Palmer v. Gregg

• Decision Date: 03 February 1967
• Citation: 56 Cal.Rptr. 97,65 Cal.2d 657,422 P.2d 985
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 422 P.2d 985 Margaret H. PALMER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frances W. GREGG and Merle Doherty, as Coadministratrices, etc., Defendants and Appellants. L.A. 29117. In Bank

Page 97

56 Cal.Rptr. 97

65 Cal.2d 657, 422 P.2d 985

Margaret H. PALMER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frances W. GREGG and Merle Doherty, as Coadministratrices, etc., Defendants and Appellants.

L.A. 29117.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Feb. 3, 1967.

Myron E. Harpole and Thomas P. Cruce, Los Angeles, for defendants and appellants.

J. E. Simpson, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff in her action to recover the reasonable value of services rendered decedent, De Nelson Smith, from August 8, 1960, to the date of his death, June 10, 1961, and the value of her services thereafter as caretaker of decedent's house at the request of his attorney.

At oral argument defendants abandoned their contention that the evidence does not support the trial court's award of compensation to plaintiff for her services. They urge, however, that the judgment erroneously allowed as additional damages the cost of gardening at her home in Palm Springs during the time she was in Los Angeles caring for decedent, and also that no interest should be allowed until such time as the probate court orders payment of the judgment. We have concluded that these points are well taken and the judgment should be modified accordingly.

The trial court found that shortly before August 8, 1960, the decedent became ill. He telephoned plaintiff, a friend of many years who resided in Palm Springs, and requested her to come to Los Angeles and take care of him. Plaintiff complied with decedent's importuning, and immediately upon her arrival took him to see his physician, Dr. Bolotin. The doctor diagnosed decedent's condition as heart failure and prescribed a regimen of bed rest, diet, drugs, and medicines. In addition, he strongly recommended that decedent go to a hospital. Decedent refused to comply with the latter recommendation, stating, according to Dr. Bolotin, that 'Mrs. Palmer (plaintiff) would take care of him.'

For approximately the next two months decedent was confined to the second floor of his home, and for the most part was required to remain in bed. The trial court found that during the entire ten-month period between August 8, 1960, and the date of decedent's death, June 10, 1961, plaintiff performed and rendered personal services at the request of decedent, consisting of acting as a practical nurse and housekeeper, doing the marketing, laundering, acting as his chauffeur, administering drugs and medicines pursuant to instructions from his doctors, watering the yard, and caring for and training decedent's dog.

Further, the court found that plaintiff frequently communicated with decedent's doctors respecting his condition, care and treatment, and was the only person who performed such services for decedent during this period of time. Moreover, when plaintiff occasionally was absent from decedent's home, she arranged for someone else to be with him.

The court found that the services were rendered with the expectation on the part of both plaintiff and decedent that plaintiff would be compensated therefor, and 'the reasonable value of the services so performed by plaintiff for Decedent' during the ten-month period was $7,344.

Our own review of the record convinces us that these findings are amply supported by the evidence.

Defendants do not challenge the determination made with regard to the second cause of action that plaintiff's services as caretaker after decedent's death were reasonably worth $601.04, the value set by the trial court.

Defendants complain of the award to plaintiff of reimbursement for the cost of gardening services performed at her home in Palm Springs during the period she was in Los Angeles taking care of decedent and later acting as caretaker. The trial court found that during the period prior to decedent's death plaintiff was required to employ a gardener to care for her Palm Springs home, and that the cost of said gardener was $400; the court made a similar finding with respect to the period during which plaintiff acted as caretaker for the estate, and the sum of $117.04 was awarded therefor.

We do not reach the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support these findings; for reasons stated hereinafter, we have concluded that the allowance to plaintiff of her gardening expenses in an action in quantum meruit was error.

The measure of recovery in quantum meruit is the reasonable value of the services rendered, provided they were of direct benefit to the defendant. (Rotea v. Izuel (1939) 14 Cal.2d 605, 610--611, 95 P.2d 927, 125 A.L.R. 1424; Major-Blakeney Corp. v. Jenkins (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 325, 339--340, 263 P.2d 655; Lozano v. Thos. W. Blake Lumber Co. (Tex.Civ.App.1929) 16 S.W.2d 983.) As Professor Corbin states, 'the defendant is regarded as a debtor to the extent of the value of something received by him and he is said to be under a legal duty sometimes called 'quasi contractual,' to make restitution of this value. In determining the amount of this value, expenditures made by the injured party are not included unless they (i.e., their benefits) were received by the defendant.' (5 Corbin on Contracts (1964 ed.) § 996, p. 17.) The facts of the present case suggest no exception to the general rule: plaintiff's personal gardening expenses conferred no direct benefit on decedent, and accordingly cannot be recovered in this action. ¹

Defendants further contend the trial court erred in ordering that interest be payable on the principal sum involved in both counts from the date that each claim was presented (December 11, 1961). This contention is meritorious.

The law on the subject of allowable interest on a judgment based upon a rejected noninterest-bearing claim was settled by our decision in Hilton v. McNitt (1957) 49 Cal.2d 79, 83, 315 P.2d 1, 4, in which we said, 'Judgments ordinarily bear interest at the statutory rate. However, only after an order for payment is the executor obliged to pay any general claim against the estate (Prob.Code, §§ 951, 952). This court said in Re Estate of Bell, 168 Cal. 253, 258, 259, 141 P. 1179, 1181, that '(I)t is settled by our decisions that the allowance of a claim against a solvent estate is not equivalent to an ordinary judgment. It is a judgment only in a qualified sense, and does not attain the force and dignity of an absolute judgment until an order of court is made directing the executor or administrator to pay it. Until then it is simply an acknowledged debt of the estate, bearing interest at the contract rate. It is only after such an order is made that it bears interest at the statutory rate.' And in Re Estate of Girard, 110 Cal.App.2d 203, 204, 242 P.2d 669, the court stated that 'The only question presented to us is whether a noninterest-bearing debt of a decedent bears interest at the statutory rate from the date of the allowance and approval of the creditor's claim. We have concluded that under the existing statutory law it does not.' It follows, therefore, that plaintiff is entitled to interest at the statutory rate on the amount owed at the time of decedent's death only after the executor has been ordered to pay her claim.' (Italics added.)

Unfortunately, some of the Courts of Appeal have seized upon and misconceived the effect of our failure to overrule or disapprove by name every case conflicting with the opinion in Hilton. (See De Meo, Cal. Estate Admin. (Cont. Ed. Bar 1960) § 10.40, pp. 230--231.) The rule enunciated in Hilton is controlling and all holdings inconsistent therewith are disapproved. (E.g., Pico v. Stevens, (1861) 18 Cal. 376; Luther v. Foster (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 725, 310 P.2d 655; White v. Deering (1918) 38 Cal.App. 516, 179 P. 401.)

Plaintiff argues that even assuming a court order for payment of the creditor's claim for pre-death services were required, such an order was made. Plaintiff relies upon language of the judgment to the effect that the principal sum 'shall be paid by said defendants in due course of administration of said estate.' Plaintiff insists this is 'a clear and express order for payment to be made by the administratrices of the Estate.'

An identical contention was advanced and rejected in Estate of Cole (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 823, 825--826, 236 P.2d 206, 207. The court there stated, 'Appellant asserts that the order is more than an order allowing the claim, for the reason, so it is urged, that it directs payment of the claim. In this connection appellant points out that the order, after allowing the claim, provides that such claim is 'to be paid in the due course of administration.' This quoted provision merely added to the order of allowance what otherwise would have been necessarily implied by reason of the provisions of section 713 of the Probate Code. That section provides: 'Every claim allowed by the executor or administrator and Approved by the judge shall be ranked among the acknowledged debts of the estate, To be paid in due course of administration; but the validity thereof may be contested by any person in interest, at any time prior to the settlement of the account of the executor or administrator in which it is first reported as an allowed and approved claim, unless established by a judgment against the executor or administrator. The date of allowance of each claim, together with the amount allowed, must be entered in the register by the clerk after the allowance or approval thereof by the judge.' (Italics added.)

'This section fixes the status of allowed claims, and it contains the very language of the order appealed from and relief upon by appellants to support their contention that this is not an ordinary order allowing a claim, but one also directing payment. Had the order not contained the language that the allowed claim was 'to be paid in due course of administration', such a direction would have necessarily been implied by virtue of section 713. In other words, the phrase in question...