Panchitkaew v. Nassau Cnty.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18-CV-00956 (LDH)(AKT) |
| Parties | MARUT PANCHITKAEW, Plaintiff, v. NASSAU COUNTY, NASSAU COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, JOSEPH M. GAFFNEY, DANIEL J. DANZI, DANIEL C. STELLER, JOHN T. HOLMES, STEVEN SCHWARTZ, JOSEPH SALVATORE, CRAIG CLARK, CHRISTINA COSENTINO, NASSAU UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, MAUREEN MOYNIHAN, EUGENE YAP, MANSI SHAH, MUKESH SHAROHA and MARIA VICTORIA AGARIN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Marut Panchitkaew brings the instant action against Nassau County, Nassau County Police Department, Joseph M. Gaffney, Daniel J. Danzi, Daniel C. Steller, John T. Holmes, Steven Schwartz, Joseph Salvatore, Craig Clark, and Christina Cosentino (together, "NCPD Defendants"); and Nassau University Medical Center ("NUMC"), Maureen Moynihan, Eugene Yap, Mansi Shah, Mukesh Sharoha, and Maria Victoria Agarin (together, "NUMC Defendants"), asserting claims for unlawful entry, excessive force, unreasonable seizure, malicious prosecution, free speech retaliation, equal protection violations, due process violations, and Monell liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New York State Constitution. Defendants1 move pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiff's third amended complaint in its entirety.
Sometime prior to January 2016, Plaintiff complained to the Nassau County Police Department Internal Affairs Bureau ("IAB") of police corruption at the Eighth Precinct. (See Pl.'s Aff. Opp. NCPD Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. ("Pl.'s NCPD 56.1 Opp'n") ¶ 2, ECF No. 180-4.) Plaintiff is Asian and refers to himself as a "minority." Defendants Steller and Danzi were assigned to the IAB. (Pl.'s NCPD 56.1 Opp'n ¶ 1.) In January 2016, Steller and Danzi visited Plaintiff's home to speak with Plaintiff about his allegations. (Id. ¶ 5.) During that visit, Plaintiff stated that his phones were tapped, his computer and appliances were bugged, and that he was being followed. (Id. ¶ 7.) According to Plaintiff, Steller and Danzi warned Plaintiff not to file a complaint with the FBI and threatened to throw him in a "psychward" if he did not comply. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.)
On February 17, 2016, Plaintiff called Steller, and Steller recorded the conversation (the "Recording"). (Id ¶ 14; Ben-Sorek Decl., Ex. I at 40:8-10; 60:10-22.) Throughout the conversation, Plaintiff indicated that his phone had been tapped, his email hacked, and he discussed his belief that there was conspiracy against him involving police officers and his neighbors. (2/17/16 Recording at 2:01-2:10, 4:20-4:25, 7:10-7:15, 13:40-12:46, 13:40-12:46.3)Plaintiff also stated that he was "running back" to his home-country of Thailand and later, that he was "planning to go back". (Id. at 9:06-9:45, 16:00-16:20.) At one point, Plaintiff stated that he believed he needed to seek psychiatric help, although he did not want to seek it that day and unequivocally did not want a police officer to accompany him to the doctor. (Id. at 16:40-17:00, 17:40-18:00, 18:30-18:45, 19:15-19:22.) At the end of the conversation, Plaintiff stated that Steller would one day see that Plaintiff would get shot and killed by a police officer. (Id. at 19:58-20:22.) Steller maintains that he believed Plaintiff to be threatening "suicide by cop." (See Ben-Sorek Decl., Ex. I at 80:16-81:7.) After this phone conversation, Steller contacted the local police precinct and requested that police personnel and an ambulance be dispatched to Plaintiff's residence to transport Plaintiff to NUMC because Plaintiff was a danger to himself. (Pl.'s NCPD 56.1 Opp'n ¶ 19; Ben-Sorek Decl., Ex I at 109:3-6, 112:7-15, ECF No. 173-8.) Gaffney, Schwartz, Salvatore, Clark, and Cosentino were the law enforcement members and medical personnel who arrived at Plaintiff's house. (Ben-Sorek Decl., Ex. C., ECF No. 173-3.4) Holmes is the supervising officer who signed the NCPD's Case Summary, which was prepared by Schwartz. (See id.)
When law enforcement and medical personnel arrived at Plaintiff's house, he was found hiding in a closet. (Pl.'s NCPD 56.1 Opp'n ¶ 24.) According to the patient care report completed by Cosentino, one of the medical personnel at the scene, Plaintiff was "very confused and paranoid," "talking about organized crime" regarding the police, FBI and the White House, and stated that he was on "44 different watch lists and that the police were going to assassinate him." (See Ben-Sorek Decl., Ex. D5; May 4 2020 Decl. Eric Broutman ("Broutman Decl."), Ex.1 at NUMC0023-24, ECF No. 158-1.) Plaintiff was then transported to NUMC. (NUMC Defs.' 56.1 Statement ( ) ¶ 1, ECF No. 159-1;.)
In the NUMC emergency room, Plaintiff was observed by Drs. Shah and Sharoha. .) In Plaintiff's initial conversation with Dr. Shah, Plaintiff stated that he had contacted IAB because the NCPD was tapping his phone, and Plaintiff also stated that he has significant credit card debt, and that the FBI was "involved." He began wailing in pain and lying on the floor saying his neck was in pain. (Id.)
Subsequently, Plaintiff was reported as pacing the psychiatric emergency unit, inducing vomiting, screaming, and behaving in an "bizarre and inappropriate" manner, a characterization to which Plaintiff objects. When Plaintiff could not be calmed down verbally, he was given a single dose of psychiatric medication via injection. (Id.) Drs. Sharoha and Shah diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from a psychotic disorder. (NUMC Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 7; Pl.'s NUMC 56.1 Opp'n ¶ 7.) Their diagnosis was based upon Plaintiff presenting as out-of-touch with reality, thinking that his phones were tapped, and that multiple agencies were "after [him]." (Id.; Broutman Decl., Ex. C at 15:13-23, ECF No. 158-5.) Based on this diagnosis, Drs. Sharoha and Shah concluded that Plaintiff was a potential danger to himself or others and needed to be admitted involuntarily to the hospital pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.37. (NUMC Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 8.) Plaintiff was transferred to the psychiatric unit, where Dr. Agarin became his treating psychiatrist. (Id. ¶ 9.) Dr. Agarin reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and spoke to Plaintiff, who she deemed to be paranoid. (See Broutman Decl., Ex. D at 16:11-17:7,ECF No. 158-6.) Dr. Agarin diagnosed him with brief Reactive Psychosis, and agreed with Drs. Saroha and Shah's conclusion that Plaintiff required involuntary hospitalization. (NUMC Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was subsequently given antipsychotic oral medication. (NUMC 56.1 ¶ 13-14; NUMC0012-13.) NUMC Defendants maintain that Plaintiff was cooperative with treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff disputes that he voluntarily accepted the medication, and states that he was injected with medication numerous times without his consent. (Pl.'s NUMC 56.1 Opp'n ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff was discharged from NUMC two days later, on February 19, 2016, because he was no longer deemed to be a danger to himself or others. (NUMC Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 15.)
Sometime after he was discharged, Plaintiff "notif[ied] the FBI for help." (See Pl.'s NCPD 56.1 ¶ 52, ECF No. 180-5.) Plaintiff contacted the FBI office in Bangkok, Thailand after his involuntary commitment at NUMC to report that the "local cops were conspiring against him." (Pl.'s Decl. Opp'n NUMC Summ. J. ("Panchitkaew NCPD Decl."), Ex. F at 1, ECF No. 179-9.) And, in April and May 2017, he sent a series of emails to the FBI Bangkok office reporting purportedly false allegations made against him by NCPD officers. (Id. at 2-18.)
Summary judgment must be granted when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant[s] are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The movants bear the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330-31 (1986); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2004). Where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movants' initial burden at summary judgment can be met by pointing to a lack of evidence supporting the non-movant's claim. Celotex Corp.,477 U.S. at 325. Once the movants meet their initial burden, the non-movant may defeat summary judgment only by producing evidence of specific facts that raise a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court is to believe the evidence of the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, but the non-movant must still do more than merely assert conclusions that are unsupported by arguments or facts. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996).
"It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted), including when facing a summary judgment motion, Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the "application of this different standard does not relieve plaintiff of his duty to...
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