Palmer v. Hospital Authority of Randolph County, 93-8619

• Decision Date: 21 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-8619,93-8619
• Citation: 22 F.3d 1559
• Parties: Jerry PALMER, as surviving spouse of Paulette Palmer, deceased; Jerry Palmer, as administrator and personal representative of the estate of Paulette Palmer, deceased; Jerry Palmer, as the sole surviving parent of Unborn Infant Palmer, deceased; and Jerry Palmer, as the personal representative and next friend of Unborn Infant Palmer, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF RANDOLPH COUNTY, a Georgia public corporation, d/b/a Patterson Hospital, Defendant, John G. Bates, M.D.; John G. Bates, M.D., P.C., a professional corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1559

22 F.3d 1559

Jerry PALMER, as surviving spouse of Paulette Palmer deceased; Jerry Palmer, as administrator and personal representative of the estate of Paulette Palmer, deceased Jerry Palmer, as the sole surviving parent of Unborn Infant Palmer, deceased; and Jerry Palmer, as the personal representative and next friend of Unborn Infant Palmer Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF RANDOLPH COUNTY, a Georgia public corporation, d/b/a Patterson Hospital, Defendant John G. Bates, M.D.; John G. Bates, M.D., P.C., a professional corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-8619.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 21, 1994.

C. Neal Pope, R. Timothy Morrison, Wade H. Tomlinson, Pope, McGlamry, Kilpatrick & Morrison, Atlanta, GA, Steven Saccoccia, Pope, McGlamry, Kilpatrick & Morrison, Decatur, GA, Teresa Pike Majors, Pope, McGlamry, Kilpatrick & Morrison, Atlanta, GA, for appellants.

Jesse Groover Bowles, III, Cuthbert, GA, Robert C. Martin, Jr., C. Morris Mullin, Columbus, GA, for appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and ATKINS ^*, Senior District Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

This case addresses a challenge by plaintiffs-appellants to the district court's dismissal of all claims against defendants-appellees for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the district court that diversity was lacking in this case. We find, however, that the district court had the power, under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a), to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against appellees, despite the dismissal of the sole federal question claim against appellees. Nevertheless, the district court made no finding as to the exercise of its discretion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c). Since we find the district court's analysis to be incomplete, we are compelled to reverse the dismissal of all claims against appellees and remand to the district court for a full consideration of the propriety of exercising supplemental jurisdiction in this case.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the death of Paulette Palmer and her unborn infant on June 24, 1990. On May 29, 1992, Jerry Palmer, the surviving spouse of Paulette Palmer and the surviving parent of the unborn infant, filed suit in federal court in Columbus, Georgia, against three defendants, Hospital Authority of Randolph County d/b/a Patterson Hospital ("Patterson"), John G. Bates, M.D., and John G. Bates, P.C. (together, "Bates"). All defendants are Georgia citizens. The claims raised against the defendants were grounded in both federal and state law. The federal claims were brought against all three defendants under the Federal Patient Anti-Dumping Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395dd ("COBRA"). In addition, the complaint included state-law claims based on: (1) the Georgia Wrongful Death Act, O.C.G.A. Sec. 51-4-1 et seq.; (2) the Georgia Medical Malpractice Act, O.C.G.A. Sec. 51-1-27; (3) the Georgia Hospital Care for Pregnant Women Act, O.C.G.A. Sec. 31-8-40 et seq.; and (4) Georgia common law.

Jerry Palmer filed this suit in four distinct capacities: (1) as the surviving spouse of Paulette Palmer; (2) as the sole surviving parent of the unborn infant; (3) as administrator and personal representative of the estate of Paulette Palmer; and (4) as the personal representative and next friend of the unborn infant. ¹

On June 18, 1992, Bates filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that COBRA did not provide a cause of action against treating physicians. The district court denied this motion on July 30, 1992. The motion to dismiss was renewed in February 1993, on the basis that the case law had developed in the interim to such an extent as to demonstrate the absence of a private cause of action against Bates under COBRA. ² The district court agreed and dismissed all claims against Bates, including those raised under state law, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Following the dismissal of all claims against Bates, all plaintiffs together filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the court retained subject matter jurisdiction over their state-law claims against Bates under either diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. The district court again rejected these theories. It is this refusal of the district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction that the appellants challenge.

II. DISCUSSION

Due to the number of parties and claims involved, this case presents a complex set of facts on which to determine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. For this reason, we set out several possible bases for jurisdiction in this case and discuss each in turn. First, we examine the validity of the district court's original exercise of jurisdiction, prior to the dismissal of the COBRA claim against Bates. Next, we analyze the two possible arguments for the continuing exercise of jurisdiction here: (1) diversity of citizenship coupled with a federal question, and (2) supplemental claim and party jurisdiction. ³ Finally in the interest of judicial economy, we briefly discuss the discretion allowed a federal court under section 1367(c) which could affect the district court's decision relative to the exercise of its power of jurisdiction in this case.

A. Original Basis of Jurisdiction

As originally filed, jurisdiction in this case was validly exercised as to all claims against all parties. First, the Georgia Plaintiffs asserted federal question claims under COBRA against both Bates and Patterson. There is no dispute that COBRA creates a private cause of action, grounded in federal law, sufficient to create federal question jurisdiction against Patterson. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395dd(d)(2)(A); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. It is true that it has been settled in other circuits that COBRA creates no private cause of action against a private physician and medical professional corporation. See, e.g., Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387, 393-94 (10th Cir.1993); Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 876-78 (4th Cir.1992); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1040 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1991). This court, however, has not decided the applicability of COBRA to parties such as Bates, and, at the time the suit was filed, the law in that area was unsettled in other circuits as well. As a result, the Georgia Plaintiffs originally asserted a non-frivolous federal question claim against both Bates and Patterson.

The state law claims by the Georgia Plaintiffs against Bates and Patterson were appropriate under traditional supplemental jurisdiction as supplemental claims. Section 1367 codifies the concepts previously known as pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. Prior to this statute, the primary source of guidance for the exercise of pendent claim jurisdiction was United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Gibbs divided the analysis into two sections: the power of a federal court to exercise pendent claim jurisdiction, and its discretion not to do so despite having the power. Id. at 725-26, 86 S.Ct. at 1138-39.

Section 1367 retains the same dichotomy, though its scope is somewhat different than the Gibbs tests. Under section 1367(a), unless section 1367(b) or (c) applies, the district court "shall have " supplemental jurisdiction over both additional claims and additional parties when those claims "are so related to claims in the action within [the] original jurisdiction [of the court] that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a). Section 1367(c), however, allows a federal court to exercise some discretion in refusing to hear a case otherwise within its supplemental jurisdiction.

In this case, original jurisdiction was initially based on the non-frivolous COBRA claims of the Georgia Plaintiffs against both Bates and Patterson. These claims arose from the two occasions on which Paulette Palmer presented herself to Patterson and Bates and allegedly received either mistreatment or no treatment at all. ⁴ The Georgia Plaintiffs' state law claims against Patterson and Bates are certainly part of the same case or controversy as the COBRA claims. The Georgia Plaintiffs' state-law claims all arise from the same two events as the COBRA claims. They will involve the same witnesses, presentation of the same evidence and determination of the same, or very similar, facts. Accordingly, it was within the power of the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims of the Georgia Plaintiffs against both Bates and Patterson, and doing so was not an abuse of discretion. ⁵

Finally, the district court properly assumed jurisdiction over the state-law claims of the Alabama Plaintiffs against Bates and Patterson. There are two possible bases for this exercise: supplemental party jurisdiction and diversity. The exercise of supplemental party jurisdiction would involve both the power and the discretion of the district court in the same manner as discussed above in relation to the supplemental claims of the Georgia Plaintiff. If this was the basis of the district court's exercise of jurisdiction, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion.

Regardless of the exercise of supplemental party jurisdiction, however, there was diversity in the original format of this case. Diversity jurisdiction, as a general rule, requires complete diversity--every plaintiff must be diverse from every defendant. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806). Since this requirement was designed to prevent abuse of diversity jurisdiction rules, for example by pleading in one diverse party in order to obtain a federal forum, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this requirement when abuse is unlikely: a court may ignore the citizenship of a plaintiff which has an independent...