Page Cnty. v. Rose

• Decision Date: 03 April 1906
• Citation: 130 Iowa 296,106 N.W. 744
• Parties: PAGE COUNTY v. ROSE ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

130 Iowa 296

106 N.W. 744

PAGE COUNTY

v.ROSE ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 3, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Page County; O. D. Wheeler, Judge.

The opinion states the case. Affirmed.

Parslow & Peters, for appellants.

H. H. Scott and D. G. Sutherland, for appellee.

WEAVER, J.

For several years Luther Van Arsdol, under the business name and style of the Bank of Coin, conducted a private banking business at the town of Coin, in Page county, Iowa. On the 9th day of March, 1904, Van Arsdol, having become insolvent, made a general assignment under the insolvency statute of the state to Ed F. Rose and Charles Hart for the benefit of his creditors. Prior to the insolvency and assignment of Van Arsdol, and beginning January 6, 1902, an arrangement existed between the bank and the treasurer of Page county, one W. L. Lundy, whereby the tax receipts of persons living in the vicinity of Coin were sent to the bank, with authority to the bank to receive the money thereon and deliver the receipts to the parties paying the same. The account thus created in favor of the treasurer was checked or drawn upon by him from time to time. The account was kept in the name of “W. L. Lundy, Treasurer,” and it was known by the bank at all times that this account represented a balance due said treasurer or the county for taxes collected as aforesaid. During the period referred to the bank collected and received from taxpayers for treasurer's receipts surrendered by it an aggregate sum of $5,919.95, and at the time of the assignment of Van Arsdol the balance due to the treasurer on this account was $1,199.47, for which sum the county filed a claim against the insolvent's estate, asking that the same be established as a preferred claim and paid in full before any distribution to the general creditors. It is agreed by the parties that payments of the taxes to the bank was effected, in part by payments in cash, and in part by the checks of the taxpayers upon deposits held for them by the bank, and in other cases the bank charged the amount of the tax receipts against the deposit accounts of their customers. In the latter instance, if we understand the record, the bank made use of the tax receipts as credit vouchers, instead of taking checks therefor. On taking possession of the assets of the bank the assignees found on hand cash to the amount of $866.88 and other assets, making the entire appraised value of the estate about $21,000. There have been presented and filed general claims against the estate to the amount of about $63,000, and other claims for which a preference is demanded to the amount of about $3,100. The trial court found in favor of Page county, giving preference to its said claim and ordering the assignees to pay the same in full. From this judgment the assignees and objecting creditors appeal. There is no dispute as to the material facts, and the one legal question presented is whether upon the conceded facts the moneys obtained by the bank for taxes due the county should be treated as a trust fund and given a preference over the claims of the general creditors.

Appellant contends that the transaction on which the account or claim presented by the county was not in fact a payment of taxes. In other words it is said that the county received nothing and has parted with nothing, and stands in no better position to assert a preferred claim than would the treasurer himself. But this is not quite correct. The treasurer had a right to collect the taxes and to bind the county by delivering proper receipts therefor. It is possible, however, that if the receipts had never been delivered, or if it were practicable to ascertain just what receipts issued through the bank were represented by the unpaid balance of $1,199.47, the county could repudiate the transaction and enforce a second payment thereof; but this is a question we do not attempt to decide. The treasurer did issue through the bank receipts to the gross amount of $5,919.95, and the bank acknowledged the receipt by itself of that amount of money. The admitted sum has been reduced by payments and credits to a remainder of less than $2,000, and it is impossible to name with any certainty the particular taxpayers whose money is represented thereby. The county treasury is depleted by that sum as fully and completely as if the treasurer had taken the money from his office safe and deposited it in the bank on the day before the assignment of its proprietor. No corruption is charged or suggested against the treasurer, and we may also for the purposes of this case assume that the transactions on part of Van Arsdol were carried on with entire good faith. It is matter of...