Pantoja v. State

• Decision Date: 03 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. SC08–1879.,SC08–1879.
• Parties: Juan PANTOJA, Petitioner,v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

59 So.3d 1092

Juan PANTOJA, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC08–1879.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 3, 2011.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Christine Ann Guard, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Pantoja v. State, 990 So.2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Jaggers v. State, 536 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

FACTS

On April 20, 2006, Juan Pantoja was sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury convicted him of sexual battery on a child under twelve years of age by a defendant less than eighteen years of age and lewd or lascivious molestation by a defendant eighteen years of age or older.¹ This case involves the following facts:

Juan Pantoja, Appellant, challenges his conviction and sentence for sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation. He raises two issues on appeal, and we affirm as to both issues. Only one of the issues, whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim recanted a prior accusation of molestation against another person, merits discussion. We hold that the trial court properly excluded this evidence under the well-settled rule that a witness' credibility may not be attacked by proof that she committed specific acts of misconduct that did not end in a criminal conviction. We find the instant case factually indistinguishable from Jaggers v. State, 536 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), where the Second District reached a contrary holding. Accordingly, in affirming the trial court, we certify conflict with the Second District's opinion in Jaggers.

Before Appellant's trial, the State filed a motion in limine, requesting that the defense be prohibited from asking questions concerning an allegation that the victim's uncle, T.D., had inappropriately touched her. Appellant argued that he should be permitted to present evidence that the victim had accused T.D. of molesting her and later admitted the accusation was false. He proffered the testimony of the victim's grandmother and aunt, who were also T.D.'s mother and sister, respectively. Both of these witnesses stated that the victim told them she had lied about T.D. because she was mad at him, although they gave different reasons for the victim's alleged anger at T.D. Appellant's counsel also cross-examined the victim outside the presence of the jury. During that cross-examination, the victim testified that T.D. had sexually abused her. She denied having recanted her previous statements about the incident. Appellant's counsel then attempted to impeach the victim with the following statement from her deposition: “I told my aunt [C.M.D.] once about Juan touching me, but I guess she might have gotten mad at my uncle and said that he did it to Nanna because my nanna will believe anything.” Finally, Appellant proffered the testimony of Mary Van Tassel, a Headstart counselor who had worked closely with the victim's family. In proffer, Van Tassel testified that, after observing a change in the victim's behavior, she asked the victim if Appellant and T.D. had touched her inappropriately. Van Tassel then testified that the victim “said very quietly with her head down ... and looking away, ‘No,’ ... And she had tears in her eyes and ... she stopped talking.” Van Tassel further testified the victim denied that T.D. touched her in a sexual way. The trial court ruled that the defense could not cross-examine the victim about her allegations against T.D. or solicit extrinsic evidence on the subject.

Although Appellant was not permitted to impeach the victim with her allegedly false prior report of molestation, he did present to the jury several other grounds for discrediting her testimony. In cross-examination, Appellant's attorney questioned the victim regarding perceived inconsistencies between her out-of-court statements and her trial testimony, as well as between her direct testimony and her testimony on cross. Additionally, Appellant's attorney asked the victim if she had told Mary Van Tassel that Appellant had not molested her. The victim denied having made such a statement to Van Tassel. Appellant later called Van Tassel as a witness, and she testified that when she asked the victim if Appellant had touched her, the victim “said no ma'am, and she dropped her head and looked away.”

Pantoja v. State, 990 So.2d 626, 628–29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (footnotes omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As a general rule, “[a] trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984). “However, a court's discretion is limited by the evidence code and applicable case law. A court's erroneous interpretation of these authorities is subject to de novo review.” McCray v. State, 919 So.2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). “The standard of review applicable to a trial court decision based on a finding of fact is whether the decision is supported by competent substantial evidence.” Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.2d 1009, 1017 (Fla.1999) (quoting Phillip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 9.6, at 155 (2d ed.1997)).

ANALYSIS

To begin, Pantoja argues that the victim's prior accusation against her uncle should have been admitted under section 90.610, Florida Statutes (2002), because there is a false reporting exception to section 90.610's criminal conviction requirement. We disagree. Section 90.610 provides:

(1) A party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment, with the following exceptions:

(a) Evidence of any such conviction is inadmissible in a civil trial if it is so remote in time as to have no bearing on the present character of the witness.

(b) Evidence of juvenile adjudications are inadmissible under this subsection.

(2) The pendency of an appeal or the granting of a pardon relating to such crime does not render evidence of the conviction from which the appeal was taken or for which the pardon was granted inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of the appeal is admissible.

(3) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence under s. 90.404 or s. 90.608.

§ 90.610, Fla. Stat. (2002). “[T]he Legislature adopted the express wording of section 90.610, Florida Statutes, in an effort to bar all character impeachment based on prior misconduct that did not involve a criminal conviction. The plain language of section 90.610, Florida Statutes, authorizes impeachment with only prior convictions....” Roebuck v. State, 953 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). “[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)).

The Florida Legislature's intent regarding section 90.610 is clear. While Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) permits character impeachment through prior misconduct without a criminal conviction requirement, Florida's Legislature adopted our evidence code without this language. See Roebuck, 953 So.2d at 43. Professor Charles Ehrhardt distinguished section 90.610 from Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b):

Occasionally decisions ignore the limitation and permit impeachment with prior acts of misconduct of a witness when they involve prior false accusations of a crime by the witness.

....

The drafters of the Code specifically intended not to adopt provision similar to Federal Rule 608(b) because it did not reflect the existing Florida law and because they felt the possibility for abuse of this type of evidence was great.

Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 610.8 (2010 ed.).

We agree with the First District's determination that section 90.610 does not permit an exception to the conviction requirement for prior false accusations. We have held that “evidence of particular acts of ethical misconduct cannot be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness. The only proper inquiry into a witness's character for impeachment purposes goes to the witness's reputation for truth and veracity.” Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 282 (Fla.1999). In so holding, we have explained, “Allowing this testimony would violate sections 90.608, 90.609, and 90.610, Florida Statutes (1993), which prohibit impeachment by reference to specific bad acts other than convictions for felonies or misdemeanors involving dishonesty.” Fernandez, 730 So.2d at 282–83. In accordance with this, we have repeatedly interpreted section 90.610 to permit impeachment of a witness's credibility only by felony conviction or by a conviction involving a crime of dishonesty or false statement. See id.; Farinas v. State, 569 So.2d 425, 429 (Fla.1990); Jackson v. State, 545 So.2d 260, 264 (Fla.1989); Hitchcock v. State, 413 So.2d 741, 744 (Fla.1982); Fulton v. State, 335 So.2d 280, 284 (Fla.1976). Accordingly, we approve the First District's decision in Pantoja, holding that section 90.610 does not permit impeachment of a witness with evidence of a prior accusation that did not result in a criminal conviction.

Pantoja further argues that the victim's prior false accusation is...