Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 July 1978
• Citation: 147 Cal.Rptr. 359,580 P.2d 1155,21 Cal.3d 650
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 580 P.2d 1155 PALOS VERDES FACULTY ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. PALOS VERDES PENINSULA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants. L.A. 30823.

Page 359

147 Cal.Rptr. 359

21 Cal.3d 650, 580 P.2d 1155

PALOS VERDES FACULTY ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. PALOS VERDES PENINSULA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.

L.A. 30823.

Supreme Court of California.

July 19, 1978.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, and Audrey Oliver, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for defendants and appellants.

William E. Brown, Gerald A. Conradi and Brown & Conradi, San Mateo, amici curiae, for defendants and appellants.

Trygstad & Odell and Lawrence B. Trygstad, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and respondents.

MANUEL, Justice.

Defendants Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District (District) et al., appeal from a judgment ordering the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing them to place John Christenson, a certificated teacher employed by District, on a step of its salary schedule commensurate with his years of teaching experience in both public and private schools, and to pay certain elements of back compensation.

Plaintiff Christenson was hired by District on or about September 17, 1968. At that time his prior teaching experience consisted of one year in the public schools and five years at an accredited private secondary school, but according to then applicable District rules relating to the rating-in of certificated employees credit was to be given only for service in the public schools; accordingly, he was given only one year's credit. On or about November 17, 1969, however, the applicable rating-in rule was amended to provide credit for service in any properly accredited elementary or secondary school, whether public or private. Plaintiff subsequently requested that he be placed on the salary schedule in the class and step commensurate to his teaching experience under the new rule, and to be awarded appropriate back pay. When this request was rejected he, in 1975, sought a writ of mandate in the superior court.

The court ordered issuance of the writ, holding in substance that former Education Code section 13506, as amended effective July 1, 1970, ¹ required that plaintiff be placed on the salary schedule as requested. On the matter of back pay the court held that plaintiff's claim was barred by laches for school years prior to 1973-1974, but that appropriate adjustments should be awarded for all subsequent years. District, et al., appeal from the judgment.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the provision relied upon by the trial court requires the result reached by it. We hold that it does. We affirm the judgment.

I

Prior to its amendment in 1969, section 13506 of the Education Code provided in relevant part as follows: "In cities, teachers of beginners shall be ranked in the salary schedule with the highest salaried teachers in the elementary grades of equal training and experience. (P) Uniform allowance may be made in any schedule of salaries for years of training and years of service." (Italics added.) ² This language, it was held, while "enjoin(ing) on (boards of education), within reasonable limits, the principle of uniformity of treatment as to salary for those performing like services with like experience . . . does not prevent the Board from making reasonable classifications" (Fry v. Board of Education (1941) 17 Cal.2d 753, 757-758, 112 P.2d 229, 233), and such classifications were to be upheld unless they were "arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable." (Rible v. Hughes (1944) 24 Cal.2d 437, 444, 150 P.2d 455; see also, Fry, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 758, 112 P.2d 229; Kacsur v. Board of Trustees (1941) 18 Cal.2d 586, 592, 116 P.2d 593; Aebli v. Board of Education (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 706, 754, 145 P.2d 601; San Diego Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 758, 762, 31 Cal.Rptr. 146; Lawe v. El Monte School Dist. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 20, 22, 72 Cal.Rptr. 554; Eastham v. Santa Clara Elementary Sch. Dist. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 807, 810, 76 Cal.Rptr. 198; Shoban v. Board of Trustees (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 534, 541, 81 Cal.Rptr. 112; Sayre v. Board of Trustees (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 488, 491, 88 Cal.Rptr. 355.)

Of the cited cases, two are of particular interest with reference to the matter we now consider. In the leading case of Fry v. Board of Education, supra, 17 Cal.2d 753, 112 P.2d 229, two teachers were appointed at a time when existing rules and regulations of the school board provided for an advanced rating based upon years of prior out-of-county teaching experience. They were immediately granted leaves of absence for one school year, and while they were absent the board revised its rules to preclude "incoming teachers" from receiving credit for out-of-county teaching experience. When the board sought to apply the new rules to the subject teachers but not to four other teachers who had been hired at the same time but had taken up their teaching duties immediately upon hiring they sought and were granted a writ of mandate ordering that they be classified for pay purposes under the prior rules and be awarded back pay.

We affirmed. After stating the principle set forth above concerning the propriety of "reasonable classifications," our opinion went on as follows: "There can be no doubt that the Board may reasonably classify between teachers with teaching experience in San Francisco and those with teaching experience outside. There can be no doubt that the resolution (adopting the new rule precluding credit for out-of-county experience) was well within the power of the Board insofar as it provided that as to all incoming teachers no credit for outside experience should be granted. It might also be conceded that the Board could, by proper action, classify as between teachers employed, but on leave of absence, and teachers employed and actually teaching. It may be that the Board could have lawfully classified the four teachers who had actually taught in San Francisco prior to (the effective date of the resolution), in one group, and could lawfully have placed the plaintiffs, who were similarly employed but who were on leaves of absence, in another group. But as already pointed out, the point is that the Board did not do this." (17 Cal.2d at p. 758, 112 P.2d at p. 233.) Concluding that the two plaintiffs were not "incoming teachers" within the meaning of the resolution adopting the new rule, we held that that rule could not be applied to them.

However strongly worded it may have been, the language above quoted relative to the kinds of classifications permissible under the law was plainly not essential to our decision in Fry, and for this reason was to be regarded as obiter dictum. It remained for the case of Lawe v. El Monte School Dist. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 20, 72 Cal.Rptr. 554 decided more than 27 years later to apply the Fry principles in a dispositive fashion. There the plaintiff, a permanent certified teacher, had been employed by the district for five consecutive years when he was granted a one year leave of absence to enable him to teach in an American Dependents Education Group School in Germany for the United States Department of Defense. Apparently during the period of his absence the district adopted a policy of allowing salary credit for outside experience only for the purpose of advancing a teacher as high as the fourth step in the salary scale, a step which Lawe had already achieved prior to his leave of absence. Thus while two other teachers who had not reached the fourth step prior to taking leaves of absence for outside teaching were granted credit for the time thus spent, plaintiff was not. His application for mandate was denied by the superior court, and he appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. After setting forth the principle of "reasonable classification" articulated in Fry and later cases interpreting section 13506, the court went on: "It is within the province of the governing board of a school district to determine the extent to which credit is to be given for teaching experience outside the district (see Fry v. Board of Education . . .) and a court is not free to interfere with such determination if the policy is reasonable in nature and is applied fairly and without discrimination. (Citations.) (P) In the present case there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the governing board of the school district in not permitting the use of approved outside experience as a basis for advancement to a step higher than the fourth step. Such a limitation tended to stabilize the continuity of service within the district of experienced teachers and tended to confine the resort to outside teaching experience to those less experienced teachers who had more to gain thereby. Moreover, the prospect of credit for such outside experience could serve as a means of attracting teachers new in the profession to the El Monte School District. The record shows that such policy was applied fairly and without discrimination." (267 Cal.App.2d at p. 23, 72 Cal.Rptr. at p. 556.)

II

With this background ³ in mind, we are brought to a consideration of the post -1969 version of section 13506, the interpretation of which is central to this appeal. As here relevant ⁴ the amended section omits the first two paragraphs of the former section i. e., that paragraph dealing specifically with "teachers of beginners" and that providing that uniform salary allowance "may" be made for training and experience (see text preceding fn. 2, ante ) and substitutes in their place the following language: "Effective July 1, 1970, each person employed by a district in a position requiring certification qualifications except a person employed in a position requiring administrative or supervisory credentials, shall be classified on the salary schedule on the basis of uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience. Employees shall not be placed in different classifications on the schedule, nor paid different salaries solely on the basis of the respective grade levels...