSON MEMORIAL NURSING HOME, SHARON CHAPMAN, BESSIE STOVALL, AND THERESA BUTLER, APPELLEES NO. 2-00-219-CV
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

FROM THE 48TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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PANEL A:CAYCE, C.J.; DAY and DAUPHINOT, JJ.

OPINION

SAM J. DAY, JUSTICE

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from a take nothing judgment rendered against Appellants Donna Pack, Ann Bowling, and Linda Pearson, individually and as representatives of the estate of James Watson. Appellants raise seven issues on appeal. In their first issue, Appellants allege that the trial court erred in refusing to submit a requested jury question. Appellants contend in their second issue that the trial court erred in limiting the admissibility of evidence. In their third issue, Appellants argue the trial court erred in refusing to permit them to obtain evidence. Appellants complain in their fourth and fifth issues about the trial court's prohibition against the admission of certain exhibits and testimony. In their sixth issue, Appellants assert that the trial court erred in striking their negligence per se claims. Lastly, in their seventh issue, Appellants claim the evidence was factually insufficient to support a finding in favor of Appellees. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Watson was hospitalized at North Hills Hospital on February 23, 1995 to undergo surgery for a fractured hip. After the surgery, Mr. Watson experienced health problems that led to continued treatment at Transitional Hospital Corporation (THC) and Westpark Nursing Home. He was ultimately admitted to Watson Memorial Nursing Home in August 1995, six months after his hip surgery. Watson was then transported to Harris Methodist Hospital on September 24, 1995. There, doctors noted Watson's physical condition: tongue coated with a thick membrane; dry mucous membranes; fecal material on perineum and legs; cloudy urine; gangrene of the right foot; and decubiti on the heels of his feet and his right hip. The hospital believed that these conditions were due to abuse or neglect and contacted the Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS). Watson died on October 2, 1995 at Harris Methodist Hospital. Appellants, Watson's surviving children, filed suit against Appellees Crossroads Evangelism, Inc. d/b/a Watson Memorial Nursing Home, Sharon Chapman, Bessie Stovall, and Theresa Butler (collectively "Watson Memorial") for negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence, wrongful death, DTPA, fraud, and negligent misrepresentations. Appellants sought damages under the Texas Survival Statute and the Wrongful Death Act. The jury returned a take nothing judgment in favor of Watson Memorial.

III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

Appellants argue in their second and fifth issues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence. In their second issue, Appellants contend the trial court erred in limiting the admissibility of certain TDHS records. Specifically, the trial court limited the admissibility of the records in question to only those entries involving Watson, instead of allowing the Appellants to admit the entries involving other residents of Watson Memorial, which Appellants argue would have shown a pattern of neglect on the part of Watson Memorial. In their fifth issue, Appellants allege the trial court erred in prohibiting the admission of Harris Methodist Hospital records and the testimony of Dr. James Cox, which alleged that Watson was the victim of abuse, neglect, or both.

A. Standard of Review

The admission and exclusion of evidence is committed to the trial court's sound discretion. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. 1995); Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1989). A person seeking to reverse a judgment based on evidentiary error need not prove that but for the error a different judgment would necessarily have been rendered, but only that the error probably resulted in an improper judgment. McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1992); King v. Skelly, 452 S.W.2d 691, 696 (Tex. 1970). A successful challenge to evidentiary rulings usually requires the complaining party to show that the judgment turns on the particular evidence excluded or admitted. GT & MC, Inc. v. Tex. City Ref., Inc., 822 S.W.2d 252, 257 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (op. on reh'g.). We determine whether the case turns on the excluded evidence by reviewing the entire record. Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989); Gee, 765 S.W.2d at 396.

To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Garcia v. Martinez, 988 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. 1999); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986). In other words, we must determine if the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242. Merely because a trial court may decide a matter within its discretion in a different manner than an appellate court would in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42.

An abuse of discretion does not occur where the trial court bases its decisions on conflicting evidence. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978); see also Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997). Furthermore, an abuse of discretion does not occur as long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court's decision. Holley v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

B. TDHS Records

Appellants attempted to introduce several records TDHS compiled during investigations of Watson Memorial from 1992 to 1995. These records reflected certain conditions of care of several residents prior to and contemporaneous with Watson's residency at Watson Memorial. Appellants argued that these documents contained examples of conditions of other residents that were similar to those suffered by Watson; therefore, Watson Memorial should have been on notice of conditions that could lead to Watson's injuries. Watson Memorial objected to these documents on the basis that the documents were irrelevant, the probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice, and they would confuse the issue and mislead the jury. The trial court sustained Watson Memorial's objections and limited the introduction of the documents to those portions relating specifically to Watson.

According to the rules of evidence, "'[r]elevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Tex. R. Evid. 401. Proximate causation has two distinct elements: (1) cause in fact and (2) foreseeability. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992) (op. on reh'g.). Appellants arguments suggest that the TDHS documents were relevant because they established the foreseeability element of causation. Therefore, based on this argument, the documents were relevant to the proximate cause of Watson's injuries.

Even relevant evidence, however, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 403. In a medical malpractice cause of action, the plaintiff must prove by competent testimony that the defendant's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. White v. Wah, 789 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ). Furthermore, expert testimony is required to prove negligence or gross negligence unless the form or mode of treatment is a matter of common knowledge, or the matter is within the experience of a layperson. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex. 1977); see also Shook v. Herman, 759 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App. Dallas 1988, writ denied). Therefore, Appellants had the burden to establish from expert testimony: (1) the standard of care, (2) the facts which show that the nursing home deviated from that standard, and (3) the deviation caused the patient's symptoms. Rodriguez v. Reeves, 730 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Lay witness testimony about negligence and proximate cause has no probative force in a medical malpractice case. Flores v. Ctr. for Spinal Evaluation & Rehab., 865 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1993, no writ); Tilotta v. Goodall, 752 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). The records do not constitute expert testimony. As such, Appellants were unable to use them in order to prove that Watson Memorial could foresee that its omission would injure Watson. Because of the slight probative nature of these documents, their admission would have been overly prejudicial. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the TDHS documents into evidence. Appellant's second issue is overruled.

C. Harris Methodist Hospital Records and

the Testimony of Dr. James Cox

In their fifth issue, Appellants contend the trial court erred in limiting the admissibility of certain records from Harris Methodist Hospital and the testimony of Dr. James Cox. Specifically, Appellants wanted to introduce,...

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