Pappion v. R-Ranch Prop. Owners Ass'n

• Decision Date: 20 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2:13–cv–01146–TLN–CMK.,2:13–cv–01146–TLN–CMK.
• Citation: 110 F.Supp.3d 1017
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Chante C. PAPPION, Plaintiff, v. R–RANCH PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a California Non–Profit Corporation; Hal Glover; Mark Grenbemer; John Crosby; Ron Bucher; Mark Perry; Michael Horne ; Rick Wever; and Does 1–10, Defendants.

110 F.Supp.3d 1017

Chante C. PAPPION, Plaintiff,

v.R–RANCH PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a California Non–Profit Corporation; Hal Glover; Mark Grenbemer; John Crosby; Ron Bucher; Mark Perry; Michael Horne ; Rick Wever; and Does 1–10, Defendants.

No. 2:13–cv–01146–TLN–CMK.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed May 20, 2015.

Filed May 21, 2015.

Mark D. Potter, Phyl Grace, Raymond Ballister, Jr., Potter Handy LLP, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.

Clifford W. Stevens, Michael R. Tener, Neumiller & Beardslee, Stockton, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Chante C. Pappion ("Plaintiff") is a wheelchair-bound partial owner at the R–Ranch recreational facility in Siskiyou County. Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendants R–Ranch Property Owners Association ("POA"), a California Non–Profit Corporation, as well as individual members of the POA Board, Hal Glover, Mark Grenbemer, John Crosby, Rob Bucher, Mark Perry, Michael Horne, and Rick Wever (collectively "Defendants") under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12182 and California state law, including the Unruh Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 51 –53, and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 54 –54.8. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that she has been denied full and equal access to the R–Ranch facilities. The parties' have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23–1) is DENIED and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24–1) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this case on June 7, 2013, to challenge Defendants' alleged violations of the ADA, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the California Disabled Persons Act. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) In her Complaint, Plaintiff specifically states that Defendants operate a place of public accommodation and violated the ADA by failing to remove architectural barriers. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 21, 23.)

R–Ranch is a five-thousand acre recreational property owned by approximately 1700 individual owners. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 2, 4; Boudek Decl., ECF No. 24–3 at ¶ ¶ 2–3.) Each owner has an undivided interest ("Share") in the real property which they can access using owner key-cards and identification cards. (Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Facts ("SUF"), ECF No. 24–2 at ¶ 24; ECF No. 24–3 at ¶ 4.) The R–Ranch POA is controlled by seven elected owners (the "Board") who are tasked with operating and maintaining the premises. (ECF No. 24–2 at ¶ 10.)

The R–Ranch facility encompasses a central building referred to as "Ranch Headquarters." (Pl.'s SUF, ECF No. 23–2 at ¶ 3; ECF No. 24–2 at ¶ 15.) Ranch Headquarters serves as the principal office of Defendants and is typically staffed by at least one employee. (ECF No. 23–2 at ¶ 5; 24–2 at ¶ 17.) Ranch Headquarters is used to store official documents including employee personnel files, financial documents, owner files, contracts, election materials, and other POA records. (ECF No. 24–2 at ¶ 18.) R–Ranch owners utilize Ranch Headquarters for regular owner business such as paying assessments, paying fines, paying fees, or copying records.

(ECF No. 23–2 at ¶ 10; ECF No. 24–2 at ¶ 19.)

R–Ranch financially operates largely as a result of the revenue collected from owner-based assessments and fees. (ECF No. 24–2 at ¶ 25.) When an owner neglects to pay their assessment, Defendant R–Ranch POA is authorized to either foreclose on the real property interest or accept a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure from the owner. (ECF No. 24–2 at ¶ 27.) As a result of foreclosures in recent years, Defendant R–Ranch POA has acquired ownership of approximately 455 R–Ranch Shares. (ECF No. 24–2 at ¶ 28.)

Defendants have attempted to sell the remaining shares of R–Ranch by occasionally attending tradeshows and inviting potential buyers to register as guests and tour the R–Ranch property. (ECF No. 23–2 at ¶¶ 6, 8; ECF No. 24–2 at ¶¶ 30–31.) Defendants use Ranch Headquarters to conduct business and real estate transactions with registered guests who are interested in purchasing Shares. (ECF No. 23–2 at ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff purchased a 1/2500 Share in R–Ranch in 2007. (ECF No. 23–2 at ¶ 2; ECF No. 24–2 at ¶¶ 4–5.) She routinely visits Ranch Headquarters to conduct owner business such as paying assessments, paying bills, registering guests, and purchasing souvenirs. (ECF No. 23–2 at ¶ 10; ECF No. 24–2 at ¶ 34.) Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").¹ (Defs.' Answer Compl. ECF No. 12 at ¶ 1; ECF No. 23–2 at ¶ 1.)

There are no handicap parking spaces at Ranch Headquarters. (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 9; ECF No. 23–2 at ¶¶ 11–12.) Further, the path of travel from the parking area to the restroom facility located near Ranch Headquarters requires navigating over at least one un-ramped step. (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 12; ECF No. 23–2 at ¶ 16.)

The present dispute stems from Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant R–Ranch POA fails to comply with the ADA guidelines and has denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the R–Ranch premises. On November 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asking the Court to enter partial summary judgment against Defendants as to her ADA cause of action. (Mot. For Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 23–1 at 5.)

On November 20, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting that the Court enter summary judgment against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 24.) Defendants argue in their Motion as follows: (1) Ranch Headquarters is a private establishment and not a place of public accommodation; (2) Pappion is not an individual with respect to her use of Ranch Headquarters; and (3) Pappion does not have standing under federal or California law. (ECF No. 24 at 2.)

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, and therefore, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered against a party who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 288–89, 88 S.Ct. 1575. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’ " Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) ; SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir.1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D.Cal.1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue that necessitates a jury trial, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the...