Palombizio v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 28 April 1959 |
| Citation | 73 A.L.R.2d 1173,146 Conn. 352,150 A.2d 825 |
| Parties | , 73 A.L.R.2d 1173 Anthony V. PALOMBIZIO v. James F. MURPHY et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Robert E. Mansfield, Hartford, with whom was George W. Ripley, Hartford, for appellant (defendant Seremet).
Wallace R. Burke, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Maxwell Heiman, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before DALY, C. J., and BALDWIN, KING, MURPHY and MELLITZ, JJ.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for injuries he sustained while riding as a passenger in an automobile operated by the defendant Seremet when it came into collision with an automobile operated by the defendant Murphy. Murphy suffered a default and judgment was rendered against both defendants. Seremet appealed. Assignments of error directed to the subordinate facts found by the trial court are not discussed in Seremet's brief and are treated as abandoned. Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc., § 327. The dispute between the parties concerns the conclusions drawn by the trial court from the subordinate facts found. These facts, so far as necessary for a consideration of the errors assigned, are as follows: On June 23, 1955, at about 7:30 p. m., Seremet was operating his automobile easterly on the eastbound traffic lane of the Merritt Parkway at a point about two-tenths of a mile west of the New Canaan town line. The plaintiff was asleep on the rear seat, and another passenger, Stephen Wasik, was riding in the front seat with Seremet. The three were returning from New York City, where they had conferred with officials of the Knights of Columbus concerning the establishment of a local council in Newington, Connecticut, where they lived. As they drove along, Seremet and Wasik were discussing the business on which they had gone to New York. It was light, the weather was clear, and the roadway dry. The eastbound and westbound lanes of the parkway were separated by an esplanade which was twenty-one feet wide at this point. As his automobile was proceeding along a gradual southerly curve in the highway, and with a clear and unobstructed view of the highway ahead of him for more than 1000 feet, Seremet saw a cloud of dust rise about 600 feet away in the north or westbound half of the parkway. He did not watch this cloud of dust or attempt to ascertain its cause. Instead he took his eyes off the road and turned his head to the right toward Wasik, who was taking some papers connected with their business out of his coat pocket to show them to Seremet. Before Seremet returned his eyes to the road, there was a terrific collision between his car and that of the defendant Murphy. Seremet never saw the Murphy car.
Shortly before the collision, Murphy had been driving his car westerly on the westbound traffic lane, or north half, of the parkway. He lost control of his car and struck the north curb of the westbound lane. He proceeded along this curb about 100 feet and then traveled about 150 feet diagonally across the westbound lane in a southwesterly direction. He mounted the esplanade, traveled diagonally across it for about 80 feet and entered the eastbound lane, where he left tire marks for a distance of 78 feet. At some point his car was catapulted into the air and landed on top of the Seremet car. It is impossible to fix the point or manner of impact between the two cars. The top of Seremet's car was crushed and torn off. The car came to rest about 61 feet south of the highway, and the Murphy car about 11 feet south of the highway and 91 feet west of the Seremet car. Before the collision, the speed of Seremet's car was 45 miles an hour. The posted speed limit on the highway was 55 miles per hour. Wasik was instantly killed in the accident. Before the trial Murphy suffered a judgment by default. He did not appear at the trial nor was he represented by counsel. The trial court concluded that the act of Seremet in taking and keeping his eyes off the road for an appreciable period of time after seeing the cloud of dust in the north half of the highway was an act of negligence which was a substantial factor in and therefore a proximate cause of the collision.
The claimed errors pursued by Seremet are in the conclusions drawn by the trial court and in a ruling on evidence A police officer who had investigated the accident was called as a witness by the plaintiff. On cross-examination, he testified that he questioned Murphy at the Stamford Hospital. When Seremet sought to elicit from the officer what Murphy had told him, the plaintiff objected on the ground that the testimony would be hearsay so far as he, the plaintiff, was concerned. The objection was sustained and an exception taken. It was Seremet's contention that the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries was the negligence of Murphy and that since Murphy was a party defendant, his statement to the police officer was admissible against him as an admission by a party of a material fact. It was, of course, permissible for Seremet to defend on the ground that Murphy's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Ferino v. Palmer, 133 Conn. 463, 468, 52 A.2d 433. But to establish that fact, it was incumbent upon Seremet to present evidence which, as to the plaintiff, was not violative of the hearsay rule. A statement made by Murphy out of court, unless in the presence of the plaintiff, was hearsay as to the plaintiff and inadmissible. The issue of Murphy's liability to the plaintiff was no longer in the case. The default entered against him precluded him from making any further defense so far as liability was concerned and removed that issue from the case. Automotive Twins, Inc. v. Klein, 138 Conn. 28, 33, 82 A.2d 146. As to Murphy, the trial was merely a hearing in damages. Whether or not he had made an admission relating to the manner in which the collision occurred was no longer of moment to the plaintiff. Any admission Murphy may have made would, if relevant, be admissible only as against him. Santossio v. D'Addario, 143 Conn. 563, 566, 123 A.2d 870. Seremet sought to employ the statement as if the present litigation involved an issue of the liability of one defendant to the other. The issue here is the liability of the defendants to the plaintiff. Neither defendant may litigate in this proceeding the liability of one defendant to the other. Puleo v. Goldberg, 129 Conn. 34, 38, 26 A.2d 359. The ruling of the trial court in excluding the evidence was correct.
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