Page v. Bakersfield Uniform & Towel Supply Co.
| Decision Date | 31 January 1966 |
| Citation | 49 Cal.Rptr. 46,239 Cal.App.2d 762 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | G. B. PAGE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BAKERSFIELD UNIFORM & TOWEL SUPPLY CO. et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 511. |
Gill & Bowles and S. B. Gill, Bakers-field, for appellants.
Goldberg, Noriega & Sullivan, and David F. Goldberg, Bakersfield, for respondents.
This case is the final result of a bitterend laundry war in Kern County. The two groups of opponents, each of which was connected with a large organization engaging in similar work in Southern California, used means reminiscent of the law of the jungle to build up their own business standing and to ruin their competitors. During the struggle, each of the two appealed to the courts in an attempt to enlist the law on its own side. Each accused the other of improper practices under the provisions of the Unfair Practices Act (§§ 17000 to 17101 of the Bus. & Prof.Code), and asked for an injunction and damages.
After a lengthy trial, the court determined that both had been guilty of repeated breaches of the statutes relative to forbidden trade practices, and issued permanent injunctions requiring both to desist from further breaches of the law in the conduct of their businesses. The plaintiffs in one of the cases filed an appeal from portions of the judgment against them; the scope of the appeal will be more particularly defined in a later part of this opinion.
Plaintiffs are the individuals, G. B. Page and L. W. Page, and their organizations doing business under the names of Mission Linen Supply and the Kern Industrial Laundry; defendants, I. M. Richman and M. B. Richman, are the owners of Bakersfield Uniform & Towel Supply Co. Plaintiffs charged in their complaint filed April 3, 1962, that defendants were offering free rental and cleaning services to plaintiffs' customers for the purpose of injuring plaintiffs and destroying competition in violation of the Business and Professions Code. A temporary restraining order and an order to show cause were issued. On May 4, 1962, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint for an injunction and damages. A first cause of action specifed four business operations conducted by the defendants which were said to be unfair and stated that other illegal acts were also committed; they asked $5,000 for attorney's fees. In a second cause of action, plaintiffs alleged that defendants were tendering laundry and cleaning work at a figure below cost and were also offering services which did not exist; in a third cause of action, they alleged that defendants were soliciting violations of the Unfair Practices Act; they stated, in a fourth cause of action, that by reason of the wrongful conduct of the defendants, plaintiffs lost 75 customers, causing damage in the sum of $196,566; the prayer asked for a temporary restraining order, an order to show cause why defendants should not be enjoined during the pendency of the action, that defendants be permanently restrained from doing the acts complained of and that plaintiffs be paid treble damages in the sum of $196,566 besides costs of suit and attorney's fees in the amount of $5,000 or 'as they shall appear reasonable to the Court.'
The injunction suit filed by the Richmans was almost a duplicate complaint except that the positions of the parties plaintiff and defendant were interchanged.
The pretrial order asserted that the matters at issue were: whether there had been violations of the Unfair Practices Act by either or both parties; whether these alleged acts or omissions were done in good faith in meeting competition, and the nature, extent, and amount of actual damages, if any; whether either party had violated the applicable temporary restraining order; whether either party was entitled to a permanent injunction restraining the other from violations of the Unfair Practices Act, and if there was a right in either group to treble damages or attorney's fees. The nonjury trial lasted 24 days spread over a period of several months; the trial judge filed a memorandum decision stating that both litigants had repeatedly performed unlawful and unfair trade practices as against the other at substantially the same time that each party had 'unclean hands,' and that the court would grant a permanent injunction against each of them; that damages were suffered by both the litigants but that they were 'highly speculative and impossible to ascertain with any degree of certainty,' and that the damages sustained by each party were 'in equal magnitude and proportion.'
A single set of findings of fact and conclusions of law and a single judgment were filed in cases 83462 and 83493; the litigants in both were permanently enjoined from offering any linen rental or cleaning services to customers, or prospective customers, in Kern County, without cost or below cost, and from engaging in any deceptive or unfair trade practices.
In the findings, it was determined that the plaintiffs and defendants are competitors in the service trade of providing linen rental and industrial laundry services to commercial and industrial businesses in the County of Kern, and that, through their 'agents, servants, and employees' each of them committed various and sundry violations of the California Unfair Practices Act, and more specifically violations of sections 17040, 17043, and 17045 of the Business and Professions Code; that all parties on both sides of the case '* * * made offers of free rental and cleaning services, offered prices below cost, extended special privileges, unearned commissions and refunds to [the other parties'] customers and others, in violation of Sections 17040 and 17043 of the Business and Professions Code, for the purpose of injuring [the other parties] and other competitors and destroying competition, and none of the exceptions set froth and contained in the Business and Professions Code are applicable.' It was thus apparent to the trial court that both plaintiffs and defendants were tarred with the same brush.
The trial judge further found that the improper acts of the parties '* * * had an injurious effect on each other's businesses and were committed by each party with a purpose and intent of injuring a competitor and destroying competition' and 'that it is true both parties committed such unlawful and unfair trade practices against each other, substantially at the same point and time' and that they also '* * * committed numerous acts of locality price discrimination,' contrary to the provisions of the Unfair Practices Act. The court again made clear in finding No. XVII that the illegal acts of both parties were done '* * * for the purpose and with the intent of injuring the other party and destroying competition, and such acts did result in an injurious effect on the business of each party.'
In the findings which followed it is pointed out that on April 3, 1962, with respect to the defendants, and on April 10, 1962, with respect to the plaintiffs, each was served with a temporary restraining order enjoining them from '* * * offering any of their linen rental and cleaning services to customers or prospective customers in the County of Kern, State of California, without cost or below cost' or engaging in any deceptive or unfair trade practices and that said orders remained in effect until the date of trial, but that '* * * plaintiffs and defendants continued to commit violations of the California Unfair Trade Practices Act, and each party, both plaintiff and defendant herein, violated the terms of the court's restraining order served on each party in all respects,' and that notwithstanding said restraining orders '* * * the defendants continued to make offers of free services and offers below cost,' and that 'usbsequent to the issuance of such restraining orders, and for sometime thereafter, the plaintiffs made offers of free services and offered a secret benefit to one customer and continued to practice locality price discrimination'; such violations '* * * did have an injurious effect on each party's business and were committed by each party with the purpose and intent to injure a competitor and destroy competition.' It is also stated in the findings that during the period of intense rivalry and competition '* * * some fifty or sixty accounts of each party were induced to become customers of the other party as a result of direct solicitation.'
With respect to damages, the court further found as follows:
'XXV
'That it is true both sides suffered damages; that it is true the amount of actual damages suffered by both parties is highly speculative and impossible to ascertain with any degree of certainty; that it is true that such detriment in damages was suffered in approximately equal magnitude and proportion by both parties.
'XXVI
'That it is true the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees would be approximately the same for both parties.' In the conclusions of law, the court held as follows:
'I
'That as a result of the actions of both parties as set out above, each party has unclean hands, and the court does hereby issue a permanent injunction against each party against committing any violations of the California Unfair Trade Practices Act, but by reason of the unclean hands of both parties in committing these various and sundry acts of violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act against each other and others the court determines that both parties are pari delicto and will help neither party by way of damages that they suffered or try to apportion said damages that they suffered, and will, leave both parties where they lie.
'II
'That each party is entitled to a permanent injunction that enjoins and restrains the other party and its officers, agents, servants and employees, and all persons acting under such party directly or in its behalf, and all persons acting in...
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