Palmer Well Services, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., C-8356
| Decision Date | 12 July 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. C-8356,C-8356 |
| Citation | 776 S.W.2d 575 |
| Parties | PALMER WELL SERVICES, INC. and Paul R. Quinonez, Petitioner, v. MACK TRUCKS, INC. Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Randall L. Rouse, Odessa, for petitioner.
Gail Kuhne, Brad Crawford, Lubbock, for respondent.
Conflict with Rule 292 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 62.102 of the Government Code, regarding the qualifications of jurors and the requisites of verdicts, prompts this court's examination of this case.
Suit was filed to recover for personal injuries suffered by petitioner, Paul Quinonez as a result of an explosion and fire of a hot oil treatment unit and truck. Quinonez was employed by petitioner Palmer Well Services, Inc. (Petitioners will be referred to collectively as "Palmer"). The trial was to jury which rendered a 10--2, take-nothing verdict against the plaintiffs. Palmer filed a motion for new trial alleging the discovery, after the verdict, of a felony indictment pending against one juror. The trial court overruled the motion for new trial.
The court of appeals held that the juror should have been excluded from the panel because of the pending felony indictment and that due diligence was not lacking in failing to discover that fact earlier. However, the court of appeals held that Palmer was required to demonstrate that the unqualified juror's presence on the jury was a material factor which was reasonably calculated to, and probably did, cause the rendition of an improper judgment. The court of appeals held that Palmer failed to establish the requisite material injury 1 needed to sustain this burden and affirmed the trial court. For the reasons expressed, the court of appeals' judgment is reversed and this cause is remanded for new trial.
The only facts pertinent to this appeal regard one of the jurors, Mr. Ira Anderson. Anderson was one of the majority of 10 jurors that rendered the take-nothing verdict. During voir dire, the trial judge queried the panel as to their qualifications to serve. Conflicting evidence exists regarding whether Anderson had gone to the restroom, or remained silent when the panel was asked about pending indictments or legal accusations for a misdemeanor or felony.
Palmer contends that the verdict was not rendered by the requisite number of qualified jurors. In all but one instance 2, where the jury is originally composed of twelve jurors, a minimum of ten members of the original jury must concur in the verdict. Tex.R.Civ.P. 292. All individuals are competent to serve as petit jurors unless disqualified by statute. Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 62.101 (Vernon 1988). The general qualifications permitting jury service are set forth by statute in Texas Government Code § 62.102. That statute disqualifies a person to serve as a petit juror if he is "under indictment or other legal accusation of misdemeanor or felony theft, or any other felony." Id. § 62.102(8).
Respondent, Mack Trucks Inc. (Mack Trucks) concedes that Anderson was under indictment for a felony and does not argue that Palmer lacked due diligence in failing to discover that fact. Mack Trucks argues, however, that Palmer was in no way prejudiced or injured by the inclusion of Anderson on the jury. Relying on De Leon v. Longoria, 4 S.W.2d 222 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1928, writ dism'd), and Mendoza v. Varon, 563 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1978, writ ref'd. n.r.e.), Mack Trucks asserts that showing the absence of a qualification or establishing a ground for disqualification of a juror does not render a jury verdict invalid nor require the jury verdict to be set aside. The cases of De Leon and Mendoza, however, are factually distinguishable from the instant case. In De Leon, although the pending felony indictment and due diligence were stipulated by the parties, a sufficient number of jurors remained that could have rendered a binding verdict. See De Leon, 4 S.W.2d 222, 224-225. In Mendoza, the parties discovered the pending felony indictment during the course of the trial and agreed to allow that juror to remain empanelled and participate...
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Preiss v. Moritz
...The supreme court has addressed the importance of the section 62.102 qualifications for jury service. In Palmer Well Services, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 776 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1989). Palmer Well Services, following a 10-2 verdict against it, discovered that a juror voting in favor of the ver......
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...that the same ten members of an original jury of twelve may render a verdict. TEX.R. CIV. P. 292; Palmer Well Servs., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 776 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex.1989). There is a split of authority as to whether the same ten jurors who found liability in the first phase of the tria......
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Beavers on Behalf of Beavers v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc.
...the verdict was returned by a sufficient number of qualified jurors and no reversible error is shown. See Palmer Well Serv. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 776 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex.1989). Appellants' first point of error is overruled. Appellants' remaining points of error have been adequately address......
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Berry Property Management, Inc. v. Bliskey, 13-91-658-CV
...the case before us, rendered a unanimous verdict. We contrast the facts in the case before us with those in Palmer Well Servs. Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 776 S.W.2d 575 (Tex.1985). In Palmer, the jury rendered a 10-2 verdict. After the verdict, Palmer, by a motion for new trial, alleged dis......