Padilla v. Carrier Air Conditioning
| Decision Date | 12 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 6:97cv998.,6:97cv998. |
| Citation | 67 F.Supp.2d 650 |
| Parties | Rosie M. PADILLA, Plaintiff, v. CARRIER AIR CONDITIONING, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Sten Marti Langsjoen, Attorney at Law, Tyler, TX, Carl Henry Franklin, Law Office of Carl Henry, Frankliin, Shreveport, LA, Rosie M Padilla, plaintiff.
Caryn Lisa Carson, Sheinfeld Maley & Kay, Dallas, TX, United Technologies, of Carrier, defendant.
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On this day came on to be considered Defendant Carrier Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief (Docket No. 29). After careful consideration, the Court is of the opinion that the following order should issue.
The plaintiff employee alleges, inter alia, racial discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and defamation against the defendant company. The defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims.
The plaintiff, Rosie M. Padilla ("Padilla"), is a black female domiciled in Tyler, Texas, and is employed by the defendant company.1
The defendant, Carrier Air Conditioning ("Carrier"), is a private business organization under the laws of Texas and domiciled in Tyler, Texas.2
Padilla began working for Carrier on June 27, 1989, as a warehouse shipper.3 Padilla's supervisor was Burlie Fuller ("Fuller").4
On or about June 27, 1997, Padilla hurt her back when unloading and lifting units in the warehouse. She immediately sought emergency medical treatment at a local hospital and the opinion of her primary care physician on the following day.5
Padilla did not return to work at Carrier until August 5, 1997. Due to the on-the-job injury, she filed for worker's compensation.6
Upon returning to work, the plaintiff claims that she was assigned by Fuller to unload heavy units without assistance. Because the heavy lifting was further aggravating her back injury, Padilla filed a harassment complaint against Fuller.7
Padilla further alleges that, subsequent to her harassment complaint, Fuller retaliated by scrutinizing her work and assigning her to "receive in the warehouse."8
Padilla alleges that, due to the heavy lifting, she injured her back a second time, and was assigned to light duty at the main plant, where she remained from October 27, 1997, to October 29, 1997.9 Padilla complains that, in addition to not receiving pay since January 1998, she was demoted and rendered unable to receive incentives, overtime pay, and holiday pay. She also contends that Carrier did not pay her medical expenses.10
Padilla then asserts that, on October 30, 1997, she returned to her regular job duties, including heavy lifting. Consequently, her back began hurting again, and she did not report to work on October 31, 1997, instead seeking emergency medical treatment.11
When she returned to work, Padilla "began to hear rumors that alleged sexual activities involving [herself] and male employees at Carrier and a male employee of a trucking company who made deliveries at Carrier."12 The delivery man alluded to in the First Amended Complaint was Dale Ward of U.S. Xpress.13 Allegedly, Fuller told Ward that Padilla "sleeps around," comparing her to an "old dog," and suggesting that he ask "any of the guys" at the main plant about her.14
Padilla alleges that her complaint to the Human Resources department about these "slanderous remarks" was ignored or neglected.15
The First Amended Complaint goes on to state that Padilla:
[B]egan feeling that she was working in a hostile work environment because other employees began to withdraw and not associate with her. One employee threatened plaintiff, telling plaintiff that he had a gun in his truck that would take care of her.16
These events allegedly caused the plaintiff to seek the help of a psychiatrist.17
Therefore, on November 10, 1997, the plaintiff filed the instant cause of action, seeking damages, costs, and attorney's fees for her claims, including hostile work environment, discrimination, and emotional distress.18
On August 18, 1998, Padilla's attorney, Carl Henry Franklin, sought leave to withdraw as counsel (Docket No. 20). The Court granted his request on September 1, 1998 (Docket No. 21).
On September 4, 1998, Sten M. Langsjoen entered his notice of appearance as Padilla's attorney (Docket No. 23).
On November 20, 1998, Carrier filed the instant motion for summary judgment, which is now ripe for consideration.
Carrier Air Conditioning, the defendant in this case, has moved for summary judgment. A party is entitled to summary judgment on all or any part of a claim "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."19 The moving party must show initially that there is no genuine issue of any material fact.20 The movant may meet this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence supporting any essential element of the non-moving party's claim.21
In deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the Court "review[s] the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."22 An issue is "genuine" only if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.23
The opposing party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of artful pleading, but must set forth affirmative facts that show a genuine issue for trial.24 This requires that the non-moving party make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial.25
For the reasons set out below, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and summary judgment is therefore proper in this case.
In relation to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court will analyze the following claims of the plaintiff:
(A) Race Discrimination;
(B) Hostile Work Environment;
(C) Retaliation;
(D) Negligent Supervision;
(E) Slander; and
(F) Worker's Compensation Retaliation.
The Court will discuss each of these issues individually in the order listed above.
The plaintiff's complaint implicitly alleges discrimination by Carrier based on her race. The plaintiff's complaint does not support such an allegation, and the Court finds that summary judgment on this claim should be granted.
Title VII proscribes an employer discriminating against a member of a protected class, providing that: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."26 The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.27 Establishment of a prima facie case raises a presumption of discrimination, which the defendant may rebut by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.28 If the defendant is able to surmount this presumption of discrimination with a legitimate reason, the burden returns to the plaintiff, who must then show that the proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination.29 The plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the whole case.30
The plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII by proving that she is a member of a protected class and that she suffered an adverse employment decision.31 The plaintiff must show that she was treated differently from similarly situated individuals and that there was a causal connection between her race and the adverse employment decision.32 The defendant correctly points out that the failure to raise a fact question as to whether she suffered an adverse employment decision is dispositive as to the plaintiff's claim.33 Therefore, the Court will now turn its attention to whether or not the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that only "ultimate employment decisions" can constitute adverse employment actions for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case under Title VII.34 Ultimate employment decisions include acts such as hiring, promoting, compensating, and firing.35 The Fifth Circuit has held that "Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect on those ultimate decisions."36 The Court has also consistently held that hostility from other employees, and the resulting anxiety, does not constitute an ultimate employment decision.37 In fact, one recent Fifth Circuit case, Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Company, held that the following actions did not constitute an adverse employment action:
(1) An alleged visit by supervisors to the employee's home;
(2) A verbal threat of termination;
(3) A reprimand for not being at an assigned station; and
(4) Placement of the plaintiff on "final warning."38
Clearly, not every negative experience on the job can give rise to a Title VII claim.
With this standard in mind, Carrier contends that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she did not suffer an adverse employment action and there is no evidence suggesting that she was treated differently from a similarly situated employee.39 In support of its position, the defendant company argues that the allegation in the plaintiff's complaint of a "demotion" to a lower pay grade was false. The defendant contends that such an adverse action would be "categorically impossible" under the relevant collective bargaining agreement. Of course, the mere fact that such action is prohibited by the labor...
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