Pagliaro v. Pezza

• Decision Date: 10 January 1961
• Docket Number: 10118,Nos. 10117,s. 10117
• Citation: 167 A.2d 139,92 R.I. 110
• Parties: Guido PAGLIARO v. Biagio PEZZA et al. Louise PAGLIARO v. Biagio PEZZA et al. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 139

167 A.2d 139

92 R.I. 110

Guido PAGLIARO v. Biagio PEZZA et al.

Louise PAGLIARO v. Biagio PEZZA et al.

Ex. Nos. 10117, 10118.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 10, 1961.

Vincent J. Chisholm, Providence, Edmund Santurri, Johnston, for plaintiffs.

Thomas E. F. Carroll, Cranston, for defendants.

CONDON, Chief Justice.

These are actions of trespass on the case for negligence. One was brought by Louise Pagliaro for personal injuries which she sustained while on defendants' premises as a social guest. The other action was brought by her husband for consequential damages resulting from her injuries. Each case is here on the plaintiff's exception to the trial justice's decision sustaining the defendants' demurrer to each declaration. Since the husband's case is dependent upon the wife's case we shall hereinafter discuss their exceptions as though only the latter case was before us.

Each declaration among other things alleges that plaintiff as a social guest was in law an invitee to whom defendants owed the duty of ordinary care. The defendants demurred thereto on the ground that as such a guest plaintiff was not an invitee but a mere licensee to whom the duty of ordinary care was not owed by them. The trial justice sustained the demurrer. In doing so he wrote a rescript in which he reviewed the principal authorities on the question in other jurisdictions and stated that the great weight held that the defendant host in such circumstances was not liable. He agreed with the parties that the precise question raised by the demurrer had never been previously considered and decided in this state, and he therefore concluded that he should follow the weight of authority elsewhere.

However, while conceding that this court has never expressly passed upon the question, plaintiff nevertheless contends that we have in several cases indicated by certain dicta that one who invites even a social guest upon his premises assumes an obligation to exercise ordinary care for the guest's safety. In support of such contention she relies upon specific statements in Goyette v. Sousa, R. I., 153 A.2d 509, Reddington v. Getchell, 40 R.I. 463, 101 A. 123, and Armstrong v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 20 R.I. 791, 29 A. 448. The trial justice rejected a similar contention after examining those cases. It was his considered opinion that the statements therein upon which plaintiff relied were not reasonably indicative of the view for which she was contending.

In reaching that conclusion we are clearly of the opinion that he did not err. At this time it is neither necessary nor desirable for us to discuss the possible extension of the meaning of the language of the cited cases to radically different situations from those therein. The statements relied on by the plaintiff were made in the context of circumstances set out in those cases which do not reasonably resemble those in the case at bar. It is sufficient to say here that we expressly disavow any application of such statements to a purely social guest.

This brings us to the final contention of plaintiff, namely, that regardless of the great weight of authority elsewhere we should now expressly hold that a guest is, in the light of modern conditions of social intercourse, entitled to the same degree of care accorded to others whom the owner invites upon his premises for business purposes or otherwise for his benefit. We have given this contention serious consideration and in doing so have examined a number of cases from other jurisdictions wherein a...