Padgett v. Penland, s. 27906

• Decision Date: 21 June 1973
• Docket Number: 27909,Nos. 27906,s. 27906
• Citation: 230 Ga. 824,199 S.E.2d 210
• Parties: Jack G. PADGETT v. Charles Cooper PENLAND. Charlene P. PADGETT v. Jack Garnett PADGETT.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 210

199 S.E.2d 210

230 Ga. 824

Jack G. PADGETT v. Charles Cooper PENLAND.

Charlene P. PADGETT v. Jack Garnett PADGETT.

Nos. 27906, 27909.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 21, 1973.

Rehearing Denied July 12, 1973.

Scheer & Elsner, Robert A. Elsner, Atlanta, for Jack G. padgett.

Congdon, Williams & Daniel, Robert C. Daniel, Jr., Augusta, for Charles Cooper Penland and Charlene P. Padgett.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

JORDAN, Justice.

The present appeals are sequels to Padgett v. Padgett, 229 Ga. 623, 193 S.E.2d 815. In that appeal this court affirmed an order of DeKalb Superior Court of May 19, 1972, adjudging Charlene Cooper Penland (formerly Charlene Penland Padgett) in wilful contempt of that court. Under the terms of a divorce decree of that court in 1971 her former husband, Jack Garnett Padgett, was awarded legal custody of their minor child. In April, 1972, the child was residing with his father in New York. The mother, while exercising visitation rights, received permission from the father to bring the child to Georgia, and after bringing the child to Lincoln County refused to return him to his father.

Six days before being adjudged in contempt in DeKalb Superior Court the mother instituted an action in Lincoln Superior Court seeking to obtain legal custody of the child, alleging a change in circumstances, in substance to the effect that the child had not been receiving proper care while in the custody of his father, and that in the best interest of the child she should have legal custody. On the same day, May 13, 1972, she obtained an ex parte order in Lincoln Superior Court awarding her temporary custody pending a hearing. On July 20, 1972, the father moved to dismiss this action, pleading improper venue, improper of insufficient process, and no jurisdiction over the subject matter of person. His allegations show that he had not resided in Georgia for more than one and one-half years. He also answered the petition, subject to his motion to dismiss.

On August 1, 1972, the mother obtained personal service in Lincoln County on the father. His motion to dismiss was thereafter overruled, and after a hearing, at which both parties testified, and other evidence was adduced, the trial judge, by an order dated January 29, 1973, awarded legal custody of the child to the mother. The father appeals from this judgment in No. 27906, asserting improper venue, no jurisdiction over the subject matter or person, insufficient evidence to disclose a change in circumstances, and an abuse of discretion.

The mother, having obtained on October 25, 1972, a 90-day stay from this court of the remittitur to DeKalb Superior Court in respect to the judgment of this court in Padgett v. Padgett, 229 Ga. 623, 193 S.E.2d 815, supra, decided October 10, 1972, filed a motion on February 8, 1973, in DeKalb Superior Court to stay and vacate the order on the complaint for contempt, relying in substance on the result obtained in the proceedings in Lincoln Superior Court. On March 7, 1973, a judge of that court denied the motion and directed the Sheriff of DeKalb County to provide escort and transportation to the father to any place in Georgia to get the child, or, upon his failure to incarcerate the mother in the common jail of DeKalb County until she complied with the order of the court to deliver the child to the father. On March 9, 1973, he amended the order to provide that the sheriff find and incarcerate the mother for 20 days or until she complied with the order of the court. The mother appeals in No. 27909 from the order of March 7, 1973, asserting error on the refusal of the judge to consider the judgment of the Superior Court of Lincoln County or the welfare of the minor child. Held:

1. A nonresident is suable in any county in this state where he may be found, and the nonresident father having been found and personally served with process in the action pending in Lincoln County, where the child was residing with the mother, the objection to improper venue in Appeal No. 27906 is without merit. Code § 3-206; Miller v. Miller, 216 Ga. 535, 118 S.E.2d 85.

2. The objections in Appeal No. 27906 to jurisdiction over the subject matter and person are likewise without merit. That the superior courts of this state have jurisdiction over the subject matter of child custody proceedings based on a change in condition is not open to serious question. The father, by his presence within the state, although a nonresident, was subject to the jurisdiction of this state and its laws. Code § 15-202; Miller v. Miller, supra.

3. Venue and jurisdiction having been established in Lincoln Superior Court, the provisions of Code Ann. § 74-107 in respect to a child under age 14 were controlling, in vesting in the trial judge the duty of exercising a sound judicial discretion, taking into consideration all of the circumstances relative to any change in condition, and to determine what is for the best interest of the child, and what will best promote his welfare and happiness.

4. The evidence adduced in Lincoln Superior Court authorized the hearing judge to determine, as he did, a material change in condition substantially affecting the welfare of the child subsequent to the award to the father under the divorce decree, there being some evidence, although disputed, that the father had neglected the child, particularly in respect to encouraging acceptable hygienic standards and in providing the child with an acceptable environment. The order of the trial judge is explicit in disclosing that after considering this evidence, and after finding the existence of changed conditions, he exercised a sound judicial discretion in awarding the child to the mother.

5. No error appears in Appeal No. 27906 for any reason argued and insisted upon.

6. That the trial judge involved in Appeal No. 27906 awarded custody of the child to the mother, and that this court is now affirming that order, however, affords no legal basis for reversing the order of the judge in DeKalb Superior Court of March 7, 1973 (which on appeal we view as including the amendment of March 9, 1973) denying her motion to stay and vacate the order on contempt as previously affirmed by this court. So much of the amended order as provides for surrender of the child is now unenforceable, however, in that she is now...