Palmer v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 13 July 1914
• Parties: PALMER v. PALMER et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

91 A. 281

112 Me. 149

PALMER

v. PALMER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 13, 1914.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, York County, in Equity.

Bill by Bartlett Palmer against Francis Palmer and others. On report. Bill sustained, with costs.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and SPEAR, CORNISH, KING, BIRD, and HANSON, JJ.

Clinton C. Palmer, of Biddeford, for plaintiff. James O. Bradbury, of Saco, and Cleaves, Waterhouse & Emery, of Biddeford, for defendants.

CORNISH, J. Bill in equity to recover from a drawee the sum of $800, with interest, the amount of an order dated April 16, 1910. Prior cases before this court arising out of the same estate have fully set forth the preliminary facts, and it is unnecessary to repeat them in detail. It is sufficient to say that one of the defendants, Clinton C. Palmer, has been held to possess an equitable estate in fee in a certain portion of the residuary estate of his mother, Elizabeth C. Palmer, which was held in trust for him by Francis Palmer, the other and real defendant, "to be used for his comfort and necessities according to the direction" of said trustee. Holcomb v. Palmer, 106 Me. 17, 75 Atl. 324, the opinion in that case being rendered on September 8, 1909.

Clinton C. Palmer had previously given to George F. Haley two promissory notes of $500 each, for money loaned, one in November, 1908, and the other in March, 1909. An equitable trustee process was brought on these notes against Clinton C. Palmer, the maker, and Francis Palmer, the testamentary trustee, under R. S. c. 79, § 6, par. 9, and was sustained, the decree of the single justice being entered on March 24, 1910, and, on appeal, was affirmed by the law court on November 9, 1910. Haley v. Palmer, 107 Me. 311, 78 Atl. 368.

On April 16, 1910, Clinton C. Palmer gave his brother, Bartlett Palmer, the plaintiff, the following order:

"$800. Philadelphia, Pa., April 16, 1910.

"Pay to Bartlett Palmer, for value received, eight hundred and no/100 dollars out of the fund constituting the trust established by the residuary clause of the will of Elizabeth C. Palmer, deceased, and charge the same to the account of Clinton C. Palmer.

"To Francis Palmer, trustee under the will of Elizabeth C. Palmer, deceased.

"Trenton, New Jersey."

This order was presented to Francis Palmer for payment at Trenton on April 19, 1910, but payment was refused by him; the reason assigned being, as appears by the indorsement, "Funds are under the control of the courts." This order is the basis of the present bill in equity.

On November 15, 1910, Clinton C. Palmer gave to Fred A. Tarbox, as collateral for a promissory note, an assignment of all his residuary interest in his mother's estate, subject to the lien established by the decree in the Haley Case. The defendant Francis Palmer refused to honor the assignment or to make the payment, and therefore another equitable trustee process was instituted by the assignee and was sustained; the opinion of the law court being rendered on May 17, 1913. Tarbox v. Palmer, 110 Me. 436, 86 Atl. 847. The amount remaining in the hands of Francis was insufficient to pay the Tarbox claim in full, so that, when the present bill was brought on June 11, 1913, the trust estate had become exhausted.

The precise question presented therefore is whether the plaintiff, as holder of the order and therefore as assignee of part of this particular fund, can recover in equity from the trustee of the fund, who was duly notified of the order, but refused to accept or pay it, who at the time of notice had ample funds in his hands with which to meet it, but has since paid the same to a subsequent creditor of the assignor under a decree of court. This case is of somewhat novel impression, as the controversy has usually arisen between attaching creditors and the equitable assignee, where the debtor or drawee assumed the position of stakeholder and stood ready to pay to whichever party might be declared by the court entitled to the funds, as in Exchange Bank v. McLoon, 73 Me. 498, 40 Am. Rep. 388, and Harlow v. Bangor, 96 Me. 294, 52 Atl. 638, trustee actions at law, and in Kingsbury v. Burrill, 151 Mass. 199, 24 N. E. 36, a bill in equity in the nature of interpleader.

In such cases the debtor stands indifferent. Here, however, the debtor is a contending party, as he has paid the funds to the assignor's creditors, regardless of the previous partial assignment to the plaintiff, so that the issue here is between the assignee and the debtor and depends upon the force and effect of the assignment itself, after notice to the debtor. Is the debtor still liable to the assignee notwithstanding the payment he has made?

This question must be answered in the affirmative.

It is familiar law that an entire demand or chose in action may be assigned; that the assignment is binding upon the debtor after notice, whether he accepts it or not; and that the assignee may enforce his rights in an action at law against the debtor, upon the acceptance if accepted, otherwise upon the original claim itself. In like manner the assignment of a part only of an entire demand or chose in action, though invalid in law except as between the parties, is valid in equity and binding upon the debtor whether accepted and assented to by him or not, and may be enforced in equity against the debtor. This distinction and the reason for its existence are clearly set forth in the leading case of Exchange Bank v. McLoon, 73 Me. 498, 40 Am. Rep. 388, as follows:

"The law permits the transfer of an entire cause of action from one person to another, because in such case the only inconvenience is the substitution of one creditor for another. But if assigned in fragments, the debtor has to deal with a plurality of creditors. If his liability can be legally divided at all without his consent!' it can be divided and subdivided indefinitely. He would have the risk of ascertaining the relative shares and rights of the substituted creditors. He would have, instead of a single contract, a number of contracts to perform. A partial assignment would impose upon him burdens which his contract does not compel him to bear. * * * In a court of equity, however, the objections to a partial assignment of a demand which are formidable in a court of law disappear. In equity, the interests of all parties can be determined in a single suit. The debtor can bring the entire fund into court, and run no risks as to its proper distribution. * * * In many ways a court of equity can, while a court of law, with its present modes, cannot, protect the rights and interests of all parties concerned."

In other words, the assignee of a part of a particular fund has the same rights in equity that the assignee of an entire demand has in law. His remedy in equity arises when notice of the assignment is given to the debtor and does not depend upon acceptance by the debtor. The fund is from that time forward impressed with a trust; it is as it were impounded in the debtor's hands, and must be held by him not for the original creditor, the assignor, but for the substituted creditor, the assignee. Mr. Pomeroy states the rule thus:

"In order that the doctrine may apply, and that there may be an equitable assignment creating an equitable property, there must be a specific fund, sum of money, or debt actually existing or to become so in future upon which the assignment may operate, and the agreement, directions for payment, or order must be in effect an assignment of that fund or of some definite portion of it. * * * The agreement, direction, or order being treated in equity as an assignment, it is not necessary that the entire fund or debt should be assigned; the same doctrine applies to an equitable assignment of any definite part of a particular fund. The doctrine that the equitable assignee obtains not simply a right of action against the depository, mandatary, or debtor, but an equitable property in the...