Commonwealth v. Housatonic R.R.
| Citation | 9 N.E. 547,143 Mass. 264 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. HOUSATONIC R.R. |
| Decision Date | 07 January 1887 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Tort to recover a penalty as provided in section 2 of chapter 338 of the acts of 1885. Trial in the superior court, before BARKER, J., where judgment was entered for the plaintiff, and the case reported to the supreme judicial court. The facts are stated in the opinion.Justin Dewey, for defendant.
The defendant maintains that said statute, (chapter 338, Acts 1885,) and the said order of the railroad commissioners made by virtue thereof, are, so far as they relate to the matter of this suit, without legal force: (1) Because, upon general principles of law, they are in excess of the jurisdiction of the legislative authority of the state; (2) because, as applied to the facts of this case, they are an attempt to “regulate commerce among the several states,” the exclusive power over which is, by section 8 of article 1 of the constitution of the United States, in congress; and (3) because, upon the facts agreed, they are in violation of section 7 of the charter of the Stockbridge & Pittsfield Railroad Company, and so are in conflict with that portion of section 10 of article 1 of the federal constitution which prohibits a state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. See Story, Confl.Laws, (8th Ed.) § 609; Com. v. Milton, 12 B.Mon. 212; S.C. 54 Amer.Dec. 532; Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586;Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 541;Const. Mass. pt. 1, art. 4; Com. v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 98;St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423;Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 132.
The defendant, being a corporation created by a law of the state of Connecticut, has no existence or powers beyond the jurisdiction of that state, except by the comity of other states. Folger v. Columbian Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 272; St. Louis v. Ferry Co., ubi supra; Runyan v. Coster's Lessees, 14 Pet. 122. As to the railroads and property situated in this state, which it is allowed to possess and use, it subjects itself to our rightful control; but it does no more. See Com. v. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa.St. 147; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 588; Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 U.S. 12;Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U.S. 226;Canada Southern R.R. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527;S.C. 3 Sup.Ct.Rep. 363.
Said statute and order of the commissioners are inconsistent with the provisions of section 8, art. 1, of the constitution of the United States, whereby exclusive regulation and control of foreign commerce, and of commerce among the states, is submitted to congress. See 6 Webster's Works, 10; Story, Const.Law, (4th Ed.) § 1057; 5 Elliott's Debates, 548; 2 Webster's Works, 205, 206; Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 256.
The defendant contends that the law, as declared and decided by the supreme court of the United States, touching the right of a state to regulate or interfere with interstate commerce, may be stated with substantial correctness as follows: A state may regulate a business which affects the public at large, but which is carried on exclusively within the limits of the state, although these instruments may be employed by those engaged in interstate commerce. Until congress acts on the subject, a state may control such domestic business, and the property used in connection with it, within the state, although in doing so it may indirectly operate on a commerce outside of its jurisdiction and territory. In the absence of any legislation by congress, a state may, unless what is done amounts to regulation of interstate commerce, control the business carried on within the state, of a railroad situated within the state, whether operated by a domestic corporation, or leased to, and operated by, a foreign corporation, and may fix the rate or price to be charged for the transportation by it of merchandise within the limits of the state, including merchandise shipped from a point without the state to a point within it, or from a point within the state to a point without; but the authority of a state to do this is arrested at the boundary of its territory. Transportation of merchandise from state to state is commerce among the states; and an attempt, as in the case at bar, to fix the charge for such transportationfor the whole distance from a point without the state to a point within it, or the reverse, especially on a main line of interstate transportation, is an attempt to regulate such commerce among the states. It is an attempt to establish a rule for the conduct of the business, which is the strict meaning of the word “regulate,” (Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 472;) a rule that has a direct and vital bearing on the success of the business. It is the imposition of a burden which, if within the constitutional authority of the state, may be made too heavy to be borne; and if one state may thus extend its controlling power over a line of transportation stretching beyond its limits, so may another, and thus that embarrassing condition of conflicting and recriminatory legislation exist which it was the object of the constitution of the United States to prevent. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232;State Tax on Ry. Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284; Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456;Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275;Henderson v. Mayor, etc., 92 U.S. 259;Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99;Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Iowa, Id. 155; Peik v. Chicago, etc., Ry., Id. 164; Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Ackley, Id. 179; Stone v. Wisconsin, Id. 181; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465;Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485; Company of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691;Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691;S.C. 2 Sup.Ct.Rep. 732;Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 526;S.C. 2 Sup.Ct.Rep. 832;Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196;S.C. 5 Sup.Ct.Rep. 826;Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622;S.C. 5 Sup.Ct.Rep. 1091;Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U.S. 307;S.C. 6 Sup.Ct.Rep. 334, 388, 1191;Stone v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 116 U.S. 347;S.C. 6 Sup.Ct.Rep. 348, 388, 1191.
The provisions of the federal constitution refer to commerce conducted by corporations as much as that of natural persons. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 182, 183;Pensacola, etc., v. Western Union, etc., 96 U.S. 1. The state may determine on what conditions foreign corporations may do business here. Paul v. Virginia, ubi supra; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566. But this doctrine does not authorize the state to fix any such conditions as amount to an interference with the right of a foreign corporation, engaged in interstate commerce, to make contracts here relating to that business. 2 Mor.Priv.Corp. § 974; Paul v. Virginia, ubi supra; Pensacola, etc., v. Western Union, etc., ubi supra; Cooper Manuf'g Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727;S.C. 5 Sup.Ct.Rep. 739. See, also, Kaeiser v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 18 Fed.Rep. 151; S.C. 16 Amer. & Eng.R.Cas. 40; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Railroad Com. of Tenn., 16 Amer. & Eng.R.Cas. 1; Pacific Coast S.S. Co. v. Board Ry. Com'rs, 18 Fed.Rep. 10;Fargo v. Redfield, 22 Blatchf. 527;S.C. 22 Fed.Rep. 373; Ex parte Koehler, October 8, 1885, (U.S. district court Or.,) 21 Amer. & Eng.R.Cas. 58; S.C. 25 Fed.Rep. 73;Carton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 59 Iowa, 148;S.C. 13 N.W.Rep. 67;Hardy v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 32 Kan. 698;S.C. 5 Pac.Rep. 6;Carpenter v. Grand Trunk Ry., 72 Me. 388; Merrill v. Boston & L.R.R. Co., 21 Amer. & Eng.R.Cas. 48. See, also, Higgins v. Lime, 130 Mass. 1; Wood, Rys. § 203; 2 Mor. Priv. Corp. (2d Ed.) § 1075d.
It can no longer be disputed that a charter granted by the state, and accepted and acted on by the incorporators, constitutes a contract. The obligations of the contract consist in its binding force on the party who makes it; and this depends on the terms of the contract, and the laws in existence when it is made. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608;Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454;Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314.
Defendant maintains that the statute, (chapter 338, Acts 1885,) and the order passed by the railroad commissioners under it, are unconstitutional and invalid, because they are prejudicial to the rights conferred on the Stockbridge & Pittsfield Railroad Company, and are inconsistent with and impair the obligations and restrictions which the state imposed upon itself by the seventh section of the charter of said company. See Metc. Cont., Rules Const. 4, 5, pp. 285-287; Shep. Touch. 86, 87; Broom, Leg. Max. c. 8; Bish.Writ.Law, §§ 70, 72; Beals v. Hale, 4 How. 37;Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430-437;Boston & L.R. Co. v. Salem & L.R. Co., 2 Gray, 1, 29. The state may, at pleasure, put this corporation to death; but, while it permits it to live, it must respect the right as to fares and profits which it has conferred on the company, for a sufficient consideration, by a solemn and specific contract. Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504;S.C. 3 Sup.Ct.Rep. 357;State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425;Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U.S. 683, 696-698;S.C. 6 Sup.Ct.Rep. 265;Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. 342;Pease v. Whitney, 5 Mass. 380;New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104;New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650;S.C. 6 Sup.Ct.Rep. 252;Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264;Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Bish.Writ.Law, §§ 112a, 112b, 64.
The state having already conferred on the Stockbridge & Pittsfield Railroad Company certain rights as to fares and profits by the charter, cannot, by a general declaratory statute, not intended as a repeal of the charter, resume those rights, nor can it authorize the railroad commissioners to disregard them by an authority given without qualification. Raleigh & G.R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 269;Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 526;S.C. 2 Sup.Ct.Rep. 832, (see, especially, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice HARLAN;) Miller v. New York & E.R. Co., 21 Barb. 513;Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679;Boston & L.R. Corp. v....
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