Padot v. Padot, No. 2D03-1011

Decision Date15 December 2004
Docket Number No. 2D03-3843., No. 2D03-1011
Citation891 So.2d 1079
PartiesKevin Y. PADOT, Appellant, v. Brenda G. PADOT, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Karol K. Williams of Karol K. Williams, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Jane H. Grossman of Law Office of Jane H. Grossman, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

SILBERMAN, Judge.

In this consolidated appeal, Kevin Padot (the Former Husband) challenges orders arising from postdissolution enforcement proceedings regarding his military retirement pay and a military survivor benefit plan. In case number 2D03-1011, we affirm the "Order re Military Retirement" of November 12, 2002, except to the extent that it provides for an income deduction order, and we vacate the clarification order of February 19, 2003. In case number 2D02-3843, we reverse that portion of the Order on Motion for Rehearing of July 24, 2003, that required the Former Husband to cooperate with Brenda Padot (the Former Wife) to obtain and share the cost of a replacement survivor benefit plan.

BACKGROUND

The parties were married in 1980, and a final judgment of dissolution was entered on February 1, 1995. In the judgment, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine, among other things, issues of equitable distribution and alimony. On March 17, 1995, the trial court entered a Supplemental Order resolving the remaining issues. The Supplemental Order indicates that the parties agreed the Former Wife "shall be entitled to direct payment of a percentage of the [Former Husband's] military retirement or retainer pay" and that the parties agreed on a formula to determine that percentage. The percentage was subsequently computed to be 33.96%. The Supplemental Order also provided, "Neither party shall take any action which shall alter or otherwise reduce the interest of the other party in the retainer pay, retired pay, deferred compensation, or other military benefit."

The Former Husband retired from active military duty on May 1, 2000, and he received his first military retirement pay in June of 2000. As part of the retirement process, he applied for and was awarded veterans' disability payments, with the Veterans' Administration (VA) determining that he was 30% disabled. Under federal law, before the Former Husband could receive the disability benefits, he was required to waive an equal amount of his military retirement pay. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 583, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989). A waiver of retirement pay for disability benefits is common because disability benefits are nontaxable. Id. at 583-84, 109 S.Ct. 2023. The Former Husband's waiver went through in December of 2000. In April of 2001, the Former Husband became employed by the federal government in a civilian capacity as an air traffic controller, a position he had held while in the military.

FORMER HUSBAND'S WAIVER OF MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS

In July 2002, the Former Wife filed a Motion to Enforce Final Judgment/Supplemental Order. She contended that the Former Husband's waiver of a portion of his military retirement pay in exchange for disability benefits operated to reduce her share of the military retirement pay, in violation of her rights under prior court orders. Additionally, she claimed that the Former Husband improperly sought to reduce a military survivor benefit plan and that the Former Husband should be required to maintain that plan for the benefit of the parties' minor child.

In the Order re Military Retirement entered on November 12, 2002, the trial court determined that the Former Husband's voluntary election to reduce his retirement pay in exchange for disability benefits worked to his benefit, at the expense of the Former Wife. The trial court concluded that the impact of the election violated the provision contained in the 1995 Supplemental Order that prohibited the parties from taking any action to alter or reduce the other party's interest in retainer pay, retired pay, deferred compensation, or other military benefit. The trial court found that the situation was inequitable and that, under Abernethy v. Fishkin, 699 So.2d 235 (Fla.1997), it had the ability to enforce the Supplemental Order "so long as no funds from the disability pool are drawn upon to fulfill the obligations" the Former Husband owed to the Former Wife. Because the Former Husband had income from his work as an air traffic controller, the trial court concluded that the Former Husband would be required to make payments to the Former Wife to fulfill the obligations of the Supplemental Order. The court ordered that payments due to the Former Wife "be computed by applying the percentage of 33.96% to the amount that the former spouse's military retirement would have been absent his voluntary reduction of those retirement dollars in favor of disability payments."

The Former Husband, relying on Mansell, contends that principles of federal preemption prohibit the result ordered by the trial court. As noted in Mansell, at the time of the divorce Major Mansell was already retired and receiving Air Force retirement pay and disability benefits. He obtained the disability benefits by waiving a portion of his retirement pay. The parties' property settlement agreement provided that "Major Mansell would pay Mrs. Mansell 50 percent of his total military retirement pay, including that portion of retirement pay waived so that Major Mansell could receive disability benefits." 490 U.S. at 586, 109 S.Ct. 2023. The state divorce court had ordered Major Mansell to pay a portion of his disability benefits directly to Mrs. Mansell, in accordance with the agreement.

The Supreme Court noted that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, provides that "disposable retired or retainer pay" is property subject to division by state courts in divorce proceedings. Id. at 584, 109 S.Ct. 2023.1 The Court explained:

"`Disposable retired or retainer pay'" is defined as "the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a military member is entitled," minus certain deductions. § 1408(a)(4) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). Among the amounts required to be deducted from total pay are any amounts waived in order to receive disability benefits. § 1408(a)(4)(B).

Id. at 584-85, 109 S.Ct. 2023. The Supreme Court held "that the Former Spouses' Protection Act does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits." Id. at 594-95, 109 S.Ct. 2023.

The situation in Mansell, however, is materially distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case. Here, the Former Husband was still in the military at the time of the divorce, and the parties agreed to a formula to determine the percentage of the Former Husband's "military retirement or retainer pay" to which the Former Wife was entitled. The divorce court ordered that neither party shall take any action to reduce the other party's interest in the retainer or retired pay, and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Former Wife's rights to her share of the benefits. The court denied "[a]ll requests for periodic and/or rehabilitative alimony" in this fifteen-year marriage.

At the time of the enforcement proceedings, in addition to receiving retainer pay and tax-free disability income, the Former Husband was employed as a civilian air traffic controller. The trial court noted that the disability pay is shielded from the Former Wife, but the court found that the Former Husband's civilian pay was a source of income that would enable him to comply with the 1995 Supplemental Order. The Order re Military Retirement specifically states, "Nothing in this Order should be read to require the former husband to pay any portion of his disability retirement income from his active military duty time over to the former wife." Rather, the order contemplates payment from a portion of the remaining military retirement benefits and the Former Husband's current civilian income as an air traffic controller. Thus, the trial court's order is distinguishable from the divorce court's order in Mansell.

The Former Husband also contends that under Mansell and 10 U.S.C. § 1408, the Florida Supreme Court wrongly decided Abernethy. In Abernethy, the parties had entered into a marital settlement agreement while the former husband, Richard Abernethy, was still on active duty. Their agreement provided that Monica Fishkin, the former wife, would receive 25% of Abernethy's military retirement pay. The final judgment of dissolution

entitled Fishkin to monthly payments comprised of twenty-five percent of Abernethy's "net disposable retired or retainer pay." The final judgment also prohibited Abernethy from pursuing any course of action which would defeat Fishkin's right to receive her allotted portion of Abernethy's "full net disposable retired or retainer pay" and required Abernethy to indemnify Fishkin for any breach in this regard.

Abernethy, 699 So.2d at 237 (footnotes omitted). Months later, Abernethy left the Air Force and began receiving military separation benefits. After an enforcement proceeding, he was ordered to pay Fishkin 25% of the separation benefits. Subsequently, Abernethy waived portions of his separation benefits in order to receive veterans' disability benefits. A second enforcement proceeding ensued.

The supreme court in Abernethy determined that federal law preempted the division of veterans' disability benefits either by court order or settlement agreement. Id. at 239. However, the court determined that Fishkin was "entitled to receive payments equal to the amount she was receiving before Abernethy elected veterans' disability benefits." Id. The court reasoned that, unlike in Mansell, there was no express provision for the division of disability benefits in the final judgment or settlement agreement. Also, an indemnification...

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    • Missouri Court of Appeals
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    ... ... Williams, 37 So.3d 1196, 120002 (Miss.App.2009) (similar); Padot v. Padot, 891 So.2d 1079, 1085 (Fla.App.2004) (similar), with Buchanan v. Buchanan, 150 ... ...
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    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Florida Family Law and Practice - Volume 1
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