Pagan v. Select Specialty Hosp.
| Decision Date | 18 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:11CV00355 |
| Parties | SHERI L. PAGAN, Plaintiff, v. SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL -YOUNGSTOWN, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
Before the Court is Defendant Select Specialty Hospital - Youngstown, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29), pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant moves the Court for summary judgment on all claims asserted against it by Plaintiff Sheri L. Pagan in her complaint (ECF No.1-1). Plaintiff responded in opposition (ECF No. 30), and Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 32). The motion for summary judgment is ripe for consideration.
For the reasons provided below, the Court denies Defendant Select Specialty Hospital -Youngstown, Inc's motion for summary judgment on all claims.
Plaintiff Sheri L. Pagan ("Plaintiff") filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant Select Specialty Hospital - Youngstown, Inc. ("Defendant") alleging two counts: (Count I) that Defendant violated Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A) by failing to provide Plaintiff with leave for pregnancy and discharging her on account of her pregnancy and pregnancy related healthcondition, and (Count II) that Defendant violated the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") by interfering with Plaintiff's exercise of her rights under the FMLA and retaliating against her for exercising her rights under the FMLA. ECF No. 1-1. Defendant removed this action from the Court of Common Pleas, Mahoning County, Ohio, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1441(b). ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 1-4. This Court has original jurisdiction over Count Two because the allegations arise from the laws of the United States, specifically the FMLA, 29 U.S.C.§§ 2601-2654. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim in Count One, an alleged violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (2011).
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law because Defendant did not single out Plaintiff for discipline based upon her pregnancy; Defendant did not discharge Plaintiff for either taking or requesting FMLA leave nor did Defendant interfere with her ability to take additional FMLA leave; and Defendant had legitimate reasons for discharging Plaintiff. ECF No. 29-1 at 1-2.
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a Nursing Assistant at its Boardman, Ohio location from March 10, 2008 to January 11, 2010. ECF No. 3 at 1, ¶ 2. Plaintiff had prior training as a State Tested Nurse's Assistant (STNA). ECF No. 30-2 at 7. Defendant is a long-term acute care hospital that provides diagnostic and medical treatment to patients with chronic disease or complex medical conditions. ECF No. 29-3 at 1, ¶ 2. Defendant also has campuses in Youngstown, Ohio (the location of its Main Campus) and Warren, Ohio. Id.
Upon beginning work for Defendant, Plaintiff received a copy of Defendant's EmployeeHandbook, which included Defendant's attendance policy. ECF No. 30-2 at 12-14. Defendant's "Attendance Guidelines" stated that "[s]even (7) or more unscheduled absences in a rolling 12 month period or 3 or more unscheduled absences in a quarter will be considered unacceptable attendance and may result in disciplinary consequences." ECF No. 29-5 at 4. Plaintiff signed an acknowledgment indicating that she understood Defendant's attendance policy. ECF No. 30-2 at 13-15; ECF No. 29-5 at 5. Compliance with the attendance policy was mandatory according to policy. ECF No. 30-1 at 25-27. Plaintiff worked full-time, three days a week, and her normally scheduled shift was from 7 pm to 7 am. ECF No. 30-2 at 16-18.
Plaintiff, and her fellow workers, were originally notified of their schedule six weeks in advance and then, after a change in administration, workers became notified of their schedule two to three weeks ahead of time. Id. at 18-19. Plaintiff has acknowledged that she did not have any problem understanding when she was scheduled to work. Id. at 19.
Defendant's Employee Handbook states that disciplinary situations "will generally be dealt with through the progressive discipline process" in which a verbal warning is issued "when a performance problem(s) is initially identified," a written warning is issued "if there is a second occurrence of the same issue or continued lack of improvement," and termination may occur if "adequate improvement does not occur or there are repeated instances of the behavior." ECF No. 29-7 at 8. On July 7, 2009, Plaintiff engaged in a loud outburst in the presence of her coworkers, which was also observed by the family members of a patient. ECF No. 29-3 at 22. Plaintiff received a written warning for her behavior, and she signed a disciplinary action form which contained the statement that any further policy violations "and/or failure to comply withcorrective action may result in disciplinary actions up to and including termination." Id.
Defendant's Employee Handbook states that "FMLA leave is limited to a total of 12 weeks in a rolling 12-month period" and that it may be used in the case of "a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the employee's job." ECF No. 29-7 at 7-9. On August 5, 2009, Plaintiff requested FMLA leave due to her own serious health condition. Id. at 1. Plaintiff's request was granted and she took approved FMLA leave from August 5, 2009 to August 19, 2009. ECF No. 29-3 at 22. On August 20, 2009, Plaintiff returned to work without any medical restrictions. Id. However, Plaintiff claims that, after returning to work, she continued to have additional problems related to her FMLA-approved health condition from August 2009. ECF No. 30-2 at 55. Plaintiff also alleges that she inquired about taking and requested additional FMLA leave, but was incorrectly told by her supervisor, Jodi Costello, that she had no more leave available. Id. at 54-55.
In December 2009, Plaintiff discovered that she was pregnant through a home test on the 12th or 13th of December. She had the pregnancy confirmed by a doctor on December 28, 2009. Id. at 46. Plaintiff informed her supervisor, Ms. Costello, of the pregnancy on January 7, 2010. Id. at 45-46. Plaintiff became upset by the reactions of Ms. Costello and Hospital CEO Sharon Norro toward the news of Plaintiff's pregnancy; specifically, Plaintiff was unsettled by what she felt were a series of inappropriate questions put to her by Ms. Costello. Id. at 40-41. Prior to Defendant's termination of Plaintiff's employment, Ms. Costello, Ms. Norro and Ms. Eorio were all aware of Plaintiff's pregnancy. ECF No. 30-6 at 4.
In her job as Human Relations Coordinator, Ms. Eorio reviewed the 2009 attendancestatistics for sixteen nurses and nursing assistants employed by Defendant, documented these statistics on Attendance Controllers, and provided the Attendance Controllers to Ms. Costello for review on January 4, 2010. ECF No. 29-3 at 2. Ms. Eorio's review revealed that twelve of the sixteen nurses and nursing assistants had violated Defendant's attendance policy, and all twelve of the employees had been disciplined between January 6, 2010 and January 29, 2010 for the violations. Id. On January 11, 2010, Ms. Eorio and Ms. Costello met with Plaintiff and informed her that, because she had violated Defendant's attendance policy and due to her having received a prior written warning for disruptive behavior, Plaintiff's employment with Defendant was being terminated. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff had three unscheduled absences in the first quarter of 2009, a total of seven unscheduled absences from January 2009 through September 1, 2009, and three additional unscheduled absences in October and December of 2009. ECF No. 30-3 at 60-61. Plaintiff was the only nurse or nursing assistant whose employment was terminated in January 2010 for attendance violations. ECF No. 29-3 at 3.
Summary judgment is appropriately granted when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2005). The moving party is not required to file affidavits or other similar materials negating a claim on which its opponent bears the burden of proof, so long as the movant relies upon the absence of the essential element in thepleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party must "show that the non-moving party has failed to establish an essential element of his case upon which he would bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial." Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees., 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992).
Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute. An opposing party may not simply rely on its pleadings; rather, it must "produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury." Cox v. Ky. Dep't. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995). The non-moving party must, to defeat the motion, "show that there is doubt as to the material facts and that the record, taken as a whole, does not lead to a judgment for the movant." Guarino, 980 F.2d at 403. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party when deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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