Padilla Roman v. Hernandez Perez, Civil No. 04-1525 (DRD).

• Decision Date: 08 August 2005
• Docket Number: Civil No. 04-1525 (DRD).
• Citation: 381 F.Supp.2d 17
• Parties: Edgar PADILLA ROMÁN, et. als., Plaintiffs v. José M HERNÁNDEZ PÉREZ, et als., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

381 F.Supp.2d 17

Edgar PADILLA ROMÁN, et. als., Plaintiffs v. José M HERNÁNDEZ PÉREZ, et als., Defendants.

Civil No. 04-1525 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

August 8, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Fernando L. Gallardo, Woods and Woods, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Jo-Ann Estades-Boyer, Anabelle Quinones-Rodriguez, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is a civil action (Docket No. 1) brought forth by plaintiffs Edgar Padilla Roman (hereafter "Padilla") and his wife Yolanda Acevedo Pérez, together with the conjungal partnership, against defendants José M. Hernández Pérez (hereafter "Hernández") in his personal and official capacity as Chairman of the Public Service Commission (hereafter PSC), and Edgar González Moreno (hereafter González), in his personal capacity as former Administrator of the PSC, including their wives and conjungal partnerships, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 et seq.) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 et seq. including § 1983). Padilla alleges he was illegally terminated because of discrimination due to his political affiliation related to the New Progressive Party ("PNP"). There are other claims contemplated in this civil action under supplemental jurisdiction that include the Puerto Rico Civil Rights Act (1 P.R. Laws Ann. §§ 13-19), and articles 22 and 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code (31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 22, and § 5141). Plaintiffs are seeking an injunctive relief, punitive damages and compensatory damages for the loss of salaries and mental anguish caused to the plaintiffs.

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 23), without submitting to this Court's jurisdiction, alleging that the present action should be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) by virtue of plaintiffs' failure to state a claim: (a) against the appearing Defendants pursuant to § 1983; (b) under Title VII of the Civil Rights of Act of 1964, and (c) under the Puerto Rico Civil Rights Act (1 P.R. Laws Ann. §§ 13-19). Plaintiffs then filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 29) submitting that defendants' motion should be denied since the Verified Complaint fully complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure warranting a claim pursuant to § 1983 and other state causes of action.

After considering the allegations presented by both parties, this Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defendants are ordered to answer the complaint within twenty days; no extensions are to be granted.

FACTS¹

On November 7, 2003 Padilla was terminated from his position as an Executive Director I of the General Services Division at PSC, employment position within the government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (hereafter "Commonwealth"). At the time, he had a long lasting employment at the PSC of twenty nine (29) years and eight (8) months, and was barely four months away from qualifying for a pension.

Approximately about a year before the termination being challenged herein, during the month of October 2002, Hernández became the Chairman of the PSC. A month later, on November 2002, Ms. Brenda Adorno Vega (hereafter "Adorno") was hired to work at the PSC as Office Worker I. Both individuals are alleged to be members and activists of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"). Padilla was Adorno's superior officer.

As supervisor in charge, Padilla was asked to evaluate the performance of Adorno. He was to inform on Adorno's work performance to co-defendants González who was, at the time, the Administrator of the PSC. Soon after the conversation with González, Padilla was visited by two employees of the Human Resources Division of the PSC who, in turn, required him to evaluate Adorno's performance in a positive manner. Padilla refused to follow this order. Consequently, on February 4, 2003, Hernández sent a letter to Padilla stating that he observed communications problems between Adorno and Padilla and that, effective immediately, Adorno would be under González's supervision. Padilla replied, on February 10, 2003, stating that he was unaware of any communications problems between him and Adorno. Thereafter, Padilla was under continuous pressure to finish those reports previously assigned to Adorno, and was curiously subjected coetaneously to four investigations. Furthermore, González expressed to Padilla that, because Padilla was not a member of the PDP, he could not be considered for the position of Executive Director II — a regular career position — even though Padilla had been temporarily occupying the position for about a year.

Padilla complied with the reports he was required to perform, including the reports and evaluations of Adorno's performance. Once again, Padilla evaluated Adorno's performance poorly using his judgment and not following the required pre-imposed orders. When Adorno became aware of this report, she made false and fabricated allegations against Padilla, including that he had sexually harassed her and that her rejection was the real reason for the negative evaluation results. After being confronted by the Human Resources Director of the PSC, Adorno confessed that she had initiated those allegations against Padilla as a result of the fabrications and machinations requirements by González and an attorney of the PSC. Subsequently, Adorno was discharged from her employment, causing González to take action in revenge against Padilla. Given the situation, Padilla tried to obtain a meeting with Hernández to explain the obvious blatant pattern of political harassment he had been subjected to, but he was unsuccessful.

On June 2, 2003, Padilla was transferred to the Documents Administrations Area (hereafter DAA), a PSC office in the Bayamón Regional Office, allegedly because of the need of service in this area. However, he was never provided with any assignments or tasks. He was not even informed the identity of his supervisor. On this day, Padilla cleaned and evacuated his personal and professional working area. In a large garbage bag, he collected those personal items he did not need and copies of alleged then irrelevant and unusable documents which included transmittal sheets that had been previously duly processed by the PSC and other papers that had prior thereto been abandoned there by his predecessors. The garbage bag allegedly never left the PSC offices. Padilla specifically avers not having shredded any official documents.

On June 11, 2003, Padilla was called by the Internal Auditor's Office of the PSC inquiring as to the reason behind the disposal of official documents. He explained his reasons to the Head Auditor (among others, the documents had already been processed). To his surprise, he realized that prior thereto on June 2, 2003, Hernández notified him that they were considering discharging him of his employment in PSC for destruction of official documents and that he had a right to request a hearing.

Subsequently, an administrative hearing was held in September 2003 at the PSC's, central offices. The hearing examiner requested Padilla to produce the documents in question. Padilla informed them he did not have them. Several months elapsed and, on September, Padilla was called by Ms. Mayte Hernández, González's successor, to report back to the Hato Rey PSC offices to perform his regular duties as Executive Director I twice a week. Hence, Defendants working conditions became even more onerous by having to work three days a week in Bayamón and two days a week in Hato Rey.

Finally, on November 7, 2003 Padilla was called into Hernández's office and was handed a letter of discharge. The letter was dated October 17, 2003, but was handed to Padilla on November 7, 2003, constituting a blatant potential example of an attempt to defeat procedural rights of the plaintiff to a pre-determination hearing and other potential procedural and substantive rights. The letter of discharge explains that Padilla had breached paragraphs 25, 27 and 28 of the Corrective Measures' Manual by having destroyed documents.

On June 2, 2004, Padilla filed the instant Complaint against Hernández and González alleging that he was illegally terminated from his employment because of political discrimination and under the pretextual disguise of destruction of public documents.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD R. 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may, in response to an initial pleading, file a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. It is well-settled, however, that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir.1991). The Court must accept as true "all well-pleaded factual averments and indulg[e] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d at 3 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted); see also Berríos v. Bristol Myers Squibb Caribbean Corp., 51 F.Supp.2d 61 (D.Puerto Rico 1999). A complaint must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Romero-Barceló v. Hernández-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 28 n. 2 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988)).

Therefore, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513 (1st Cir.1988). In sum, a claim shall be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it...