Rivera-Quiñones v. Departamet of Educ. of Puerto Rico
| Decision Date | 11 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 16-2171 (BJM) |
| Parties | WIDALLYS RIVERA-QUIÑONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DEPARTAMET OF EDUCATION OF PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Widallys Rivera-Quiñones ("Rivera"), personally and on behalf of her minor child A.V.R. ("plaintiffs"), sued the Department of Education of Puerto Rico ("DOE") for injunctive relief, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, and the Puerto Rico Civil Rights Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 13. Docket No. 2 ("Compl."). The parties have resolved the IDEA claims by stipulation. Docket No. 38. The DOE moved to dismiss the ADA and Puerto Rico Civil Rights act claims for failure to cause of action and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Docket No. 15, and plaintiffs opposed. Docket No. 20. The case is before me on consent of the parties. Docket No. 37. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "[T]he party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving its existence." Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995)). Where the movant challenges the plaintiff's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction solely on the pleadings, the court takes the complaint's jurisdictionally significant facts as true and assesses "whether the plaintiff has propounded an adequate basis for subject-matter jurisdiction." Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362 (1st Cir. 2001).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is inappropriate if the complaint provides "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fornuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "A short and plain statement needs only enough detail to provide a defendant with 'fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Id. at 12 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This requires that the complaint contain sufficient facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In this case, the DOE alleges that the complaint fails to state a claim under Titles II and III of the ADA, so this motion will be evaluated under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than 12(b)(1). See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974); see also Primax Recoveries v. Gunter, 433 F.3d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 2006) ().
A.V.R. is a minor with disabilities who is registered with the DOE. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 35. She has been diagnosed with spina bifida, hydrocephalus, and cerebral palsy. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 34. As a result of her conditions, she is very limited or "unable to engage in the major life activity of walking and requires a wheelchair to move." Id.A.V.R. is a student at the Mariano Feliu Balseiro School ("MFBS"). Id. at ¶ 2. As part of A.V.R.'s education, she takes classes in an independent living classroom and an industrial classroom. Id. at ¶ 38. Rivera has filed several administrative and judicial complaints claiming that the DOE has failed to provide A.V.R. with access to the facilities and equipment at MFBS. Id. at ¶ 15.
Specifically, Rivera alleges that MFBS has violated the ADA because: (1) the parking spaces are insufficiently accessible; (2) the parking spaces are not adequately reserved for people with disabilities; (3) the parking spaces "do not have an accessible aisle of proper width"; (4) the parking spaces designated for disabled people are not located "on the shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent parking to an accessible entrance"; (5) the ramps in the property do not comply with the slope requirements; (6) the accessible path provided is not near the designated parking spaces and is cracked, unusable, and unleveled; (7) there is no accessible path of travel to the basketball court of MFBS; (8) the facility floors are "non-compliant floor and ground surfaces"; (9) the main classroom is not wheelchair accessible; (10) the restrooms are non-complaint; (11) the personnel are not "properly trained in emergency evacuation" for students with disabilities; and (12) the library personnel are not properly trained in "special assistance" for the public and students with disabilities. Id. ¶ 7. Additionally, Rivera argues that A.V.R. has also been discriminated under the Puerto Rico Civil Rights Act due to these failures to comply with ADA requirements.
The complaint alleges that the DOE violated Titles II and III of the ADA, as well as the Puerto Rico Civil Rights Act. The DOE has moved to dismiss all of these claims.
Rivera contends the DOE violated Title II of the ADA by discriminating against A.V.R. based on her disability. Plaintiffs allege MFBS has "architectural barriers that impede [A.V.R.] from having full and equal access to [the] facility and services [MFBS] provides." Docket No. 20. Rivera argues that A.V.R. is a qualified individual with a disability by alleging that A.V.R. has been diagnosed with spina bifia, hydrocephalia, and cerebral palsy, which confines her to a wheelchair and limits her movement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1231. She also alleges that the DOE falls under the public entity definition of the ADA. Id. The DOE does not contest that it is a public entity under the ADA or that A.V.R. is a qualified individual. The DOE argues, however, that the complaint lacks an allegation of A.V.R. being discriminated "by reason of" her disability when seeking MFBS's services.
"To state a claim for a violation of Title II, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of his disability." Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2006). Title II imposes an affirmative obligation on public entities to make their programs accessible to qualified individuals with disabilities. See Parker v. Univ. of P.R., 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.150).
Rivera alleges there are various structural and personnel deficiencies at MFBS that have caused A.V.R. to struggle when moving around the school. For example, the complaint states that A.V.R.'s main classroom is not wheelchair accessible. Id. ¶ 7. The First Circuit has noted when addressing the accessibility of an existing facility that ADA regulations "give high priority to mobility for persons in wheelchairs." Parker, 225 F.3d at 6.
In Parker, plaintiff was attending a social event at the University of Puerto Rico's Botanical Garden and found it very difficult to gain access to the Monet Garden due to the university's failure to have an accessible path for disabled people in a wheelchair. Id. at 6. The First Circuit held that, because the garden served as a venue for group events, the university had a duty to make the garden "readily accessible" to and "usable" by individuals with disabilities. Id. at 6. Additionally, the court stated that the university had to provide "at least one route that a person in a wheelchair [could] use to reach the" garden, absent a defense that excused the deficiency. Id. at 7. As a result, the court concluded it was self-evident that Parker's inability to utilize his wheelchair was discrimination "by reason of" his disability. Id.
As in Parker, A.V.R.'s main classroom serves as a venue for daily group events of academic learning. Thus, because it is alleged that A.V.R.'s classroom is not wheelchair accessible, the complaint alleges a plausible ADA claim. . See Marradi v. K&W Realty Inv. LLC., No. CV 16-10038-LTS, 2016 WL 5024198, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 15, 2016) (). Rivera's complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a Title II claim and therefore the DOE's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is denied.
Rivera also alleges the DOE violated Title III of the ADA by discriminating against A.V.R. She alleges MFBS has "architectural barriers that impede [A.V.R.] from having full and equal access to [the] facility and services [MFBS] provides." Docket No. 20. The DOE argues that Rivera fails to state a claim under this title because the DOE is not a private entity as defined by the ADA.
Title III of the ADA "prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in public accommodations operated by private entities." Sanchez v. ACAA, 247 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D.P.R. 2003). This claim has four elements: (1) that the plaintiff has a disability as defined under the ADA; (2) that the defendant's office is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; (3) that the plaintiff requested a reasonable modification of defendant's policies or procedures to allow him access to the public...
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