Painters & Paperhangers Local Union No. 1018, A. F. of L. v. Rountree Corp., 3972

• Decision Date: 10 September 1952
• Docket Number: No. 3972,3972
• Citation: 72 S.E.2d 402,194 Va. 148
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: , 30 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2621, 22 Lab.Cas. P 67,157 PAINTERS AND PAPERHANGERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1018, A.F. OF L., AN ASSOCIATION, AND OTHERS v. ROUNTREE CORPORATION AND EANES BUILDING CORPORATION. Record

Page 402

72 S.E.2d 402

194 Va. 148, 30 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2621, 22 Lab.Cas. P 67,157

PAINTERS AND PAPERHANGERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1018, A.F. OF L., AN ASSOCIATION, AND OTHERS v. ROUNTREE CORPORATION AND EANES BUILDING CORPORATION.

Record No. 3972.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

September 10, 1952.

Beecher E. Stallard, Woll, Glenn & Thatcher and John R. Foley, for the appellants.

Sands, Marks & Sands, for the appellees.

JUDGE: BUCHANAN

BUCHANAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Rountree Corporation and Eanes Building Corporation, complainants below, filed their bill for an injunction to restrain the union and its agents, defendants below, from picketing the complainants' premises. The trial court refused to award the injunction, but upon presentation of the bill and defendants' answer to two justices of this court (Code 1950, § 8-618) a temporary injunction was granted on the ground that the picketing was being carried on for an unlawful purpose. Afterwards depositions were taken and a decree was entered by the trial court holding that the picketing was unlawful and that the plaintiffs were entitled to such damages as they might show they had sustained on account thereof. Later a jury, empanelled to assess the damages, returned a verdict in favor of Rountree Corporation for $1,587.18 upon which judgment was entered and this appeal followed.

The defendants make eleven assignments of error but they present only these two issues: (1) Whether the picketing, which was concededly peaceful, was for an unlawful purpose and therefore properly enjoined; (2) if so, whether the damages allowed were adequately proved.

There is little dispute about the facts. Eanes Corporation owned premises 111-115 West Broad street, in Richmond, in which Rountree Corporation, its lessee, conducted a retail furniture business. These premises were badly damaged by fire on November 12, 1948. Reconstruction and repairs were made and during their progress business operations were conducted in part and it was planned to reopen on a complete basis on May 10, 1949. When the picketing began on April 21, only painting and electrical work remained to be done.

The painting work had been let to O. A. Walker, who employed union labor and who began work the latter part of March, 1949. On April 8 Walker's painters left the job and did not come back. The next day Eanes, president of the complainant companies, was informed that they were on strike. He then called Wilton B. Dickerson, inquired whether he operated a non-union shop, and on being advised that he did, Eanes engaged him to finish the painting. Dickerson began work on April 17 and there was no interference with his work after he took over the job.

In the meantime, the defendant Reynolds, business agent for the union, had written a letter to Eanes, dated March 31, 1949, stating:

'We have been informed that your company is anticipating doing some painting and decorating. It would be greatly appreciated if you would consider using Union labor. My telephone number is 2-6837 and I will be glad to render any service possible.'

On April 21, 1949, four days after Dickerson and his men began work, the union began picketing in front of the Rountree premises. This picketing consisted of one picket at a time, the defendant Rowe being one of them, walking back and forth on the sidewalk in front of the store, carrying a sign reading: 'This painting is unfair to the Painters and Paperhangers Local Union No. 1018, A.F. of L., member of Richmond Trades and Labor Council.'

This picketing continued until May 6, 1949, when it was enjoined as stated. Admittedly it was orderly and peaceful at all times and in all respects. It did not obstruct entrance into or exit from the store or the use of the street and no effort was made to impede customers. No attempt was made to have Dickerson sign a union contract, nor to induce the painters to become members of the union, nor to interfere with their continuing to work.

For about two days after the picket line was established no electricians appeared on the job. The electrical contractor informed Eanes that his men were not permitted to cross the picket line. The contractor testified that after two days he got another crew of union men who crossed the picket line and resumed the work. He estimated the picket line caused a delay of ten days in the electrical work, including two days when he had two men, three days in acquainting the new men with the work already done and five additional days of work with a short crew.

There was testimony for the complainants to the effect that a delay of 30 days was experienced in completing the repairs and fully opening for business, of which ten days were chargeable to the defendants as a result of the picket line.

Prior to the picketing the complainants had never been engaged in any controversy with the union or its members; and likewise there was no controversy between the painting contractor or the electrical contractor and their employees, and no demand of any kind had been made on the complainants by the union. The only communication between the union and the complainants was the letter of March 31, above quoted.

Reynolds, the business agent of the union, testified that the purpose of the picketing was 'To let the friends of organized labor and the sixteen thousand members that we have here in Richmond and vicinity know who is fair and unfair to us. ' On cross-examination he was asked what he wanted to accomplish by the picketing, and he said, 'I wanted them sixteen thousand Union boys and ladies, and the sympathizers of organized labor in the city of Richmond and vicinity, to know that that painting was being done non-union.'

In their answer to the bill, the defendants said they desired to unionize the non-union painting contractor and that the picketing had a twofold purpose -- to let friends of the union know that a non-union contractor was doing the work and to let members of the Richmond Building Trades Council and all organized labor of the vicinity know that fact.

In a written motion to dissolve the temporay injunction the defendants stated: 'The purpose of the said peaceful picketing at all times has been to inform the public that non-union painters were being employed to do the painting on the complainants' premises to the end that plaintiff's employees or some of them may be unionized, that is, they or some of them become members of defendant union.'

The defendants argue that the picketing was for the sole purpose of communication, and no more than an exercise of their right to freedom of speech, guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and by the twelfth section of the Virginia Bill of Rights.

The complainants contend that communication was not the sole purpose of the picketing but that the true purpose was to compel complainants to get rid of the non-union painters, employees of Dickerson, an independent contractor, or to compel those employees to join the union as a condition of continued employment. Such purpose it is argued was unlawful and hence the picketing was properly enjoined under the doctrine of Giboney v. Empire Storage, etc., Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.ed. 834, and similar cases.

In Edwards v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 272, 60 S.E. (2d) 916, we reviewed the picketing cases decided by the United States Supreme Court beginning with Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.ed. 1093, and including the Giboney Case, as well as the three cases decided in May, 1950. We concluded from that review that the holding in the Thornhill Case had not been departed from to the effect that a statute (or an injunction) which prohibits picketing for a lawful purpose, unaccompanied by the threat or the...