Pagel v. Pumphrey
Decision Date | 04 June 1947 |
Docket Number | No. 11715.,11715. |
Citation | 204 S.W.2d 58 |
Parties | PAGEL et al. v. PUMPHREY et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, La Salle County; H. D. Barrow, Judge.
Suits in trespass to try title by Ada Pumphrey and others against L. A. Pagel and others to recover a mineral interest in certain land. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Lawler & Childress, of Houston, and Willson & Hargrove, of Cotulla, for appellants.
O. R. Armstrong and C. D. Bates, both of Cotulla, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a judgment in nineteen consolidated trespass to try title suits wherein appellees recovered from appellants an undivided one-third mineral interest in approximately 10,000 acres of land, under nineteen separate ownerships, situated in La Salle County, Texas. The trial was before the court without a jury. The appellees are the heirs or assigns of one Andrew Armstrong, Sr., and appellants are the assigns of Alexander J. Uhl, Jr., and Henry Caley.
By written stipulation the parties agreed:
Appellants concede that under a deed of April 17, 1901, from Andrew Armstrong, Sr., to Henry Caley and Alexander J. Uhl, Jr., Andrew Armstrong, Sr., effectively excepted and reserved an undivided one-third mineral interest in the lands conveyed thereby. The controlling question presented on the appeal is whether appellants and their predecessors in title thereafter acquired the title to that mineral interest, either (1) by voluntary relinquishment thereof by Andrew Armstrong, Sr., or (2) by operation of the statutes of limitation.
Appellants contend that on April 18, 1903, by a legally sufficient instrument, the reserved mineral interest was relinquished and quitclaimed by Andrew Armstrong, Sr., to appellants' predecessors in title, as provided by the terms of an alleged prior parol agreement to that effect; but, in the alternative, if the instrument which was executed in performance of the alleged parol agreement did not have the legal effect of relinquishing such interest, then appellants claim the superior equitable title thereto by reason of a full and complete performance of the terms of such contract by their predecessors in title.
Appellants further contend that the one-third mineral interest was relinquished by a deed and assignment dated April 28, 1903, from Andrew Armstrong, Sr., to H. P. Drought & Company, and a subsequent release and quitclaim deed, dated November 28, 1905, from H. P. Drought & Company to appellants' predecessors in title. Lastly, appellants assert title to such mineral interest under the statutes of limitation.
A decision of this appeal will turn upon (1) the construction of the aforesaid instruments, (2) the admissibility of and the legal effect to be given to evidence of certain transactions between predecessors in title of appellees and appellants, which preceded and followed the execution of such instruments, and (3) the legal effect of alleged acts of adverse possession of appellants and their predecessors in title.
The instruments above referred to have been discussed and their effect construed in an opinion by the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals styled Armstrong et al. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. et al., reported in 145 S.W.2d, beginning at page 692. There it was held that these instruments were not sufficient to relinquish the undivided one-third mineral interest theretofore excepted and reserved by Andrew Armstrong, Sr., in the deed from himself to Caley and Uhl, Jr., dated April 17, 1901.
It might be well to here set forth chronologically all the facts concerning these transactions. On April 17, 1901, Andrew Armstrong, Sr., was the owner of 18020 acres of land situated in La Salle County, Texas. He borrowed the sum of $10,800 from M. J. Barlow & Company, giving his note therefor and a deed of trust upon the north 9081 acres of the above tract of land to secure the payment of this note. On the same day he sold to Caley and Uhl, Jr., the entire 18020 acre tract in consideration of a cash payment of $5,000, the assumption by the grantees of the $10,800 note in favor of M. J. Barlow & Company, and the execution of six promissory notes each in the sum of $4,124.50. A vendor's lien was retained to secure the payment of the assumed Barlow & Company note, as well as the six purchase money notes. In this conveyance Armstrong, Sr., reserved to himself an undivided one-third mineral interest out of the entire tract conveyed to Caley and Uhl, Jr.
On July 1, 1901, Armstrong, Sr., borrowed $10,800 from H. P. Drought & Company, and to secure his note in that amount pledged the six promissory notes executed and delivered to him by Caley and Uhl, Jr. Caley conveyed his interest in the land to C. A. Goeth and Chas. Duessen, who did not assume the payment of the Barlow note, but took the property subject to this note. The Lockwood National Bank of San Antonio ultimately became the owner of the Barlow note.
On April 18, 1903, Uhl, Jr., C. A. Goeth and Chas. Duessen paid to the Lockwood National Bank the $10,800 note and a release and quit-claim was executed by Lockwood National Bank and Armstrong, Sr. It is claimed by appellants that by this instrument Armstrong, Sr., relinquished his reserved one-third interest in the minerals.
On April 28, 1903, Armstrong, Sr., for the total consideration of $20,409.90, sold and assigned to Drought & Company the six Caley and Uhl, Jr. notes, together with the vendor's lien and superior title securing their payment. It is also contended that by this assignment Armstrong, Sr., divested himself of the reserved one-third mineral interest.
On November 28, 1905, H. P. Drought & Company released and quit-claimed to Caley and Uhl, Jr., and C. A. Goeth and Chas. Duessen, as assignees of Caley, the vendor's lien and superior title securing the payment of the six notes. The consideration of this release and quit-claim was the payment of these notes by Uhl, Jr., and C. A. Goeth and Chas. Duessen.
As showing the attending circumstances surrounding the execution of these instruments, C. A. Goeth gave certain oral testimony which was first received by the trial court, over the objection of appellees, but later stricken from the record. The testimony was as follows, to-wit:
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