Page v. McCain Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 30391.,30391.
• Citation: 109 P.3d 1084,141 Idaho 342
• Parties: Verdene PAGE, Claimant-Appellant, v. McCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer and Transcontinental Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

109 P.3d 1084

141 Idaho 342

Verdene PAGE, Claimant-Appellant, v. McCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer and Transcontinental Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 30391.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, November 2004.

February 17, 2005.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 2005.

L. Clyel Berry, Chtd., Twin Falls, for appellant. L. Clyel Berry argued.

Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Boise, for respondent. Glenna M. Christensen argued.

KIDWELL, Justice Pro Tem.

This is an appeal seeking reversal of an order of the Idaho Industrial Commission. The claimant alleged an injury caused by standing from a sitting position. Following hearing, the Commission found in favor of the employer and denied the claim for benefits. There are two primary issues: 1) whether the claimant gave proper notice of the accident or the employer had sufficient knowledge of the injury; and 2) whether standing from a seated position constitutes an "accident" under the Idaho workers' compensation law. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Verdene Page (Page) was employed with McCain Foods, Inc. (McCain). The record discloses that prior to the date of alleged injury, Page had been seeing a chiropractor for leg and back pain. On August 17, 2001, Page felt her left knee "grab" and experienced pain in the knee as she rose from a chair in the break room at work. She rubbed the knee and the pain went away. A couple hours later, Page was seated at a table engaged in doing a "key report." She rose from her seat, her left leg "grabbed" again and she experienced pain in her knee. Other employees heard Page cry out in pain, but did not witness the incident. Page telephoned her supervisor to inform him that her knee had locked up when standing from a chair and she needed to leave work. Page did not tell her supervisor she had experienced an "accident," because she did not consider the event to be an accident. Page left work and sought treatment at a local emergency room. Page never gave McCain written notice of her injury.

Eventually, Page filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The matter was submitted to a referee. After taking evidence, the referee found that, although Page had not told her supervisor she had an "accident," she had given oral notice of the event and McCain had actual notice of the occurrence. Therefore, McCain had the opportunity to investigate, but did not. The referee found that Page suffered an injury arising from an accident and recommended certain benefits.

The Idaho Industrial Commission held differently, however. In a 2-1 opinion, the Commission concluded that Page did not suffer an "accident" when merely arising from a chair at work. Additionally, the Commission concluded that Page did not give notice as required by statute, McCain did not have actual knowledge of the accident, McCain was prejudiced by the lack of proper notice and such prejudice was a bar to Page's claim for benefits. The dissenting commissioner would have adopted the referee's findings and conclusions. Page timely appeals to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commission's findings of fact will be upheld if supported by substantial, competent evidence. Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 211, 217 (2000). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Id. (citing Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 515, 975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999)). This Court will not "re-weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented." Id. at 409, 18 P.3d at 214 (citing Warden v. Idaho Timber Corp., 132 Idaho 454, 457, 974 P.2d 506, 509 (1999)).

This Court freely reviews the Commission's conclusions of law. Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 Idaho 568, 571, 21 P.3d 890, 893 (2001) (citing Taylor v. Soran Rest., Inc., 131 Idaho 525, 527, 960 P.2d 1254, 1256 (1998)).

Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab, 138 Idaho 859, 861-62, 71 P.3d 458, 460-61 (2003).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Commission Erred In Concluding The Claim is Barred By A Lack Of Notice.

The policy dictating Idaho adoption of its workers' compensation law is stated as:

The welfare of the state depends upon its industries and even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as is in this law provided.

I.C. § 72-201. "We must liberally construe the provisions of the workers' compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purpose for which the law was promulgated." Murray-Donahue v. Nat'l Car Rental Licensee Ass'n, 127 Idaho 337, 340, 900 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1995) (citing Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994)).

1. Written Notice

An employee suffering a personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of any employment covered by the workers' compensation law is required to give certain notice to the employer. I.C. §§ 72-701 through -703 (requiring written notice that provides certain particular information and is delivered to certain persons). "The requirement that notice of an accident be given to an employer `is to give the employer or someone on his behalf timely opportunity to make an investigation of the accident and surrounding circumstances to avoid payment of an unjust claim.'" Taylor v. Soran Rest., Inc., 131 Idaho 525, 528, 960 P.2d 1254, 1258 (1998) (citations omitted). It is undisputed that Page failed to adhere to the requirements of I.C. §§ 72-701 through -703 and failed to give proper written notice of her accident. The Commission's finding on this issue is correct.

2. Employer's Knowledge

Where an employee fails to fulfill the requirements of I.C. §§ 72-701 through -703, I.C. § 72-704 becomes the applicable inquiry. An employee's failure to give written notice may be "cured" in two ways: 1) a showing of actual knowledge of injury or occupational disease; or 2) a showing that the employer has not been prejudiced by delay or want of notice. I.C. § 72-704 (emphasis added); see also Taylor, 131 Idaho at 527,

960 P.2d at 1256. Whether actual notice was given to the employer or whether the employer was prejudiced by the delay in notice are questions of fact. Id. (citing Dick v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 100 Idaho 742, 745, 605 P.2d 506, 509 (1979)). With regard to actual notice, the inquiry is whether an employer had considerable knowledge of an accident or injury. Murray-Donahue, 127 Idaho at 340,

900 P.2d at 1351 ("Oral notice to the employer may provide the employer with actual knowledge of an injury, thus obviating the necessity of a written notice." (citing McCoy v. Sunshine Mining Co., 97 Idaho 675, 677, 551 P.2d 630, 632 (1976))).

In Taylor, an employee suffered two injuries, being struck in the head by a box that fell from a shelf and experiencing pain after lifting a heavy object. The employee was unable to testify whether she informed the employer of the accidents, other than reporting a general complaint of being in pain. While the Commission did not make findings or a conclusion concerning the employer's knowledge, this Court held that there was no evidence in the record supporting a conclusion that the employer had any knowledge that would waive the written notice requirement.

In Murray-Donahue, an employee was on a business trip for her employer. When retrieving her luggage from a baggage claim at an airport, the employee suffered an injury to her back. The employee testified that "[v]erbally I had notified [my supervisor] that we had difficulty in Boston and that I was having problems with my back." While the Commission found this was inadequate notice of an accident or injury, the Commission failed to make a finding regarding the knowledge in the possession of the employer. This Court remanded the case for an appropriate fact-finding.

In this case, the Commission found that Page's testimony on the issue of notice was "ambiguous, conflicting, and not enough to give Employer notice of an accident, but rather mere discomfort unconnected with a work-related injury." On direct examination of Page, the following evidence was adduced:

Q: Talk to me about what you told Lonny and what he said to you during the context of this telephone conversation.

A. I told Lonny that my knee had locked up and it was really hurting and could he give me somebody to replace me, and he said no, he didn't have anybody. . . . .

Q: Okay. Did you tell Lonny that your knee had locked up while you tried to get up from the computer table?

A. Yes, I told him — He didn't ask me. I just told him that I was sitting there on the chair doing the key report, is what I told him, because that's what we were sitting there to do, and it locked up. . . .

On cross-examination, no statements were elicited to contradict Page's testimony. Page's first statement establishes an injury but does not provide a cause. Page's second statement is a response to a question that incorporates a cause. In total, Page testified that she told her supervisor that her knee had locked up when she attempted to stand from a seated position at a table where she was engaged in a duty of her employment. This provided the supervisor with knowledge of the injury and the source of the injury. Page's first...