Paffel v. Paffel
| Decision Date | 08 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 19423,19462,s. 19423 |
| Citation | 732 P.2d 96 |
| Parties | Wayne C. PAFFEL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jean K. PAFFEL, Defendant and Respondent. Jean K. PAFFEL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Wayne C. PAFFEL, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Keith F. Oehler, Holladay, for plaintiff and appellant.
Gregory B. Wall, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
These cases, which were consolidated for purposes of appeal, arise out of the separation and subsequent divorce of Wayne C. Paffel ("appellant") and Jean K. Paffel ("respondent"). Appellant seeks reversal of case No. 19423, in which he was ordered to pay permanent alimony to respondent. Appellant also seeks reversal of case No. 19462, in which summary judgment was entered in favor of respondent for alimony arrearages.
Appellant and respondent were married on June 18, 1949, in Minnesota. The couple have two children who are both now adults. The parties separated on or about June 1, 1967, and have lived substantially apart ever since. At the time of the separation, appellant was employed by Sperry-Univac, and he remained so employed at the time of his appeal. In 1969, Sperry-Univac transferred appellant to Utah, and he has resided here since that time.
In June 1967, respondent filed an action for divorce in the Fourth District Court of Hennepin County, Minnesota. On July 5, 1967, that court ordered appellant to pay temporary child support and alimony. That court also permitted respondent to occupy the family home during the pendency of the action, but required respondent to make the mortgage payments thereon. On September 17, 1968, the case was placed on the trial calendar, with the entry indicating a reconciliation might occur. The case never went to trial, and to date no further proceedings have been pursued in that court to bring that divorce action to a close.
In 1974, a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) action was filed in Third District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah ("Third District Court"), and in December of 1974 the trial court entered an order requiring appellant to pay $140 per month for support of the couple's then only minor child.
No divorce having been obtained in the above-mentioned Minnesota proceeding, appellant filed for divorce in Third District Court on November 12, 1980. Respondent answered and counterclaimed for divorce, praying for an award of permanent alimony as well as a judgment for alimony arrearages allegedly due her under the terms of the Minnesota temporary order. On July 26, 1982, the Third District Court entered a decree of divorce, but reserved for a subsequent hearing the issues of permanent alimony and alimony arrearages under the Minnesota order. On October 2, 1982, appellant remarried.
Also in October 1982, respondent petitioned the Minnesota court for a judgment of alimony arrearages under that court's temporary order. While that court originally dismissed this petition, it subsequently reviewed and reversed itself and entered judgment against appellant for respondent's claimed arrearages. On February 28, 1983, respondent filed an action on the Minnesota judgment in the Second District Court of Davis County, Utah ("Second District Court"). Decision on this matter was reserved until after the Third District Court's hearing and decision concerning permanent alimony and arrearages due under the Minnesota court's temporary order.
On June 22, 1983, a hearing was held in Third District Court regarding respondent's alimony claims. At that hearing, respondent withdrew her claim for alimony arrearages and relied on the action pending in Second District Court with respect to that claim. Following the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and on June 24, 1983, awarded respondent permanent alimony in the amount of $300 per month commencing July 1983. The trial court relied on Rost v. Rost 1 for its authority to enter the judgment despite the pending Minnesota action. On July 28, 1983, judgment was rendered in the Second District Court action in favor of respondent for $6,325.25 in alimony arrearages. In his ruling, the Second District Court judge noted he had received the Third District Court's decision wherein the claim for alimony arrearages was withdrawn.
In case No. 19462, appellant attempts to escape enforcement of the Minnesota court's judgment for alimony arrearages. Appellant contends that since the alimony arrearages issue was already before the Third District Court at the time the Minnesota judgment was entered and at the time the enforcement action was initiated, principles of comity and abatement should have either barred the Minnesota court's judgment or barred the action on the judgment in Second District Court. Appellant also contends that the Third District Court's 1974 URESA order barred respondent's claim for alimony arrearages. 2 However, determination of appellant's assignment of error under the full faith and credit clause is dispositive here.
At the outset, we note that this Court does not look favorably upon the type of forum shopping engaged in by respondent in this case. 3 However, the Court's policy against forum shopping is outweighed in this case by article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public ... Proceedings of every other State." Appellant contends that the Minnesota judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit because the Minnesota court lacked jurisdiction over him. Specifically, appellant claims that the 1967 Minnesota divorce action was abandoned and that since no action was pending before that court, it lacked jurisdiction over him to enter the judgment for alimony arrearages. 4
In general, there is no dispute that jurisdiction and the requirements for service of process, if properly raised, may be asserted as defenses to an action on a foreign judgment. 5 A judgment granted without these prerequisites is void and need not be accorded full faith and credit by sister states. 6 However, a division of authority is found where a matter of fact or law upon which jurisdiction depends was litigated in the original suit:
It has been held that a direct adjudication by the courts of one state that the court which rendered a certain judgment had the requisite authority and that the parties were legally brought before the court is conclusive on the question in every other state; but other cases hold that a foreign judgment may be attacked for want of jurisdiction even though the court rendering it expressly finds that jurisdiction exists. 7
Utah is one of those jurisdictions following the former position. In Fullenwider Co. v. Patterson, 8 where the debtor/defendant was collaterally attacking a foreign judgment, this Court stated: "[I]f the same issue as to the jurisdiction of the foreign court was raised and adjudicated therein, then the determination of that issue becomes res judicata, and is entitled to full faith and credit, the same as any other issue that has been so determined." 9 This principle was further explained by the Court in Harris v. Briggs 10 and followed in Clarkson v. Western Heritage, Inc. 11 Moreover, to the extent that Chevron Chemical Co. v. Mecham 12 is inconsistent with this rule, it is overruled.
Appellant does not contend on appeal that the Minnesota court did not have jurisdiction over him when it entered its original temporary support decree. In fact, the record indicates that appellant filed an answer and cross-complaint in the 1967 action. As stated above, appellant relies upon respondent's alleged abandonment of the 1967 divorce action as the basis for claiming the Minnesota court had no jurisdiction over him. In 1982 when respondent filed her motion in the Minnesota court for a judgment for alimony/maintenance arrearages, appellant appeared by local counsel and filed affidavits and a memorandum in opposition to this motion. Appellant's memorandum argued, in addition to other points, that the 1967 action had been abandoned, thereby depriving the Minnesota court of jurisdiction over appellant. The referee who heard the argument recommended findings and an order dismissing the proceeding and denying respondent's motion. These findings and order were adopted by the Minnesota district court. However, based upon respondent's motion for review, the Minnesota court subsequently reversed its earlier order and found, in pertinent part: The court went on to order appellant to pay respondent $6,292 in alimony arrearages.
Although appellant complains that the Minnesota court erred in finding the matter was not abandoned, appellant did not appeal that decision. We will not allow appellant to appeal the Minnesota court's decision in this Court. Moreover, because the issue of abandonment was previously litigated and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, appellant, in accordance with the principles discussed above, is barred from raising the abandonment issue anew. And since the issue was decided adversely to appellant, his argument that the Minnesota court had no jurisdiction is without merit. Therefore, the Minnesota court's judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, and the Second District Court was correct in so finding. Inasmuch as the Minnesota judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, appellant's other arguments are without merit.
In this case, appellant attacks the Third District Court's award of permanent spousal support and the amount of spousal support awarded. The purpose of such support is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard...
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Dahl v. Dahl
...to consider the Jones factors when determining an appropriate alimony award "constitutes an abuse of discretion." Paffel v. Paffel , 732 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah 1986). But where a party seeking alimony fails to satisfy its burden, a district court will generally not abuse its discretion in decli......
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...of from the bench or by a short written order that may be informative to the parties but to no one else." Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). For a discussion of the potential problems associated with unpublished opinions see Reuben, Published in Part......
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