Pamela B. v. Ment
| Citation | 709 A.2d 1089,244 Conn. 296 |
| Decision Date | 31 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 15719,15719 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | PAMELA B. v. Aaron MENT et al. |
Gregory T. D'Auria, with whom were Susan T. Pearlman, Assistant Attorneys General, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and Carolyn K. Querijero, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants-appellees (named defendant et al.).
Paul Chill, Supervising Attorney, with whom were Hollace P. Brooks and Jon Bauer, Supervising Attorneys, and, on the brief, Michele Camerota, Certified Legal Intern, for appellee-appellant (plaintiff).
Martha Stone, Hartford, Stephen Wizner, New Haven and David Friedman, Bridgeport, Certified Legal Intern, filed a brief for the Center for Children's Advocacy, Inc., et al., as amici curiae.
Before BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ. 1
The plaintiff, Pamela B., brought this action against the defendants, Aaron Ment, in his official capacity as chief court administrator John Rowland, in his official capacity as governor of the state of Connecticut, 2 and Linda D'Amario Rossi, in her official capacity as commissioner of children and families, seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 389 et seq., now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 17-54 et seq., 3 and injunctive relief on behalf of herself and a class of persons consisting of all parents in the state whose children have been or may be seized by the state department of children and families (department), and who have been or may be denied their statutory and constitutional right to challenge the state's temporary custody in a timely evidentiary hearing. 4 The plaintiff alleged that on August 8, 1995, the department, assisted by East Hartford police officers, acting pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-101g, 5 and Practice Book § 1041.1, now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) §§ 32-6 through 32-9, 6 seized her nineteen month old son, Jonathan B., and placed him on a "ninety-six hour hold." On August 11, 1995, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (b), 7 the department applied, ex parte, to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Hartford, for an order of temporary custody. The plaintiff alleged that, upon information and belief, the application consisted of a neglect petition with accompanying affidavits. On the basis of these documents, the court granted the temporary custody order, scheduled a "ten day hearing" on the continued need for temporary emergency care, as required by § 46b-129 (b), for August 21, 1995, and caused a notice of that hearing to be served on the plaintiff. Following her receipt of the notice of the hearing, the plaintiff, along with counsel, appeared in court on August 21, 1995, intending to contest the custody order. Over the plaintiff's objection, and without requiring or permitting any testimony, the court extended the custody order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the order to be combined with a hearing on the underlying neglect petition for March 4 and March 18, 1996, the next available trial dates. Under the court's order, the temporary custody order would remain in effect based upon the ex parte application until the underlying neglect petition could be adjudicated fully.
According to the complaint, the practice of continuing orders of temporary custody for a period of up to several months, without requiring or permitting testimony and based solely upon hearsay statements contained in affidavits and other documents, is common in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Hartford. The practice of consolidating temporary custody orders and neglect hearings, thereby effectively eliminating any separate custody order hearing, is also commonplace. These practices are also alleged to be widespread in juvenile matter districts throughout the state. Furthermore, as a consequence of a dramatic increase in the number of temporary custody order applications brought by the department and the defendants' failure appropriately to perform their official duties, resulting in unreasonably crowded juvenile matters dockets, insufficient staffing in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters and inadequate allocation of judicial resources, the following practices are also allegedly widespread throughout the state: (1) beginning presentation of evidence at a ten day hearing, allowing one witness to testify in whole or in part, and continuing the hearing for several weeks or months while extending the temporary custody order in the interim; (2) extending the temporary custody order "without prejudice," indefinitely, without obtaining the parent's knowing and voluntary waiver of her statutory and constitutional rights when the parent appears at the ten day hearing unrepresented by counsel; and (3) failing to convene an evidentiary hearing promptly when an attorney appointed at a ten day hearing subsequently requests one.
The plaintiff claimed that she and the other potential class members and their children have a constitutionally protected right to family integrity and that the defendants, by denying them a fundamentally fair process, have improperly interfered with that right, in violation of their rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. 8 The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants' practices violate § 46b-129, as well as the state and federal constitutions, temporary and permanent injunctive or other equitable relief as needed to enforce compliance with state and federal law, reasonable attorney's fees and such other relief as justice may require. Following the defendants' request to revise, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint that added to paragraph two of the demand for relief a request for specific injunctive relief including: (a) an order directing Ment to establish procedures for all cases in which a temporary custody order is issued ex parte, including, but not limited to, the immediate appointment of counsel for parents; (b) an order directing Ment to allocate sufficient resources to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters to eliminate the unlawful practices described in the complaint; (c) an order directing Rossi to restore parental custody of any child whose parents have been subjected to the unlawful practices described in the complaint; and (d) such other remedial orders as may be appropriate based on the evidence adduced at trial.
Thereafter, the defendants moved to strike the complaint in its entirety on the ground that it did not make out an appropriate case for a declaratory judgment. Additionally, they moved to strike the relief requested in paragraphs 2(a) and (b) of the complaint on the grounds that Ment does not have the authority to establish new procedures and that any order by the court would necessarily interfere with his functions and discretion and is therefore barred by sovereign immunity. Finally, they moved to strike the third prayer for relief, paragraph 2(c), on the ground that a court order directing a blanket termination of temporary custody orders would unduly interfere with Rossi's discretion and is therefore barred by sovereign immunity. Although the trial court, Hon. Jerry Wagner, judge trial referee, took no action regarding the motion challenging the declaratory relief, the court agreed with the defendants and granted the motion to strike the relief requested in paragraphs 2(a), (b) and (c). The defendants then moved to dismiss and/or strike the complaint claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint because the complaint did not state an appropriate case for a declaratory judgment. The trial court, Sullivan, J., disagreed with the defendants and, in an oral decision, determined that the court had jurisdiction over the case, which presented a narrow issue that was appropriate for a declaratory ruling. Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a, 9 the defendants sought certification to appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss and/or strike and the plaintiff similarly sought certification to appeal the decision striking her claim for injunctive relief. The Chief Justice granted certification to both parties and these appeals followed. 10 The defendants raise in essence a two part claim, each part of which has subparts. First, the defendants claim that because the trial court correctly struck the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, the court cannot grant any practical relief and, therefore, the case is nonjusticiable. This claim is based on two assertions: (1) what the plaintiff wants Ment to do procedurally would supersede the rule-making power of the judges of the Superior Court; and (2) what the plaintiff wants Ment to do administratively, by way of allocation of resources, would violate sovereign immunity. Second, according to the defendants, the trial court improperly refused to strike the plaintiff's prayer for a declaratory judgment because: (1) the case is nonjusticiable; and (2) what the plaintiff wants can, and indeed, should be done on a case-by-case basis, which would be an alternate and effective, appropriate and complete remedy, rendering declaratory relief unnecessary.
The plaintiff, in her cross appeal, claims that the trial court should not have struck her claims for injunctive relief but that it properly refused to strike her claim for declaratory relief. Her arguments mirror the defendants' arguments--whether the case is justiciable, and whether declaratory relief is appropriate. Thus, these claims will be addressed in this opinion together with the defendants' claims.
We begin with a brief discussion of certain fundamental principles regarding the standard of review that are applicable to the issues in this appeal. In an appeal from a judgment granting a motion to strike, we operate in accordance with well established rules. ...
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