Padon v. State
| Decision Date | 31 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-17-00695-CR,03-17-00695-CR |
| Parties | Sarah Christine Padon, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY
NO. CR2016-582, THE HONORABLE JACK H. ROBISON, JUDGE PRESIDING
A jury convicted appellant Sarah Christine Padon of manslaughter, see Tex. Penal Code § 19.04, and assessed her punishment at confinement for twenty years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $10,000, see id. § 12.33. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contends that the trial court erred in denying her requested jury-charge instruction, complains that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and asserts that the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
BACKGROUND
The jury heard evidence that shortly after 9:00 p.m. on June 17, 2012, Heidi Frericks was riding as a passenger in her Buick with her friend, April Hand, who was driving, and her five-year-old son, Conner, who was riding in the backseat. The group was travelling on FM 2673, a two-lane roadway (that had one lane in each direction) with no divider between the lanes and a small shoulder adjacent to each lane. As the car went around a curve, it was struck head-on by appellant's Ford Explorer. Hand was killed instantly; Frericks and her son were both seriously injured.
At trial, Frericks recounted what she could recall about the collision. She explained that, before the impact, she had turned briefly to look at her son and then turned back to the front and "everything was just black." She did not see what hit them and did not see lights approaching before they were hit. Frericks described Hand as a "very cautious driver" and indicated that she did not see any reaction from Hand before the impact. Regarding the driving conditions, Frericks testified that it was "between middle of dusk to dark" and expressed her opinion that it was dark enough that a person's headlights should have been on. She said that she knew for a fact that her car's headlights were on. Frericks also described the injuries that she and her son sustained in the collision.
Lawrence Escamilla, a trooper with the Department of Public Safety, responded to the 911 dispatch for the collision. When he arrived at the location, he found the two vehicles in the roadway, more in the North lane. He opened the driver's door on the Explorer and found appellant, crying and screaming, with her legs pinned by the dashboard. Trooper Escamilla detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage and noticed that the switch for the Explorer's headlights was in the off position. The trooper testified that appellant told him that "all [she] saw was a big boom." When emergency medical services personnel arrived to assist appellant, Trooper Escamilla went to the Buick. He immediately recognized that the driver was deceased. He heard the young boy screaming and saw that the driver's seat was crushing the child's legs, so he informed the paramedics that the boy was stuck. The trooper tried to get information aboutwhat had happened from the passenger, later identified as Frericks, who was injured such that she was in and out of consciousness.
After the injured parties were removed from the scene to be transported to the hospital, Trooper Escamilla, who had extensive experience and training in accident investigation, investigated the crash. He discovered that there were no road marks or "gouge marks" on the South side of the road (the lane appellant was driving in) but there were gouge marks on the North lane (the lane the Buick was in). The trooper explained that gouge marks, from debris indenting the roadway, indicate the area of impact in a collision. He concluded that the area of impact was on the North side of the road, in the victim's lane of travel. Trooper Escamilla also testified that there was no indication that appellant braked at all before the collision—explaining that there were no skid marks on the road "so there was no breaking whatsoever." Ultimately, the trooper concluded that appellant caused the collision because she was driving on the wrong side of the road—she was "pretty far off" "on the wrong side of the roadway"—without her headlights on. His testimony indicated that he also thought that alcohol consumption might have been a factor.
During his investigation, the trooper inventoried the vehicles. He found an open container of alcohol in appellant's Explorer—a twelve-ounce can of beer that was a quarter full. Trooper Escamilla described the location of the collision as a "pitch black" blind curve and testified that it was "dangerous" to drive in that particular area without headlights on and "unsafe" to travel at that time without headlights on.1 He also expressed his opinion that it ismore difficult to maintain control of a vehicle, stay in the lane of travel, and operate a car around a curve when consuming alcohol. During the trooper's testimony, State's Exhibit #10, a page from appellant's medical records, was admitted. The exhibit reflected that the attending physician who treated appellant consulted a licensed chemical dependency counselor "due to [appellant's] intoxication."
Several days after the collision, Trooper Escamilla interviewed appellant at the hospital. Appellant told him that she had been floating all day on the river, since about 12:30 p.m., and had been drinking. She also said that she met a man and went to a nearby bar and grill to eat and drink some more. Appellant explained to the trooper that, afterward, she was tired and did not want to drive all the way home so she was going to follow the man to San Antonio.2 She indicated that she did not know how much she had been drinking.
As part of the investigation at the scene, Trooper Escamilla took photographs of the crash scene, which were admitted into evidence during his testimony. He also collected the light bulbs from the rear taillights of both vehicles at the scene. At trial, a senior master auto technician described how the three-bulb system in the taillights of a Ford Explorer operated. He explained that the top and bottom bulbs were single-filament lamps. The top one is for the turn signal; the bottom one is for the reverse lights. The middle bulb has two filaments. One filamentis powered by the park lights or headlights; the other filament is powered by the brake lights. The technician clarified that when the headlights of the Explorer are turned on, only the smaller thinner filament of the middle bulb is illuminated. When the brake pedal is depressed, only the larger heavier filament of the middle bulb is illuminated.
In addition, a trace evidence analyst, who had special training in lamp-filament analysis, testified about her analysis of the bulbs from appellant's Explorer. Based on her analysis of both the chemical reactions and physical interactions of the bulbs, she concluded that the dual-filament lamp from appellant's left taillight was off when the filaments in the bulb were broken. The expert was unable to make a determination of whether the dual-filament lamp from the Explorer's right taillight was off or on.3
The State called six witnesses at trial: the communication supervisor for the sheriff's office, who provided the recordings of the 911 calls that night; Frericks, who testified about what she recalled of the collision; Trooper Escamilla, who testified about responding to the collision, his investigation of the collision, and his interview with appellant; a forensic pathologist, who testified about conducting Hand's autopsy and the findings concerning Hand's injuries and cause of death; the senior master auto technician, who testified about the three-bulb taillight system of a Ford Explorer; and the trace evidence analyst, who testified about the lamp-filament analysis she conducted. Appellant called no witnesses. After extensivedeliberations and a supplemental jury charge from the court,4 the jury found appellant guilty of manslaughter as charged in the indictment.
During the punishment phase, the State presented evidence of appellant's prior DWI conviction and evidence that, on several occasions, appellant violated her bond condition prohibiting the consumption of alcohol. In closing argument, appellant sought community supervision; the State asked for the maximum sentence of twenty years. The jury returned an affirmative finding that appellant used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, assessed appellant's punishment at the maximum sentence of twenty years, and, in addition, assessed the maximum fine of $10,000.
Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial, asserting that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence, which was overruled by operation of law.5 This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant raises four points of error. First, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. Second, she complains about jury-charge error. Third, sheargues that if trial counsel's actions preclude appellate review of the complaint asserting jury-charge error, counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Lastly, appellant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted an excerpt from her hospital records.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Due process requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979); Lang v. State, 561 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Musacchio v. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial