Palm Beach County v. Boca Development Associates, Ltd., 85-101
| Citation | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 533,485 So.2d 449 |
| Decision Date | 26 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-101,85-101 |
| Parties | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 533 PALM BEACH COUNTY, Appellant, v. BOCA DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, LTD., Holiday City Civic Association, Inc., and Boca Grande Property Owners Association, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Charles Schoech, Co. Atty., and Sandra Sprague, Asst. Co. Atty., West Palm Beach, and Fred W. Mattlin and Gloria O. North, of Siemon, Larsen & Mattlin, Boca Raton, for appellant.
Marjorie Gadarian Graham and Paul C. Wolfe, of Jones & Foster, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees.
The question presented is whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when, acting on a matter for which the appellate court had relinquished jurisdiction for a limited purpose, the trial court vacated a four-year-old judgment. We reverse.
The facts are complicated, but nonetheless necessary to understand the present appeal. Boca Development Associates, Ltd. (Boca Development) purchased a forty-one acre parcel of land in Palm Beach County. The property had been zoned for agricultural use, but Boca Development obtained a rezoning classification to commercial use. Two property owners' associations--the Holiday City Civic Association, Inc. and the Boca Grande Property Owners Association--contested the rezoning by seeking certiorari from the circuit court. The named-respondent in the certiorari proceeding was Palm Beach County ("County"). The circuit court granted the writ and quashed the rezoning. Boca Development, although aware of the litigation, did not attempt to intervene until after the trial court had announced its decision. The trial court denied intervention; Boca Development appealed; and we affirmed. Boca Development Associates, Ltd. v. Holiday City Civic Association, 411 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
Failing at its first effort, Boca Development next filed an independent action in the circuit court pursuant to Rule 1.540(b), Fla.R.Civ.P. The county and the two property owners' associations were named as defendants. The suit asserted that the trial court's decision in the earlier certiorari proceeding was the result of extrinsic fraud. Boca Development claimed that the county had changed its mind on the rezoning matter and, therefore, had purposefully presented an ineffective defense. In essence, Boca Development contended that the county had "thrown in the towel."
The trial court ruled against Boca Development and it appealed. 1 While the appeal was pending, Boca Development reached a settlement with two of the three defendant/appellees, viz, the two property owners' associations. Therefore, Boca Development and the two property owners' associations filed a stipulation and joint motion that this court relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court. In the motion, the parties to the settlement asked this court to "relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court to enter an order approving their settlement agreement and to enter an amended final decree in conformity with the settlement agreement of the parties ...."
We granted the motion and issued an order which provided, in full:
Ordered that the Stipulation and Joint Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction is granted. Jurisdiction is hereby relinquished to the trial court for an order on settlement agreement.
The parties shall forward to this Court a copy of any order issued during relinquishment. This case shall proceed in this Court upon expiration of relinquishment unless otherwise notified in writing by parties.
After relinquishment, the trial court issued an order approving the settlement agreement and vacating the final judgment which had been entered in the certiorari proceeding. The county now appeals, claiming that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by vacating the four-year-old judgment. We agree.
Our starting point is Rule 9.600(b), Fla.R.App.P, which provides:
Further Proceedings. When the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal has been divested by an appeal from a final order, the court by order may permit the lower tribunal to proceed with specifically stated matters during the pendency of the appeal. [Emphasis added.]
When this court relinquished jurisdiction, it empowered the trial court to enter "an order on [the] settlement agreement." Implicit in this, was the direction that the trial court enter an order resolving the differences among the three parties which stipulated to the relinquishment of jurisdiction. It was never our intention to permit the trial court to take additional action which would prejudice the rights of a non-consenting party, viz, the county. Furthermore, our order of relinquishment did not authorize the trial court to vacate the four-year-old judgment which had been entered against the county and to which Boca Development was not a party.
On appeal, Boca Development contends that the county should be estopped from contesting the trial court's decision to vacate its prior judgment. Boca Development notes that the county has consistently argued that the rezoning was proper. Since, by vacating its earlier judgment, the trial court, in effect, would allow the rezoning to stand, Boca Development maintains that the county is precluded from taking an inconsistent position. We cannot agree.
The doctrine of estoppel against inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings is well established. Palm Beach Co. v. Palm Beach Estates, 110 Fla. 77, 148 So. 544, 549 (1933), contains the classic formulation of the rule:
It is the general rule that, where a party to a suit has assumed an attitude on a former appeal, and has carried his case to an appellate adjudication on a particular theory asserted by the record on that appeal, he is estopped to assume in a pleading filed in a later phase of that same case, or on another appeal, any other or inconsistent position toward the same parties and subject matter.
Id. 148 So. at 548. See also Lambert v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 456 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Salcedo v. Ass'n Cubana, Inc., 368 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pollock, 270 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Federated Mutual Implement & Hardwood Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 237 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
Boca Development, however, has overlooked a significant point: the doctrine of estoppel against inconsistent positions is not applicable to cases in which the party was unsuccessful in the prior proceeding.
In Olin's Inc. v. Avis Rental Car System of Florida, 104 So.2d 508 (Fla.1958), the court held:
Nor can the District Court's decision be sustained upon the theory of estoppel to maintain inconsistent positions in pleading, since this rule is not applicable unless the previous position was successfully maintained.
Id. at 511. Similarly, in Grauer v. Occidental Life Insurance Co., 363 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So.2d 468 (Fla.1979), the court held:
"Equitable estoppel" precludes a person from maintaining a position inconsistent with another position which is sought to be maintained at the same time or which was asserted at a previous time; and, as a general rule where a person has, with knowledge of the facts, acted or conducted himself in a particular manner, or asserted a particular claim or right, he cannot afterward assume a position inconsistent with such act or conduct to the prejudice of another who has acted in reliance on such conduct. The doctrine requires of a party consistency of conduct, when inconsistency would work substantial injury to the other party.
The above rule is subject to the exception that it is not applicable unless the party's position in the prior suit was successfully maintained.
Id. at 535 (citations omitted). This point was restated recently in Leitman v. Boone, 439 So.2d 318, (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), when the court stated
In judicial proceedings, a party simply is not estopped from asserting a later inconsistent position (if that it can be called), unless the party's initial position was successfully maintained.
Id. at 323. See also Smith v. Urquhart, 129 Fla. 742, 176 So. 787 (1937); McWilliams Co. v. Travers, 96 Fla. 203, 118 So. 54 (1928).
In the case at bar, the county's prior...
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