Pandem Oil Corporation v. McKinney

• Decision Date: 15 December 1927
• Docket Number: (No. 610.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL&gt
• Citation: 3 S.W.2d 466
• Parties: PANDEM OIL CORPORATION v. McKINNEY.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 466

3 S.W.2d 466

PANDEM OIL CORPORATION v. McKINNEY.

(No. 610.)^*

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

December 15, 1927.

Rehearing Denied January 26, 1928.

Appeal from Limestone County Court; H. F. Kirby, Judge.

Action by W. E. McKinney against the Pandem Oil Corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Winfrey & Lane, of Dallas, for appellant.

W. W. Mason, of Mexia, for appellee.

GALLAGHER, C. J.

Appellee W. E. McKinney sued appellant Pandem Oil Corporation to recover for personal services rendered to it by him and for use of a car furnished by him in connection therewith. Appellee alleged that one Chas. W. Harrison represented to him that he (Harrison) was agent of appellant; that appellant had sent him to Limestone county for the purpose of leasing a block of acreage upon which it desired to drill a well for oil or gas; that appellant was to pay all expenses incurred in securing and blocking such acreage, and that appellant would pay appellee for his services in assisting in said work; that the amount to be paid therefor was not agreed upon at the time but was to be discussed and determined at a later date; that said Harrison, in making said agreement with him, was acting within the scope of his employment, or within the apparent scope thereof. Appellee further alleged that said Harrison introduced him to one Geo. S. Vaughan, landman for appellant, and told him that appellee was to assist in securing and blocking said acreage; that he rendered the services sued for; that the same were of the reasonable value of $350, and that he had never been paid for the same; that appellant, with knowledge of the agreement between him and said Harrison, accepted said services, and received the benefit thereof, and became thereby as a matter of equity liable to appellee for the value thereof, and that he had not been paid anything therefor.

Appellant denied that Harrison was its agent; that he was authorized to enter into said contract with appellee on its behalf; that it ever ratified or acquiesced in said transaction; and that it ever received any of the benefits of the services rendered by appellee. Appellant also pleaded that it had theretofore entered into a contract with said Harrison in which he had agreed to secure a block of oil and gas leases on certain acreage and that it was especially agreed therein that said Harrison should not have authority to obligate it to any third person on account of said leases or expense incurred in procuring the same, but that its obligation under such contract was to said Harrison only, and that all the same was known, or ought to have been known, to appellee at the time.

The case was tried by the court without a jury, and judgment rendered in favor of appellee against appellant for the sum sued for. The recitals in said judgment show that the same was rendered on the implied contract pleaded by appellee.

Opinion.

Appellant's first seven propositions attack appellee's right to recover on the express contract of employment pleaded by him. None of them attack appellee's right to recover on the implied contract pleaded. Appellee introduced evidence in support of the contract of employment made by him with said Harrison as agent for appellant substantially as alleged in his petition, except that he failed to show that Harrison was authorized by appellant to bind it for the payment of the compensation promised appellee for his services. Apparently, for the purpose of attempting to prove affirmatively that Harrison did not have authority to bind appellant for the payment of the compensation promised appellee for his services, appellant offered in evidence a written contract between it and said Harrison, by the terms of which appellant authorized said Harrison to secure leases on said block of acreage.

While said contract so offered provided that said Harrison should be personally obligated to pay the cost of said leases and all expense of procuring the same, and should not have authority to obligate appellant to any third person for any sum of money on account of the procuring of said leases or the expense thereof, it further provided that appellant should be obligated to pay said Harrison all such costs and expense. It also obligated appellant to set aside, for the purpose of carrying out said contract, a fund sufficient in amount, not to exceed $30,000, and provided that such fund should be used at the direction of said Harrison for the purposes of acquiring said leases and paying any and all expenses incident thereto, including the personal expenses of said Harrison, and further provided that all such costs and expenses should be paid out of said fund. A further recital of the contents of said contract is not necessary. Appellee objected to the introduction of said contract in evidence on the grounds that it was immaterial, was a secret agreement between appellant and said Harrison and was not binding on appellee. The court sustained said objection, and refused to admit said contract in evidence. We think the court erred in excluding said contract.

Appellee testified that Harrison employed him to render the services sued for; that he told him he had a contract with appellant, and read from it to him where he (Harrison) was to spend $30,000 as he saw fit in securing said block of acreage. He also testified that Harrison showed him at that time the signatures thereto of himself and appellant by its president. While he testified that he did not read the same, he knew of its existence, and was charged...