Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Dist.

• Citation: 135 Cal.Rptr. 192,65 Cal.App.3d 121
• Decision Date: 21 December 1976
• Docket Number: ALTO-MENLO
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: PALOPARK YELLOW CAB CO., INC., a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT, a body politic, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 38211.

Page 192

135 Cal.Rptr. 192

65 Cal.App.3d 121

PALO ALTO-MENLO PARK YELLOW CAB CO., INC., a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT, a body politic, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 38211.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 21, 1976.

Anthony J. Anastasi, Phillip J. Nielsen, Anastasi & Vogel, San Jose, for plaintiffs and appellants.

William M. Siegel, County Counsel, Gerald J. Thompson, Asst. County Counsel, San Jose, for defendants and respondents.

WEINBERGER, Associate Justice. ^*

Appellants Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co., Inc. and Cabs Unlimited, Inc. (doing business as Yellow Cab of Mt. View, Los Altos and Cupertino) and other owners and operators of taxicab companies operating in Santa Clara County, on November 18, 1974, filed a complaint in the superior court for injunctive and declaratory relief.

The complaint alleged violation of the Santa Clara County Transit District Act (Pub.Util.Code, § 100000 et seq.) and sought to enjoin the operation of the Dial-A-Ride service proposed by Santa Clara County Transit District, et al. (hereinafter respondents), unless and until respondents purchased plaintiffs' businesses in accordance with Public Utilities Code section 100055.1. ¹ The complaint further sought declaration that plaintiffs are 'existing systems' within the meaning of Public Utilities Code section 100021, ² and that respondents are therefore required to purchase plaintiffs' businesses before beginning operation of the Dial-A-Ride system, which was scheduled to and did begin operation on November 24, 1974.

At a hearing on an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted the parties, on January 9, 1975, stipulated in open court (1) that the matter had been fully heard on the merits both as to law and to facts; (2) that plaintiffs were 'existing systems' within the meaning of Public Utilities Code section 100021; (3) that respondents had diverted, lessened and competed for the patronage of plaintiffs' businesses; (4) that respondents failed to purchase plaintiffs' businesses before beginning their Dial-A-Ride operation in violation of California Public Utilities Code section 100055.1; (5) that respondents be allowed a period of time ending January 24, 1975, to decide whether to terminate the Dial-A-Ride system or to enter negotiations for the purchase of plaintiffs' businesses; and (6) that the trial court would retain jurisdiction to insure prompt follow-up of negotiations. The court granted an interlocutory decree in conformity with the stipulation and directed appellants' counsel to prepare the necessary order. A document entitled 'Interlocutory Judgment on Complaint for Injunction and Declaratory Relief' was signed and filed on January 17, 1975, wherein it was ordered that respondents should permanently stop all operations of the Dial-A-Ride system on or before January 24, 1975, unless, on or before that date, respondents delivered to plaintiffs a written notice of respondents' willingness to immediately enter into negotiations for the purchase of each of plaintiffs' systems. The judgment further provided that respondents could continue the operation of their Dial-A-Ride system if they elected, within the time prescribed, to purchase plaintiffs' systems and actually pursued good faith negotiations for the purchase of plaintiffs' systems.

Respondents notified appellants on January 21, 1975, of their election to enter into negotiations for the purchase of appellants' businesses pursuant to court order. On May 9, 1975, respondents unilaterally and voluntarily terminated the Dial-A-Ride system in the north, east, and west zones of Santa Clara County without having completed negotiations to purchase appellants' businesses, and on June 4, 1975, filed a motion in the trial court for an order stating that respondents, by reason of having terminated Dial-A-Ride services in areas served by appellants, were not required to purchase appellants' taxicab companies, and for an order that appellants had an adequate remedy at law for any damages they may have sustained.

After a hearing which concluded on June 20, 1975, the trial court announced its decision to grant the respondents' motions and on July 25, 1975, a document entitled 'Judgment' was signed and filed directing that, among other things, (1) 'The motion of the Santa Clara County Transit District to modify the Judgment of this Court made on January 9, 1975, to show the remedy to be applied is one of damages, not injunctive relief, is hereby granted by reason of the termination of its Dial-A-Ride personalized service on May 9, 1975'; (2) that the defendants are 'relieved of that injunctive portion of the Judgment made on January 9, 1975, and that the remedy will be that of damages'; (3) 'That damages are ascertainable and afford plaintiffs an adequate remedy at law for the diversion, lessening and competing for the patronage and revenues of plaintiffs' existing systems by the defendants'; (4) that defendants 'are not required to purchase the plaintiff taxicab companies'; and (5) 'That the Superior Court, under its retained jurisdiction, shall supervise the remedy of damages which the Court has found to be the proper remedy to be applied.'

This appeal is from the 'judgment' modifying, in part, the prior 'interlocutory judgment' of January 9, 1975.

Appellants first contend that the interlocutory judgment of January 9, 1975, regardless of its label, became final and not subject to modification or collateral attack when the time for appeal expired on March 9, 1975. They urge that the trial court, having retained jurisdiction only to insure prompt follow-up of negotiations, exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the 'judgment' of July 25, 1975, purporting to modify the interlocutory judgment.

Where a judgment is truly interlocutory, it is not a final and conclusive determination of the rights of the parties, and may be changed or modified by the trial court as the law or evidence requires until rendition of a final judgment. (Solorza v. Park Water Co. (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 818, 821, 211 P.2d 891.) It is also well settled that the mere denomination of a judgment as 'interlocutory' is not determinative of its finality. (Brown v. Memorial Nat. Home Foundation (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 448, 453, 322 P.2d 600; Lyon v. Goss (1942) 19 Cal.2d 659, 669, 123 P.2d 11.) In determining whether a judgment is final or merely interlocutory the rule is that if anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties the judgment is interlocutory only; but where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, the decree is final. (Zappettini v. Buckles (1914) 167 Cal. 27, 33, 138 P. 696.) This general test must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case. (Lyon v. Goss, supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 670, 123 P.2d 11.)

In the instant case the judgment of January 9 was a final determination of the substantive rights of the parties despite its denomination as interlocutory. The parties stipulated that the matter had been fully heard on its merits, both as to law and to fact, and that no further trial was needed on the issues raised by the pleadings. They further stipulated that respondents were in violation of section 100055.1 of the Public Utilities Code, and therefore must decide within two weeks whether to terminate the Dial-A-Ride system, or to negotiate to purchase appellants' businesses and that the court would retain jurisdiction to insure prompt follow-up negotiations.

Despite our holding that the judgment entered pursuant to these stipulations was a final judgment, it was nevertheless modifiable as to remedy. A court of equity has inherent power to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions. 'When it can be shown that circumstances have so changed that an injunction is no longer necessary or desirable, the trial court has power to amend it in the interest of providing justice for all parties in interest. 'The court's power in this respect is an inherent one.' (Citation.)' (Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 604, 342 P.2d 249, 250.)

In Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 92, 95, 113 P.2d 689, it was held that a trial court has inherent power, upon motion, to modify or vacate a permanent preventive injunction upon a showing that the ends of justice will be served or that there has been a change in controlling facts upon which the injunction rests. The Supreme Court recognized the long established policy of the law to accord finality to judgments, but held this rule to be inapplicable to a decree granting injunctive relief, stating, 'This is so because the decree, although purporting on its face to be permanent, is in essence of an executory or continuing nature, creating no right but merely assuming to protect a right from unlawful and injurious interference.' (Id., at p. 94, 113 P.2d at p. 690; see also Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage, supra, 52 Cal.2d 601 at p. 604, 342 P.2d 249 (similar power to modify preliminary preventive injunction upon a showing of changed circumstances); Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Harrah's Club (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 764, 772, 62 Cal.Rptr. 505 (similar power to grant injunction previously denied upon a showing of changed conditions).) 'When the decree is continuing in nature, directed at future events, it must be subject to adaptation as events may shape the need.' (Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage, supra.) As is stated in 4 Witkin, California Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, section 78, page 3239: 'Independent of statute, a court which renders an equitable decree may appropriately reserve jurisdiction to take steps to carry it into effect, and to that end, may make changes in procedural...