Pagano v. Bechly
| Citation | 232 N.W. 798,211 Iowa 1294 |
| Decision Date | 11 November 1930 |
| Docket Number | 40263 |
| Parties | LEO PAGANO, Petitioner, v. FRANK BECHLY, Judge, Respondent |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
REHEARING DENIED MARCH 17, 1931.
Certiorari to Jasper District Court.--FRANK BECHLY, Judge.
An original certiorari proceeding to review an order by one of the judges of the district court, refusing to set aside order and judgment of revocation of a previously suspended sentence against the plaintiff.--Writ annulled.
Writ annulled.
Sloane & Sloane, for petitioner.
A. M Miller, for respondent.
On June 17, 1929, judgment was entered against the plaintiff in a criminal action then pending in the district court of Iowa in and for Jasper County. This order and judgment provided that the defendant should pay a fine of $ 300 and costs of prosecution, and in default of payment of said fine and costs, be imprisoned in the county jail of Jasper County at hard labor until such fine and costs were paid, and in addition, that he should be imprisoned in the county jail of Jasper County, Iowa, at hard labor for the term of one year; but that, during good behavior, the sentence of one-year imprisonment should be suspended, and that, during such suspension, he should be paroled into the custody of Earl Shields, who would report to the court as to his conduct. Mittimus was to issue accordingly.
On the 9th day of November following, the court entered what is designated "Order of Revocation," the material part of which reads as follows:
"It appearing to the court that the said defendant has violated the terms of the suspension of sentence and parole, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the suspension of sentence and parole of said defendant are revoked, and the clerk of this court is ordered to issue mittimus in this case, and that the proper officer proceed to take the said Leo Pagano into custody and imprison him in the county jail of Jasper County, Iowa, for the said term, with the same effect as if no suspension and parole had ever been granted."
On the 27th day of November following, an application was made by Pagano in the above-entitled matter, asking the court to reconsider and set aside the order and judgment of revocation, and to make and enter an order fixing a date for hearing thereon and prescribing the kind of notice, service, and time to be served on the county attorney of said hearing. Said application set out numerous grounds on which he based his request for setting aside said order of revocation.
On the same day, November 27, 1929, this application was denied; whereupon a petition was filed for writ of certiorari in this court, and, on proper order, such writ was issued, and due return made.
Numerous grounds are set out in said application, the fundamental and underlying proposition of many of these grounds being the claim that the court had no power to revoke the suspension of sentence without notice and opportunity to the then defendant to have a hearing thereon. As a collateral issue is the claim that the defendant had a vested right to his personal liberty during good behavior under the suspended sentence.
It is a fundamental doctrine that no court has an inherent power to suspend the operation of a sentence theretofore pronounced by it. We have recognized and acted upon this doctrine in the cases of State v. Voss, 80 Iowa 467, 45 N.W. 898, and State ex rel. Hammond v. Hume, 193 Iowa 1395, 188 N.W. 796. Stating it conversely, the power of the court to suspend sentence must come from statutory provisions, and not otherwise; and while some of our sister states hold differently, we are committed to this doctrine. We turn to the Code, therefore, to see what powers of this character are conferred upon the courts. Section 3800, Code, 1927, reads as follows:
It is apparent from this section that such power of suspension of sentence and parole is conferred upon the district courts under the conditions and limitations provided in this section of the statute. The plaintiff herein does not, of course, question the right of the court to make the suspension of sentence and parole that he did in this case, but, in fact, relies wholly upon the exercise of this power under the aforesaid section as a basis of his action.
As a part of the same chapter in the Code, however, we find Section 3805, which reads as follows:
"A suspension of a sentence by the...
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