Paone v. Gerrig
| Decision Date | 05 January 1973 |
| Citation | 362 Mass. 757,291 N.E.2d 426 |
| Parties | Charles P. PAONE, Special Administrator & Administrator, et al. v. Burton W. GERRIG et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Marshall M. Schribman, Boston, for respondents.
Francis H. Farrell, Boston, for petitioners.
Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.
The respondents challenge the amount of the fees allowed to the petitioner Paone (Paone) for his services as special administrator and administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Helen Gerrig and the amount of the fees allowed to Paone's counsel, Mr. Francis H. Farrell (Farrell). The respondents are Mr. Burton W. Gerrig, who is now co-administrator with the will annexed, the decedent's husband Morris Gerrig (Gerrig) and the guardian of Beverly R. O'Hara, the daughter of a sister of the decedent. The decedent's will, executed under her maiden name after her marriage to Gerrig, gave all of her property equally to two sisters, or the survivor. Neither sister survived the decedent. Gerrig and the daughter of the decedent's sister are the heirs at law.
The respondents specifically appeal from a decree after hearing allowing the special administrator's first and final account, amended so as to increase the amount shown as Paone's fee as special administrator from $1,200 to $2,400 and the amount shown as Farrell's fee as 'Atty. and Investigation' from $1,600 to $4,800 exclusive of disbursements of $276.38. 1 The respondents also appeal from a decree allowing the substitute first and final account of Paone as administrator with the will annexed, which, although providing no further fees for Paone or Farrell, did reflect the consequences of the allowance of such fees in the account of the special administrator. 2
The judge filed a report of material facts with respect to the allowance of each account. The evidence is reported. The report of material facts, which merely recites changes in amounts to be shown for certain line items in the probate accounts, clearly fails to meet the statutory requirement (G.L. c. 215, § 11) that the judge report all material facts on which his decision is based. 3 However, where, as here, the evidence is reported and particularly where no specific challenge to the report of material facts was made in the Probate Court, the familiar standard of review is applicable despite the total inadequacy of the report made by the judge. 4 It is thus our duty to examine the evidence and to decide the case according to our own judgment, on all questions of law, fact and discretion, giving due weight to any findings of the judge, which will not be reversed unless plainly wrong. White v. White, 322 Mass. 30, 31, 76 N.E.2d 15. In the absence of any findings by the judge in the report filed by him, under this standard of review this court may decide the case on its own judgment, giving no weight to the action of the judge. 5 In fulfilling this task the court has unfortunately been obliged, without the assistance of findings by the judge who heard the witnesses, to review a record which presents for determination the credibility of witnesses but fortunately no conflict in the testimony of those witnesses.
The estate consisted of about $49,700 in personal property and a house and land valued at $25,000. Certain claims against the estate were investigated by Farrell. One has not been disposed of and is in litigation.
The evidence shows that Paone served as special administrator from March 5, 1969, to May 22, 1969, and thereafter as administrator until August, 1969. During that period Paone was represented by Farrell. Farrell testified that he worked for 195 hours on the estate, he charged about $35 an hour for his time, and he was seeking a total fee of $6,400 and an amount of $276.38 for disbursements. Farrell's testimony concerning the time devoted by him to various problems and the necessity or reasonableness of his various efforts was in many instances very general.
Paone testified that he spent about 190 hours working on matters for the estate for which he charged $15 an hour. Paone testified that he was seeking a total of $2,850 for his services. Much of Paone's time was devoted to the performance of necessary details concerning the preservation of assets of the estate. The tasks performed in numerous instances, however, were hardly complicated or challenging. For example, four or five times a week he drove by the decedent's house (but apparently did not stop) to see that all was in order. Each trip took fifteen or twenty minutes. He and Farrell also spent a considerable, but unspecified, amount of time with respect to the defence of a petition of Gerrig to vacate the decree allowing the will and appointing Paone as administrator with the will annexed. Without a more detailed explanation in the record, it is not possible for this court to conclude that all of the hours spent by Paone were necessary and well spent, particularly in light of the number of hours also spent by Farrell.
The only unusual feature about this estate was the discovery after the decedent's death that the decedent (who had been assumed by most, if not all, of her acquaintances to be unmarried) was survived by a husband, Gerrig. Farrell spent a great deal of time investigating Gerrig's claim that he had married the decedent and was still married to her at her death. Farrell's suspicion concerning Gerrig's claim that he was the surviving spouse was reasonable because of the unwillingness of Gerrig's then counsel (his nephew) to permit Farrell to talk with his client about his marital status in relation to the deceased. This suspicion justified, if it did not require, further investigation by Paone or Farrell, or both, concerning the claim of Gerrig that he was the surviving spouse. On the record, however, it is not clear that all aspects of the investigation were necessary. 6
In June of 1969, shortly after Gerrig's then attorney declined to permit Farrell or Paone to talk with Gerrig, Gerrig filed a petition to vacate the decree allowing the will and appointing Paone as administrator with the will annexed. This petition alleged that there had been fraudulent representations (by persons not named in the petition) upon which Gerrig relied at the time he assented to the allowance of the will. 7 In July of 1969, after two days of trial on the petition to vacate the decree allowing the will and appointing Paone, at which Paone was represented, not only by Farrell but also by specially retained trial counsel, a settlement was reached. Counsel for Gerrig was appointed co-administrator with the will annexed to serve with Paone, and Gerrig's petition to vacate Paone's appointment was dismissed with prejudice and the petition was impounded. No petitions for counsel or administrator's fees were presented at the time of the entry of the decree dismissing the petition to vacate the decree allowing the will and appointing Paone as administrator.
The respondents contend that Paone and Farrell are not entitled to fees in connection with the defence of the petition to vacate the decree appointing Paone as administrator because they could have obtained proper approval of their fees in connection with that defence only by a court order at the time of the dismissal of that petition. They further claim that the services of Paone and Farrell in connection with the petition to vacate the decree did not benefit the estate, and, therefore, Paone and Farrell may not be compensated from the estate for their efforts in that defence. Finally, the respondents argue that any fees allowed to Farrell should be determined according to conservative principles because the heirs did not retain Farrell and that, in any event, the fees allowed by the judge were excessive and unsupported by the evidence.
Neither an administrator nor his counsel is required at the time a decree is entered resolving a dispute to seek an allowance of his fees for services in connection with the resolution of that dispute. He may appropriately wait to present those fees for approval at a later time, either by petition or in connection with an account of the fiduciary. See G.L. c. 206, § 16, as appearing in St.1949, c. 140 (...
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