Paoli v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corp., 16720
| Decision Date | 18 April 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 16720,16720 |
| Citation | 140 Cal.App.2d 854,296 P.2d 31 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 30 Lab.Cas. P 69,948 G. A. PAOLI, Individually and as a member of Sugar Refinery Employees' Union, Crockett Local 20037, A. F. of L., a voluntary unincorporated association, and A. W. Newman, individually and as a member of Sugar Refinery Employees' Union, Crockett Local 20037, A. F. of L., a voluntary unincorporated association, appearing individually and in a representative capacity for and on behalf of said Crockett Local 20037 and all of the members thereof, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CALIFORNIA AND HAWAIIAN SUGAR REFINING CORPORATION, Limited, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant. |
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, for appellant.
Charles P. Scully, San Francisco, for respondents.
Plaintiff Paoli and others, on behalf of Sugar Refinery Employees' Union, Crockett Local 20037, A. F. of L. (the collective bargaining representative), seeking damages and injunctive relief, sued defendant alleging a breach by defendant of a collective bargaining contract and of an arbitration award rendered thereunder. The trial court rendered judgment denying damages 1 but granting injunctive relief. Defendant appeals.
The relief granted was a declaration that defendant had breached the contract and the award and 'That the plaintiffs are hereby entitled to injunctive relief to prevent the defendant, and all agents,' etc., 'from designating certain employees in the Engineering Department to work a reverse back to back schedule rather than a Monday through Friday schedule.' The entire action is based upon a certain contract between the union and the defendant and an arbitrators' award rendered thereunder. The contract expired September 1, 1954. 2 August 13, 1954, a 'memorandum order' hereafter discussed was filed. January 10, 1955, findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment were filed. The appeal was taken thereafter.
Question Presented.
While the action was primarily to obtain a declaration of the meaning of the arbitration award and damages, the question that is determinative of this appeal is the effect of the termination of the contract before the entry of judgment. While the injunction portion of the judgment does not limit its application to the term of the contract, under the pleadings and facts it could apply only during that term. Plaintiffs concede that 'the injunctive relief could not be effective beyond such date'--'the date of termination of the contract * * *.'
Plaintiffs contend that the 'memorandum order' was a final order granting injunctive relief, and having been filed before the contract expired was a valid order, and although any appeal therefrom would be moot, the judgment itself is valid. Defendant contends that the 'memorandum order' was merely an opinion of the judge, or at most an interlocutory order; that the judgment is the only final order, and being made after the expiration of the contract, is void. An examination of the 'memorandum order' discloses that it is not a final order. During the trial it was stipulated that before taking any evidence upon the question of damages the court should first try the issues raised concerning the arbitration award. While plaintiffs contend that in effect it was stipulated that there were to be two judgments, one on the legal questions arising from the award and one on damages, we have examined the transcript and find no such stipulation. The only one made was of the type found frequently in lawsuits,--that before considering the question of damages, the question of liability or lack of liability is first determined, but the judgment, when made, is to cover all issues. The 'memorandum order' which was not entered in the minutes but merely filed, shows on its face that it was to be followed by another order. After reciting the court's view of the effect of the award viewed in the light of the contract, the court said: 'The plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief, therefore, must be granted; and it will be the Order of this Court that plaintiffs have such relief.' (Emphasis added.) The order then stated that 'in line with the contingent stipulation' (emphasis added) the case could be set down for trial on the question of damages. Obviously such 'memorandum order' was not appealable, nor could a writ of injunction have been issued thereon.
While the judgment, in addition to granting injunctive relief, declared that defendant had breached the contract and award, such declaration in view of the finding of the court that none of the plaintiffs including the union had suffered 'any monetary loss or damage' by reason of defendant's breach, 3 became moot after the expiration of the contract. 4
All the issues and the judgment being geared to the life of the contract, and it having expired prior to the entry of judgment, there was no 'real or substantial controversy between the parties to the suit * * *.' See Bradley v. Voorsanger, 143 Cal. 214, 215, 76 P. 1031, 1032, dealing with an appeal which had become moot. In Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. United Automobile, etc., Workers, 27 Cal.2d 859, at pages 862-863, 167 P.2d 725, at page 727, a case dealing with an appeal from a judgment confirming an award of arbitrators under a contract which had been superseded by another contract, the court quoted...
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