Padfield v. Padfield

• Decision Date: 30 June 1879
• Citation: 92 Ill. 198,1879 WL 8502
• Parties: WILLIAM R. PADFIELDv.CATHARINE PADFIELD.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

92 Ill. 198

1879 WL 8502 (Ill.)

WILLIAM R. PADFIELD

v.CATHARINE PADFIELD.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June Term, 1879.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. WILLIAM H. SNYDER, Judge, presiding.

Mr. JEHU BAKER, for the appellant:

The facts in this case exclude complainant's claim of dower in this homestead, 160 acres, and bring the case within the principles laid down in Hugunin v. Cochrane, 51 Ill. 302, and Kurtz et al. v. Hibner et al. 55 Id. 514. In the latter case the court say: “A court of equity will always enforce a promise upon which reliance is placed, and which induces the expenditure of labor and money in the improvement of land. Such a promise rests upon a valuable consideration. The promisee acts upon the faith of the promise. We can perceive no important distinction between such a promise and a sale.”

Mr. JAMES M. DILL, also for the appellant:

“An agreement by the husband to convey before the dower attaches will, if enforced in equity, extinguish the claim to dower.” 4 Kent's Com. 50; Rawlings v. Adams, 7 Md. 26; Firestone v. Firestone, 2 Ohio St. 415; Bowie v. Berry, 3 Md. Ch. 359, are cited in support of this proposition.

In Hugunin v. Cochrane, 51 Ill. 305, our court say: “An agreement to convey, made by a husband before marriage and enforced after the marriage, defeats dower.”

Mr. CHARLES W. THOMAS, for the appellee:

The whole theory of appellant's case is, that under a contract to convey, his father gave him possession and he made improvements, and his own testimony is that the possession of the father was never surrendered, and this alone is enough to overthrow his claim. The case of Wood v. Thornly, 58 Ill. 464, has many elements in common with this case. There, this court announces the rule in regard to possession to be as follows: “The mere possession of land under a parol agreement of sale, even with the superadded fact of valuable improvements, will not be deemed part performance, if the possession was obtained otherwise than under the contract.”

To entitle a party to specific performance, proof must be clear. Hartwell v. Black, 44 Ill. 301; Allen v. Webb, 64 Id. 342; Worth v. Worth, 84 Id. 442. And the contract also must be fair. Bowman v. Cunningham, 78 Id. 48. And it must be proved as laid and not otherwise. Cronk v. Trumble, 66 Id. 428; Tieman v. Granger, 65 Id. 351. And specific performance is always within the discretion of the court. Fish v. Leser, 69 Id. 364; Gosse v. Jones, 73 Id. 508. And a claim like this was preferred and denied. Wood v. Thornly, 58 Id. 464. A minor has no claim for services where he remains at home and works without an express agreement. Griffin v. National Bank, 74 Ill. 259.

Equity does not assist executed contracts embraced by the Statute of Frauds. They are governed by the provisions of the statute. Browne on Statute of Frauds, sec. 116. After a contract is executed, it can not be canceled because the statute prevents its proof. Craig v. Van Pelt, 3 J. J. Marshall, 489. But it must be proved, as provided by the statute, and it is an absurdity to speak of enforcing an executed contract.

In Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 Ill. 514, and Fitsimmons v. Allen's Heirs, 39 Id. 440, the parties were let into possession under the contract, and there is no similarity between them and this case. The declarations of Thomas Padfield, so much relied upon by counsel for appellant, are entitled to no weight in a case like this. Worth v. Worth, 84 Id. 442. And if they were, they are offset by the declarations of appellant made to appellee and others, that he had no interest in the land, and would be put off it if appellee married his father.

A different rule obtains between relatives from that which governs transactions of strangers. Allen v. Webb, 64 Ill. 342; Wright v. Wright, 31 Mich. 380. And in a case like this a delay of 16 years is fatal. Rose v. Swan, 56 Ill. 31; Igelhardt v. Gibson, 56 Id. 91.

Mr. JUSTICE SHELDON delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a bill for dower in certain lands described in the bill, exhibited December 20, 1873, by Catharine Padfield, as the widow of Thomas Padfield, deceased, against William R. Padfield, one of his children. Complainant was married to the said Thomas Padfield January 19, 1869, he being then 77 years of age, and in April following he conveyed the lands described in the bill to the defendant, complainant refusing to join in the deed. The answer admits complainant's right of dower in one tract containing 100 acres, but denies it in two tracts, one containing 160 acres, the other 38 1/2 acres.

As to the 160 acre tract, the defence set up is substantially this: That before 1856, Thomas Padfield entered from the government a certain 140 acre tract of land in his own name, but that his son William R., the defendant, furnished half the purchase money; that Thomas set apart this tract for William R., and the latter went into possession and made improvements of the value of $2000 to $3000, the answer not alleging that the former ever agreed to convey the land to the latter, nor stating any particular contract as having been made in regard to it. That in 1856, they made this agreement: that William R. gave up to his father all his claim to the 140 acre tract, and all claim for improvements made by him thereon, and released to his father all claim for wages for labor done for the latter after becoming of age, and that the father, in consideration of all this, “sold and set apart” to William R. the said 160 acre tract as his own, subject to the condition that the latter should keep and take care of his father during his life, and that thereupon the defendant, in pursuance of said agreement, in 1856 entered into the actual possession of the 160 acre tract and has been in open possession of the same ever since, and has made permanent improvements thereon of the value of $3000 to $4000, and in all things performed his said agreement.

As to the 38 1/2 acre tract the defence set up is that it was purchased in 1860 and 1863 in two parcels by the defendant and his father, each furnishing half the purchase money; that the deeds were made to the father, and that before the marriage of the father with complainant, defendant bought his father's interest in the tract and went into possession, and has so remained to this time.

And it is further set up, that in view of the equities which defendant had in connection with said 160 and 38 1/2 acre tracts prior to the marriage of the said Thomas and the complainant, the circuit court of St. Clair county in this State, at its August term, 1869, in a suit therein pending in which defendant was complainant and said Thomas Padfield was defendant, (the bill in said suit having been dismissed as to said Catharine Padfield, who was...