Papadakos v. Spooner, 65-785
Decision Date | 17 May 1966 |
Docket Number | 65-786.,No. 65-785,65-785 |
Citation | 186 So.2d 786 |
Parties | Dorothy Mae PAPADAKOS, Appellant, v. Charles H. SPOONER and Peter J. Papadakos, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Sibley, Giblin & Levenson, Miami, Beach, for appellant.
Jepeway & Gassen, Miami, for Spooner.
Kurtz & Cooper, Miami, for Papadakos.
Before HENDRY, C.J., and PEARSON and SWANN, JJ.
Appellant, Dorothy Mae Papadakos, and her husband, Peter J. Papadakos, were sued for an attorney's fee by the appellee, Charles H. Spooner. Mr. Spooner is a practicing attorney and had represented Mrs. Papadakos in domestic difficulties which she experienced with her husband. The plaintiff received a summary final judgment against Mrs. Papadakos. This judgment is the subject of appeal no. 65-785. After the entry of the final judgment and prior to the appeal, the appellant sought relief in the trial court pursuant to Rule 1.38, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A. This relief was denied. That order is the subject of appeal no. 65-786. The two appeals have been consolidated for all appellate purposes. The complaint brought by Mr. Spooner against Peter J. Papadakos and Dorothy Mae Papadakos alleged, in part, that:
The complaint further alleges that as a result of the attorney's effort the defendants were reconciled and left the State of Florida. It appears that they are both now residents of the State of New York. The defendants own, as an estate by the entirety, certain real property in Dade County, Florida. The plaintiff attempted to secure jurisdiction by issuing a writ of attachment1 upon the real property mentioned and constructive service of process upon the defendants, Dorothy Mae Papadakos and Peter J. Papadakos, pursuant to Chapter 48, Fla. Stat. 1963, F.S.A. See Harris & Company Advertising, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, Fla.App. 1961, 127 So.2d 687, 694; Cuba Aeropostal Agency, Inc. v. Kane, Fla.App. 1962, 145 So.2d 764. An affidavit in support of attachment was filed wherein it was averred that the defendants were indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $5,280.28. The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction over their person. The motions were denied. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for and was granted a summary final judgment against the appellant, Dorothy Mae Papadakos, in the amount of $5,579.15. The cause remains pending against the husband.
Appellant moved, pursuant to Rule 1.38 (b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, to be relieved from the summary judgment entered against her upon the ground that the judgment was void in that the attempt to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction had failed because attachment does not lie in an action upon an unliquidated claim.
On this appeal, two points have been presented:
(1) Whether the court acquired jurisdiction by virtue of the attachment of property owned as an estate by the entirety by defendants in the law action where the claims against the defendants were separate and for unliquidated money damages?
(2) Whether the trial court erred in entering summary final judgment before answer2 for one of two defendants in a common-law action based on quasi in rem jurisdiction?
We think that the points raised actually involved three issues:
(A) May an attorney have attachment in a suit against his client for a reasonable attorney's fee? (B) May property held as an estate by the entirety be attached upon a claim against husband and wife but which is based upon several contracts rather than a joint contract? (C) Whether summary judgment was improperly entered because of a genuine issue of material fact?
It is appellant's position upon the first issue that a claim for a reasonable attorney's fee creates a question of fact concerning the amount of such fee; therefore, a writ of attachment cannot issue under the laws of the State of Florida because the amount is unliquidated. She relies upon Ake v. Chancey, 152 Fla. 677, 13 So.2d 6 (1943).
In the Ake case, supra, the Supreme Court considered an appeal from a final decree declaring an equitable lien upon certain property. The purported jurisdiction had been based upon garnishment and constructive service under the 1941 Constructive Service Law.3 The decree established that the court had jurisdiction of a res by garnishment, that the constructive service was valid, and decreed a lien upon the property. The Supreme Court reversed the final decree upon a holding that the garnishment was void and that the purported constructive service was ineffective. In so deciding, the Supreme Court held that the facts in the case gave rise to nothing more than a common law action to collect an attorney's fee, that there was no ground for equity jurisdiction because the ultimate question was whether the amount fixed by the attorney's client was reasonable,4 and that there was, therefore, no basis for equitable garnishment or constructive service in the court of equity.
The Ake case is not directly in point on the question of whether or not a writ of attachment may be had as an ancillary proceeding in a law action upon a claim for a reasonable fee for personal services. Nevertheless, it is persuasive authority for a holding that a claim of that nature is not a "debt" for which the writ of attachment may be issued. See also Tanner & Delaney Engine Co. v. Hall, 22 Fla. 391 (1886).
Section 76.09, Fla. Stat. 1963, F.S.A., provides:
The use of the term "debt" has significance. Prior to the abolition of the common law forms of action, it was generally understood that a writ of attachment could be used only in those actions which were appropriate for collecting a debt; viz., debt, covenant, and assumpsit. The "debt" was also required to be an "absolute present debt." Crandall, Florida Common Law Practice § 276 (1928). In applying these statutes, the tests which were used in determining the availability of the action for debt are used to determine whether or not an action is for a "debt". See cases collected at 12 A.L.R.2d 787.
The nature of an action for debt is described by Crandall, supra, in section 175 as follows:
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