Packet Company v. St Louis
Decision Date | 01 October 1879 |
Citation | 100 U.S. 423,25 L.Ed. 688 |
Parties | PACKET COMPANY v. ST. LOUIS |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. James H. Davidson, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Leverett Bell, contra.
The plaintiff in error is a corporation of the State of Iowa, and, during the years 1870, 1871, and up to March 28, 1872, was engaged with steamboats and barges of which it was the owner, in the business of commerce and navigation on the Mississippi River, between ports and places in different States. Its steamboats and barges, in the course of such business, landed at St. Louis, and, during the period named, it paid to that city, upon the demand of its constituted authorities, large sums of money, amounting in the aggregate to $6,571.35. These sums were exacted as wharfage dues, in virtue of certain ordinances of the city, one of which was entitled 'An ordinance establishing and regulating the harbor department,' and the other, 'An ordinance to reduce the rate of wharfage in the city of St. Louis.'
The authority of the city to collect these fees is referred to sect. 30 of the ordinance first named, which is as follows:——
The payments in question were made by the company whenever demanded, but always under protest, and without waiving any right it had to recover the same from the city by an action at law.
This action was instituted to compel the repayment of the sums thus collected, upon the ground that the ordinances in question, and particularly the section above quoted, was in conflict, 1st, with the clause prohibiting any State, without the consent of Congress, from laying any duty of tonnage; 2d, with the clause which declares that 'no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State; no preference shall be given any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of any one State over those of another; nor shall any vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another;' 3d, with the clause conferring upon Congress the right to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; 4th, with the 'Treaty of Paris, 1783,' which declares that 'the navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall for ever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States;' 5th, with the Troaty of Spain, concluded Oct. 27, 1795, which declares: '. . . And his Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that the navigation of the said river, in its whole breadth, from its source to the ocean, shall be free only to his subjects and the citizens of the United States;' 6th, with the ordinance of 1787, which, among other things, provides 'that the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and for ever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory as to the citizens of the United States, that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor.'
The court below, the circuit and district judges concurring, was of opinion that the plaintiff in error was legally bound to pay the sums so exacted and paid as wharfage fees, under the ordinances to which we have referred. Judgment was, accordingly, given for the city. Whether the facts set forth in the special finding are sufficient to sustain the judgment is the controlling question arising upon this writ of error.
The elaborate argument of counsel for the company is directed to the support of the first, second, and third of the foregoing propositions. He withholds any suggestion or argument in support of the remaining propositions, for the obvious reason, as we suppose, that the case must fail altogether unless the plaintiff in error can successfully maintain the invalidity of the ordinances, under some one or more of the constitutional provisions by him cited. If the particular section of the ordinance, by virtue of which these collections were made, is not in conflict with the Federal Constitution, there would be no ground whatever for holding that it was inconsistent with either of the treaties referred to, or with the ordinance of 1787. We will, therefore, only consider whether the city of St. Louis was inhibited by any provision of the Federal Constitution from charging and collecting the fees, to enforce the repayment of which is the object of this action.
By the charter of the city, its mayor and council were invested with authority to regulate the stationing, anchoring, and mooring of vessels, within the city, and to charge and collect wharfage on fire-wood, lumber, logs, &c., brought to the port of...
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