Padilla v. Lovern's, Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-15,94-15 |
| Citation | 883 P.2d 351 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Daniel R. PADILLA, Appellant (Employee-Claimant), v. LOVERN'S, INC., Appellee (Employer-Defendant). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
John M. Walker of Hickey and Evans, Cheyenne, for appellant.
Lee E. Christian of Lee E. Christian, P.C., Fort Collins, CO, for appellee.
Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.
Appellant Daniel R. Padilla appeals from the district court's order which affirmed the hearing examiner's denial of benefits for Padilla's back injury.
We affirm.
Padilla presents two issues:
A. The worker's compensation benefits awarded to Mr. Padilla were subject to the doctrine of finality and as such should not have been revoked by the office of administrative hearings.
B. The worker's compensation benefits awarded to Mr. Padilla should not have been revoked by the office of administrative hearings as there was no medical testimony supporting employer's position.
Padilla worked as a house painter for Appellee Lovern's, Inc. While he was at work on April 29, 1992, painting the trim on a house, Padilla fell from a ladder and injured his left foot. None of his co-workers witnessed the accident. Padilla's employer took him to the emergency room at a local hospital where his foot was X-rayed and he was diagnosed as having a "[c]ontusion of the foot." The emergency room report stated that Padilla's "[b]ack [was] nontender."
Padilla went to see Richard Torkelson, M.D., an orthopaedic surgeon, on May 5, 1992, complaining of foot pain. Dr. Torkelson examined Padilla and directed him not to return to work. On May 18, 1992, Dr. Torkelson released Padilla for work, and Padilla reported to work the next day. When Padilla arrived at work, his employer confronted him and told him that, during his absence from work, one of his co-workers had seen him loading cement blocks and bags of cement into his father's truck. After the confrontation, Padilla quit his job.
On May 21, 1992, Padilla filed an employee's report of the injury which indicated that he had injured his left leg while he was working for Lovern's. On that same day, he returned to see Dr. Torkelson and reported that he had tenderness in his sciatic notch area. Dr. Torkelson referred Padilla to Stephen Martin, M.D., a physician and surgeon who limited his practice to neurological surgery. Dr. Martin diagnosed Padilla as probably having a "herniated lumbar disk" in his lower back. On July 15, 1992, Dr. Martin performed surgery on Padilla's back and removed the disk.
Padilla did not file an amendment to his employee's report of the injury to indicate that he had received a back injury. See WYO.STAT. § 27-14-504 (1991). The Workers' Compensation Division began making medical payments on May 28, 1992, to Padilla's doctors. On June 2, 1992, Padilla completed an application for temporary total disability benefits which referred only to his "injury" and did not specifically refer to a back injury. On the same day, the Workers' Compensation Division sent a consent and waiver notice form to Lovern's which referred only to "the April 29 ... injury ... of your employee." Lovern's sent a letter dated June 15, 1992, to the Workers' Compensation Division which indicated that Lovern's disapproved of disability payments being paid to Padilla. In the letter, Lovern's referred only to Padilla's foot injury.
The Workers' Compensation Division issued an initial review dated June 30, 1992, which did not mention Padilla's back injury, and a determination of the disputed claim dated July 30, 1992, which concluded that Padilla was entitled to receive benefits. The determination of the disputed claim referred only to Padilla's "injury."
Lovern's did not learn until August or September of 1992 that Padilla had received a back injury. On September 14, 1992, the Workers' Compensation Division sent a notice of claims reimbursement to Lovern's. The notice informed Lovern's that it would be billed for all payments which had been made to Padilla because Lovern's did not have an active worker's compensation account on the date that Padilla was injured. In a letter to the Workers' Compensation Division dated September 23, 1992, Lovern's requested a hearing on the compensability of Padilla's injuries because, in part, "based upon the review of the file available at this time, the employer ... challenges any subsequent medical treatment in so far as the medical problems appear to be unrelated to the minor injury initially claimed."
Lovern's petitioned for a hearing on the determination of the disputed claim or, in the alternative, to reopen the case for fraud pursuant to WYO.STAT. § 27-14-605(a) (1991). 1 The Office of Administrative Hearings held a hearing in March 1993 and, after the hearing, issued an order which denied benefits for Padilla's back injury. In the decision letter attached to the order, the hearing examiner stated:
Critical to this Office's decision herein is the distinction which needs to be drawn between [Padilla's] left leg injury and the alleged back injury. As will be more fully ....
addressed later, this Office concludes that finality attached to claims and awards made on account of the left leg injury, but not to claims and awards made on account of the alleged back injury. Thus, [Padilla] maintains the burden of proving that his alleged back injury arose out of his April 29, 1992, work-related accident.... This Office concludes that Padilla has failed to meet this burden.
... [F]inality has never attached to any of the claims and awards made in connection with Padilla's alleged low back injury as sufficient and proper notice was not provided Lovern's. It was not until sometime in August, 1992, that Lovern's first received any notice of an alleged back injury--notice provided long after Padilla first sought back treatment and filed an accident report on May 21, 1992, and weeks after Padilla underwent back surgery on July 15, 1992....
Under the totality of the evidence presented, this Office is not persuaded that Padilla's back condition arose out of his April 29, 1992, accident with Lovern's. In addition to the numerous inconsistencies in his actions following April 29, 1992, Padilla lacks any credibility in testifying before this Office. This Office observed Padilla continually recant various assertions made under oath only when upon cross-examination he was confronted with certain evidence. In essence, Padilla appears to be an individual either not capable of or unwilling to testify truthfully.
....
The medical testimony herein is based upon a questionable history and as such is not persuasive. Accordingly, when viewed together with the remaining evidence, this Office concludes that Padilla has failed to meet his burden of proving that his alleged back injury arose out of his April 29, 1992, accident with Lovern's. For these reasons, Padilla's claims relating to the alleged back injury must fail.
(Citations omitted.)
Padilla filed a petition for judicial review in the district court, and the district court affirmed the hearing examiner's decision. Padilla appealed to this Court.
Padilla contends that Lovern's should not have been allowed to have a hearing on the case because Lovern's failed to object in a timely manner to the Workers' Compensation Division's determination of the disputed claim. Lovern's argues that it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard and, therefore, the Workers' Compensation Division's determination was not final and that, since finality had not attached to the Workers' Compensation Division's award for Padilla's back injury, the hearing examiner did not err by conducting a hearing. Lovern's asserts in the alternative that, if finality did attach, the hearing examiner should have reopened the case on the basis that Padilla's back injury claim was fraudulent.
WYO.STAT. § 27-14-606 (1991) states:
Each determination or award within the meaning of [the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act] is an administrative determination of the rights of the employer, the employee and the disposition of money within the worker's compensation account as to all matters involved. No determination shall be final without notice and opportunity for hearing as required by this act.
(Emphasis added.)
In construing a statute, we must determine whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. "[A] statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo.1991). "[A] statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." 813 P.2d at 219-20. "[W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined by the court." 813 P.2d at 220. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Murray v. STATE EX REL. WORKERS'SAFETY AND COMP. DIV.
...834 P.2d 688, 693 (Wyo.1992); see also Jackson v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 886 P.2d 601, 603, 604 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Padilla v. Lovern's, Inc., 883 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo.1994)). The medical experts in this case agreed that something happened while Murray was at work that triggered the urticaria,......
-
Corman, Matter of
...of a preexisting condition. Substantial Evidence Whether an injury occurred in the course of employment is a question of fact. Padilla, 883 P.2d at 354. The standard of review for agency findings of fact is quite different from the standard of review for agency conclusions of law. Aanenson,......
-
Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.
...have held that the finder of fact is in the best position to judge the weight to be given to the medical evidence. Padilla v. Lovern's, Inc., 883 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo.1994). Even though there may have been a conflict in the testimony between Dr. Goldstein, the toxicologist, and Dr. Young, the......
-
In re Helm
...Shassetz v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 920 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Wyo.1996) (quoting Padilla v. Lovern's, Inc., 883 P.2d 351, 354 (Wyo. 1994)). Even though Helm asserts that the burden shifted to the Division after she made a prima facie case, the burden of proof......