Palmer Brick Co. v. Woodward
Decision Date | 13 June 1912 |
Citation | 75 S.E. 480,138 Ga. 289 |
Parties | PALMER BRICK CO. v. WOODWARD et al. WOODWARD et al. v. PALMER BRICK CO. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
A contract is not unilateral and unenforceable which contains mutual obligations equally binding on both parties to the contract.
A contract which grants to one of the parties thereto the use and occupation of premises for a definite term, with the right to take brick clay from certain land of the other party and manufacture the same into merchantable brick, for a valuable consideration moving from the other party thereto during a specified term of years, is a contract of lease.
Where in such a contract it is provided that the lessee, "the said brick company, [is] to have the exclusive right to take from said land, or any portion thereof, and use, in the manufacture of brick, such amount of dirt and clay as they may see proper, for the said period of 20 years," and the said brick company shall pay "a royalty of 12 1/2 cents per thousand for all merchantable brick manufactured out of the clay taken from said land herein leased, payments to be made as follows: Two hundred and fifty dollars cash and $100 on the 1st day of each month during the continuance of this lease; but, on the 1st day of January, in each year an accounting shall be had between the said parties, when the said *** trustee, as aforesaid, shall account for any overpayment made, and the *** brick company shall account for any deficit on the said basis of 12 1/2 cents per thousand for said brick, as aforesaid." Held:
(a) The lessee is to have the exclusive right to take from the land, or any portion thereof, and use in the manufacture of brick, all clay that it chooses to take therefrom, and to pay ultimately for the clay so used at the rate of 12 1/2 cents per 1,000 of merchantable brick manufactured therefrom.
(b) The payment of the $100 per month is to continue regularly as a minimum alternative sum, subject to be reduced if, at the end of each year, the company shows on an accounting that, after using reasonable diligence in operating the clay mine and brick plant under ordinary conditions, there was not sufficient clay mined to make the sum of $1,200 at 12 1/2 cents per 1,000 merchantable brick, and in that event the lessee could require the lessor to refund the overpayment.
(c) If the lessee, after operating the mine and brick plant as stated in note (b), took clay from the mine in quantities sufficient to make a sum in excess of $1,200 during the year previous to 1st day of January in each year, pending the lease, as to which the accounting was to be had, the lessor had the right to demand and receive from the lessee the amount of such excess on the basis of 12 1/2 cents per 1,000 merchantable brick manufactured out of the clay so taken.
(d) By necessary implication the lessee is bound to exercise reasonable diligence in taking clay from the mine and operating the brick plant, or else is liable to the lessor in the minimum alternative sum of $100 fixed in the contract.
(e) If the lessee failed to exercise reasonable diligence in mining the clay and operating its brick plant in the manufacture therefrom of merchantable brick, or declined altogether to mine the clay and operate its plant in the manufacture of brick, the lessee would lose its right of having an accounting on the 1st day of January of each year, and would be liable, absolutely and unconditionally, to the lessor for the $100 per month agreed to be paid, and the latter could recover of the former such payments, or deferred payments, with interest.
There being ample evidence to support the findings of the auditor on the questions of fact, and his findings of law being in accord with the rulings herein made, the judgment of the court overruling the exceptions of law and fact to the auditor's report was not erroneous.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Geo. L. Bell, Judge.
Action by A. P. Woodward, trustee, and others, against the Palmer Brick Company. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant excepts, and plaintiffs file a cross-bill of exceptions. Judgment affirmed, and cross-bill of exceptions dismissed.
See, also, 135 Ga. 450, 69 S.E. 827.
The petition of the plaintiffs against the Palmer Brick Company showed substantially the following facts:
In 1876 C. Howell, father of Catherine S. Woodward, conveyed to A. P. Woodward, the husband of Catherine S. Woodward, as trustee for his wife and children, 300 acres of land, more or less, in Fulton county, situated on and near the Chattahoochee river, a large portion of which was bottom land, valuable for farming purposes, and also containing large deposits of clay suitable for making brick. In 1896 negotiations were entered into between A. P. Woodward, trustee, and the Collins Brick Company, resulting in a lease of the said lands by said trustee to said brick company for a term of 20 years, for the purpose of establishing thereon a brick manufacturing plant and using the clay for the manufacture of brick. Before the lease was executed, a petition was filed by counsel for the brick company (who was paid by the trustee) in the superior court of Fulton county, praying an order of the court authorizing the trustee to make the lease. Service was perfected on the beneficiaries, and a guardian ad litem was appointed for the minors. The order of the court authorizing the lease was granted on the 17th day of September, 1896. In accordance with the authority granted by the order, the contract of lease (prepared by the same counsel) was duly executed on the 25th day of September, 1896, the material portions of which are as follows:
The brick company took possession of the leased land, and began to mine and remove the clay and to manufacture it into brick. In 1898 the name of the brick company was changed to ...
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...He has also testified as an expert witness in a jury trial before the Georgia State-wide Business Court. --------- Notes: [1] 138 Ga. 289 (1912) ("But surely it was never in the contemplation of the parties to so important a contract as this that the lessee could use the leased premises, wi......