Palmer v. Bell

• Decision Date: 22 March 1893
• Citation: 85 Me. 352,27 A. 250
• Parties: PALMER v. BELL.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

27 A. 250

85 Me. 352

PALMER

v. BELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 22, 1893.

(Official.)

Exceptions from supreme Judicial court, Cumberland county.

Action by Daniel F. Palmer against Samuel Bell. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant brings exceptions, and moves for a new trial. Exceptions sustained.

S. C. Strout and J. A. Waterman, for plaintiff.

J. W. Symonds and L. B. Dennett, for defendant.

FOSTER, J. This is an action on. the case to recover damages for alleged deceit in the sale of a farm by the defendant to the plaintiff. The case comes before us upon exceptions and motion for a new trial.

When the defendant purchased this farm, which he afterwards sold to the plaintiff, a right of way was reserved in the deed from what may now be termed the Clifford house and land to the main road leading from Portland to Gray. In the deed which the defendant received from his grantor, the way is specifically set out, and the rights of the parties fully defined. The defendant conveyed to the plaintiff; and in his deed, by express reference to the deed he had taken, precisely the same reservation as to this right of way was made.

The writ contains two counts, both based upon substantially the same alleged misrepresentation,—that, being about to purchase the farm, the defendant, during the negotiations, stated to the plaintiff that there was not, and never had been, any trouble whatever between himself and Clifford in regard to this road.

At the trial it was claimed on the part of the defense that if these representations were made by the defendant at the time with reference to the sale of the farm, and if it was proved that they were not true, still they did not constitute a legal cause of action.

But the judge in charging the jury, among other things, instructed them, in effect, that the statement made to the plaintiff by the defendant during the negotiations for the sale and purchase of the farm—that there was no trouble in regard to the right of way which Charles E. Clifford had over the premises about to be purchased—would, if proved to have been made, and to have been false, and known to be false by the defendant, be such a material misrepresentation as would sustain the plaintiff's action.

The only inquiry which we consider essential in deciding this case, upon the exceptions raised, is whether, assuming the misrepresentations to have been proved as stated, they constitute a legal cause of action against the defendant. We think they do not.

It is well settled that, to be actionable, the fraud or deceit relied upon must relate distinctly and directly to the contract, must affect its very essence and substance, and it must be material to the contract, for if it relates to another matter, or to this only in a trivial and unimportant way, or is wholly extrinsic and collateral, it affords no ground of action. 2 Pars. Cont. *769. To entitle a party to sustain an action for deceit on account of fraudulent misrepresentations, it must appear that the statements were made in relation to some fact or facts material to the subject-matter of the transaction. As was said by this court in Long v. Woodman, 58 Me. 49: "It is not every misrepresentation relating to the subject-matter of the contract which will render it void, or enable the aggrieved party to maintain his action for deceit. It must be as to matters of fact, substantially affecting his Interests, not as to matters of opinion, judgment, probability, or expectation." Hence, it is the well-recognized doctrine of the courts in this state and Massachusetts, if not in many others, repeatedly recognized and acted upon in relation both to real and personal property, that the statements of the vendor as to its value, or the price which he has given or been offered for it, are so commonly made by those having property to sell, in order to enhance its value, that any purchaser who confides in them is considered as too careless of his own interests to be entitled to relief, even if the statements are false, and intended to deceive. Medbury v. Watson, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 246, 259, 260; Manning v. Albee, 11 Allen, 520, 522; Hemmer v. Cooper, 8 Allen, 334; Brown v. Castles, 11 Cush. 348, 350; Long v. Woodman, 58 Me. 49, 52; Martin v. Jordan, 60 Me. 531, 533; State v. Paul, 69 Me. 215; Richardson v. Noble, 77 Me. 390, 392; Bourn v. Davis, 76 Me. 223, 225. With regard to such statements, the maxim of "caveat emptor" applies, and they are to be received with great allowance and distrust. It is folly for the purchaser to rely upon such statements, in disregard to his own judgment and means of information. They do not fall within that class of representations upon which actions have been held to lie when made in relation to past or existent facts, material to the contract, and pertaining to the quantity, quality, or condition of the property, as in Martin v. Jordan, 60 Me. 531, where a fraudulent affirmation was made by the defendant to the plaintiff as to the quantity of hay cut the previous year; or Rhoda v. Annis, 75 Me. 17, in relation to the quantity of hay cut in previous years; or Ladd v. Putnam, 79 Me....