Padula v. State

• Decision Date: 29 November 1979
• Docket Number: No. 54694,No. 56914,54694,56914
• Citation: 48 N.Y.2d 366,422 N.Y.S.2d 943,398 N.E.2d 548
• Parties: , 398 N.E.2d 548 Clara PADULA, as Administratrix of the Estate of Frank Padula, Deceased, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. Paul MODAFFERI, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent. . Claim Claim
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 943

422 N.Y.S.2d 943

48 N.Y.2d 366, 398 N.E.2d 548

Clara PADULA, as Administratrix of the Estate of Frank

Padula, Deceased, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Paul MODAFFERI, Appellant, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Claim No. 54694.

Claim No. 56914.

Nov. 29, 1979.

Charles A. Schiano, Rochester, for Clara Padula, appellant

David Jaroslawicz, New York City, Francis E. Dorn and Joseph Fallek, Brooklyn, for Paul Modafferi, appellant.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (J. Lawson Brown and Shirley Adelson Siegel, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MEYER, Judge.

The question presented by this appeal is whether the State is liable for the death of one and blindness of another certified heroin addict, residents of the Iroquois Narcotic Rehabilitation Center maintained by the State Narcotic Addiction Control Commission, both of whom had been committed to the center pursuant to the provisions of the Mental Hygiene Law. The death in one case and blindness in the other resulted from the drinking of a fluid (Ditto) containing methyl alcohol which had been mixed with an orange preparation called Tang. After a joint but bifurcated trial, the Court of Claims found for each claimant on both negligence and contributory negligence and directed a further trial on the issue of damages. From that interlocutory judgment the State appealed to the Appellate Division, Third Department, which agreed, one Judge dissenting, with the Court of Claims' finding of negligence, and rejected the State's argument that it is immune from liability because its addict rehabilitation program involves the exercise of governmental judgment and discretion (cf. Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63), but concluded that the complaints should nevertheless be dismissed because the weight of the credible evidence established that each addict had sufficient control of his will to resist the temptation of ingesting the Ditto fluid (59 A.D.2d 480, 399 N.Y.S.2d 916). On claimants' appeal of right to us, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and that of the Court of Claims reinstated.

We agree with the Appellate Division's legal conclusion that the negligence issue turns not on the design of the rehabilitation program, but on the manner in which it was carried out. With respect to its affirmance of the finding of fact that there was negligence on the part of the State, we note that, since there is ample evidence in the record to support that finding, ^* the issue is beyond our power of review. Our disagreement with the Appellate Division is on the issue of contributory negligence, on which we find the standard used by that court incorrect and the weight of the evidence to be with the findings of the Trial Judge (cf. Matter of Town Bd. of Town of Clarkstown v. Sterngass, 40 N.Y.2d 888, 389 N.Y.S.2d 362, 357 N.E.2d 1017; Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, § 112).

Since the Padula action is for wrongful death, it was the State's burden to establish contributory negligence as a defense (EPTL 5-4.2), but we do not distinguish the two cases on that ground for in our view the weight of the evidence sustains the Trial Judge's finding that as addicts they did not have the ability to resist the temptation to ingest the Ditto-Tang mixture. The Appellate Division's contrary conclusion is predicated on its conception that neither addict suffered from a mental disability, that both had been found psychologically sound prior to admission and were not seeing a psychiatrist and that their actions were reasoned and deliberate. That reasoning fails to take account of our decisions in Fuller v. Preis, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 322 N.E.2d 263 and Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd. of City of N.Y. (25 N.Y.2d 196, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362, 250 N.E.2d 460). In Fuller we recognized in a tort setting "that one may retain the power to intend, to know, and yet to have an irresistible impulse to act and therefore be incapable of voluntary conduct" (35 N.Y.2d, at p. 432, 363 N.Y.S.2d, at p. 574, 322 N.E.2d, at p. 267); in Ortelere with respect to capacity to contract we held that incapacity "may exist, because of volitional and affective impediments or disruptions in the personality, despite the intellectual or cognitive ability to understand" (25 N.Y.2d, at p. 199, 303 N.Y.S.2d, at p. 365, 250 N.E.2d, at p. 462). Moreover, the Appellate Division placed undue emphasis on the label "mental disability", which as we noted in Matter of Torsney (47 N.Y.2d 667, 683, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 201, 394 N.E.2d 262, 271), is being continually redefined by psychiatrists. The divergence of viewpoint between the law as applied in the decision under appeal and at least one practicing psychiatrist is well illustrated by a quotation from an article by Dr. Daniel D. Pugh, entitled The Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and Brawner (1973 Wash.U.L.Q. 87). Commenting on the difficulty with the law's definition of "mental disease" as stated in Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 and McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 847, Dr. Pugh, whose view is that heroin addiction clearly is a mental illness (1973 Wash.U.L.Q., at p. 107), has this to say (Id., at pp. 104-105): "Is heroin addiction a 'mental disease' under Durham-McDonald? I must confess I cannot think of a psychiatric illness that better fits the Durham-McDonald definition of insanity. It is the only psychiatric disease that has as one of its typical manifestations an irresistible compulsion to commit crimes. It is the only psychiatric disease in which the impairment of behavior control can be measured: less than five percent of addicts who have been withdrawn and returned to the community are able to avoid readdiction within a year. Voluntary withdrawal from heroin by persons with access to the drug is virtually unknown. Although the disease has little effect on cognitive processes, there is no psychiatric disease that has a greater effect on emotional processes."

We noted in Fuller v. Preis (supra, at pp. 429-430, 363 N.Y.S.2d at p. 572, ...