Pangle v. Joyce

• Decision Date: 21 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-1675,95-1675
• Citation: 667 N.E.2d 1202,76 Ohio St.3d 389
• Parties: PANGLE, Appellee, v. JOYCE et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 389

76 Ohio St.3d 389

667 N.E.2d 1202

PANGLE, Appellee, v. JOYCE et al., Appellants.

No. 95-1675.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 5, 1996.

Decided Aug. 21, 1996.

This cause involves the jury determination of fault in a serious traffic accident. A tractor-trailer driven by Doyle Joyce collided with a Jeep Cherokee driven by Timothy Beyer at the intersection of U.S. Route 127 and State Route 81 in Van Wert County. As a result of the accident, Beyer suffers permanent head injuries. Beyer's mother, Virginia Pangle, filed suit against Joyce and Joyce's employer, Roundys Lake End Sales, as Beyer's guardian, claiming that Joyce's negligence had caused the accident. The defendants denied Joyce's negligence and claimed that the injury had been caused by Beyer's own negligence.

At trial, the plaintiff and defendants produced differing accounts of the events that immediately preceded the collision. According to the plaintiff, both Beyer and Joyce were traveling in the southbound lane of U.S. Route 127 before arriving at the intersection of Routes 127 and 81. Beyer's passengers were directing him to the location of a stranded vehicle. As Beyer approached Route 81, he signaled a right-hand turn, but was informed by one of his passengers that he should turn left and proceed east on Route 81. Plaintiff's passengers testified that, without ever completely leaving the southbound lane as marked (i.e., passing over the west edge line of the lane), Beyer signaled a left-hand turn and began that turn. Before reaching the eastbound lane of Route 81, Beyer's Jeep was struck by Joyce's truck, which was now in the northbound lane of Route 127, proceeding in a southerly direction. Plaintiff's passengers opined that Joyce had entered the northbound lane in an attempt to pass Beyer. Plaintiff's theory was that Joyce's per se negligence in failing to maintain an assured clear distance R.C. 4511.21) or driving on the left side of the roadway within one hundred feet of an intersection (R.C. 4511.30) had caused the accident.

Defendants account for the collision in the manner that follows. Immediately preceding the accident, Joyce was traveling in the southbound lane of Route 127. As he approached the intersection of Routes 127 and 81, he was in radio contact with a truck driven by Gary Yontz. The truck driven by Yontz was directly in front of Joyce and directly behind Beyer as all three vehicles approached the intersection. Yontz told Joyce that the vehicle in front of Yontz--Beyer's Jeep--was making a right-hand turn onto Route 81. Yontz passed Beyer's Jeep on the left well before reaching the intersection. Joyce testified that, upon seeing Beyer's Jeep beginning a right-hand turn, Joyce "hugged the center line" in order to pass Beyer's Jeep as it completed its right turn. According to Joyce, as he neared the intersection, Beyer pulled his Jeep off Route 127 onto Route 81, made a U-turn and reentered the intersection of Routes 127 and 81 traveling in a northeasterly direction. Joyce claims that he then swerved into the northbound lane of Route 127 in an attempt to avoid colliding with Beyer's Jeep, but was unsuccessful.

After trial, a jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants and answered the following interrogatory in the negative: "Was [Joyce] negligent and did that negligence directly and proximately cause any injury to the plaintiff?" The court failed to render judgment on the verdict in accordance with Civ.R. 58(A).

Plaintiff moved for a new trial on grounds that the supposed judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence (Civ.R. 59[A] ) and contrary to law (Civ.R. 59[A] ), and on the basis of misconduct of the prevailing party (Civ.R. 59[A] ). ¹ The trial court granted plaintiff's motion, finding that the judgment was contrary to law.

The defendants appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's order by a two to one vote. The appellate court also grounded its reasoning solely on Civ.R. 59(A)(7) (judgment contrary to law).

The cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Stephen P. Gehres and Martin D. Burchfield, Van Wert, for appellee.

Cooper, Walinski & Cramer, Richard Walinski, J. Michael Vassar and Paul R. Bonfiglio, Toledo, for appellants.

COOK, Justice.

In O'Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 58 O.O.2d 424, 280 N.E.2d 896, paragraph two of the syllabus, this court held that "[t]he fact that a question of law involves a consideration of facts or the evidence, does not turn it into a question of fact or raise a factual issue; nor does that consideration involve the court in weighing the evidence or passing upon its credibility." With respect to questions of law, O'Day requires a court to consider both facts and evidence in reaching its legal determination and enjoins the court from weighing the evidence or passing on issues of credibility. Id. at 218-219, 58 O.O.2d at 426, 280 N.E.2d at 898-899. The central question in this case is whether, in ordering a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law, the trial court impermissibly conducted a weighing of the evidence and an assessment of the credibility of witnesses. ² Because we conclude that it did, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate the original jury verdict.

Central to the dispositions reached by the trial court and court of appeals is the characterization of defendants' evidence regarding the extent to which Beyer initiated a right-hand turn before eventually turning left. Under the defendants' theory, Beyer left the marked portion of the southbound lane of Route 127, used Route 81 to make a U-turn, and reentered the intersection crossing Joyce's line of travel. The effect of this evidence, if believed by a jury, would be to demonstrate that Beyer departed Joyce's line of travel and reentered it suddenly, thus providing a legal excuse for failing to maintain an assured clear distance (Erdman v. Mestrovich [1951], 155 Ohio St. 85, 44 O.O. 97, 97 N.E.2d 674) and for driving on the left side of the roadway within one hundred feet of an approaching intersection (Satterthwaite v. Morgan [1943], 141 Ohio St. 447, 25 O.O. 581, 48 N.E.2d 653).

In concluding that the jury verdict was contrary to law, the trial court grounded its determination on the fact that there was "no credible evidence that [Beyer's] vehicle ever completely left the U.S. Route 127 southbound right of way onto the westbound State Route 81 right of way, and then suddenly entered back into U.S. Route 127." (Emphasis added.) In conjunction with its finding, the court concluded that there remained no legal excuse for Joyce's failure to keep an assured clear distance from Beyer's car (R.C. 4511.21) or his act of driving on the left side of the roadway within one hundred feet of an intersection (R.C. 4511.30[C] ) and, therefore, that Joyce was negligent as a matter of law.

In reviewing the order for a new trial, the appellate court noted the determinative nature of the trial court's finding such a void of evidence, stating that "if [Beyer] did in fact leave the south bound lane of Rt. 127 he would no longer be a discernible object in [Joyce's] path of travel and the assured clear distance ahead rule would no longer apply." The appellate court additionally noted that the same evidence of Beyer's maneuvering could justify Joyce's act of driving in the left lane as an effort to avoid a sudden emergency. Nevertheless, the appellate court upheld the trial court's order, concluding that the trial court neither weighed the evidence nor assessed the witnesses' credibility, but "merely determined the facts of the case in order to apply the law of assured clear distance ahead and driving left of center within 100 feet of an intersection."

Initially, we note that the analysis employed by the trial court contains a faulty legal premise. The trial court would require Beyer's vehicle to have passed completely over the right white edge line of Route 127 or a continuation of it, thereby entirely leaving the marked southbound highway lane, in order to end Joyce's duty to keep an assured clear distance ahead. See Kohnle v. Carey (1946), 80 Ohio App. 23, 27, 35 O.O. 413, 415, 67 N.E.2d 98, 100-101. However, as made clear by this court in Pallini v. Dankowski (1969), 17 Ohio St.2d 51, 46 O.O.2d 267, 245 N.E.2d 353, paragraph one of the syllabus, "[t]he word 'ahead,' as used after 'assured clear distance' in the first paragraph of section 4511.21, Revised Code, means to the front of and within the directional line of travel of a motorist whose conduct allegedly violates such statute." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, in determining assured clear distance, the question is whether a vehicle is in the path or line of travel of a driver of a following vehicle, not whether the vehicles are in the same lane.

As stated by the Pallini court, "[i]f all traffic lanes were the exact width of the vehicles moving therein, no problem [with the line/lane distinction] could result. Since such is not the case, however, a discernible object could be within a motorist's traffic lane of travel, but not within his directional line of travel, and the statute would have no application." Id. at 55, 46 O.O.2d at 269, 245 N.E.2d at 356. Accordingly, when a lead vehicle departs from a following motorist's line or path of travel, only to reenter the line or path of travel suddenly and without the fault of the following motorist at a forward distance insufficient to allow the following motorist to avoid collision in the exercise of ordinary care, the following motorist is not negligent per se for failing to maintain an assured clear distance. This is true regardless of whether the lead vehicle completely leaves the lane of traffic in which both the lead and following motorist are traveling.

Error in the courts' pronouncement of the law of assured clear distance was not raised as a...