Paquette v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America

• Decision Date: 27 November 1906
• Parties: PAQUETTE v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA. LANGDEAU v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

193 Mass. 215

79 N.E. 250

PAQUETTE

v.PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.

LANGDEAU

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Nov. 27, 1906.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Hampden County.

Actions by one Paquette and by one Langdeau against the Prudential Insurance Company of America. A verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiffs, and defendant brings exceptions. Overruled.

John F. Malley and Danl. J. O'Connor, for plaintiffs.

Harlan P. Small, for defendant.

BRALEY, J.

These cases were tried together, and the exceptions raise certain questions relating to the admission and exclusion of evidence, to the refusals to rule as requested, and to the rulings given. Under the terms of the contracts the plaintiffs were required to prove the death of the insured to the satisfaction of the company before the amount of the insurance became payable. If this event had been admitted by the pleadings, or at the trial, any real or supposed prejudice affecting the defense which the answers to certain of the questions propounded by the company may have contained would have been avoided. Instead of making such admission, among other allegations, the defendant's answer contained a general denial, which put in issue this material fact, and therefore the proofs of death became relevant. The defendant argues that if admitted for this limited purpose, they should not have gone to the jury as they tended to impair its defense to the other issues on trial. Having been put in evidence generally, it was within the discretion of the presiding judge either to submit or withhold them from the consideration of the jury, and to the exercise of this discretion no exception lies. Besides the defendant might have asked for an instruction limiting the use of these papers to the special purpose for which they had been offered, but having neglected to make this request it has no just ground of complaint that the evidence subsequently was not limited. Burghardt v. Van Deusen, 4 Allen, 374, 375;Krauss v. Cope, 180 Mass. 22, 61 N. E. 220. See Jennings v. Rooney, 183 Mass. 577, 580, 67 N. E. 665;O'Driscoll v. Boston & Lynn Railroad Co., 180 Mass. 187, 189, 62 N. E. 3.

When a witness has made material statements contrary to those given by him in his testimony such statements may be introduced for the purpose of contradicting him, and the admission during the cross-examination of Dr. Cooley, a witness called by the defendant, of a medical certificate signed by him in which he stated that he had examined the insured on September 19, 1904, was competent for the purpose of contradicting his previous evidence that he had not made an examination at that time. Handy v. Canning, 166 Mass. 107, 109, 44 N. E. 118. See Jennings v. Rooney, ubi supra. The description of the physical appearance of the insured in the evidence in reply also was competent to rebut the testimony of the defendant's witnesses that he appeared to be in unsound health, and that his general appearance showed indications of the excessive use of intoxicants.

The remaining, and principal exception is to the exclusion of a negative answer to an inquiry whether the insured ever had used malt or spirituous liquors to excess. A policy of life insurance may contain conditions not found in the application, but outside of an independent agreement the application and policy together usually form the contract. Com. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Wm. Knabe Mfg. Co., 171 Mass. 265, 270, 50 N. E. 516;Millard v. Brayton, 177 Mass. 533, 59 N. E. 436,52 L. R. A. 117, 83 Am. St. Rep. 294;Nugent v. Greenfield Life Ass'n, 172 Mass. 278, 284, 52 N. E. 440. In themselves these policies contained neither the medical examination, and the agreement of the applicant therewith connected, nor any express condition that as such they were included. It is plain, however, that they were intended to be incorporated, as these declarations and answers relating to his past and present condition of health, and family history were essential inquiries which upon their face showed that the life proposed was an insurable risk. But if not found in the policies, then resort must be had to the paper called the application, which by reference is incorporated. It would be a narrow construction to say that the first page of this paper alone constituted the negotiations, when the second page contained the declarations and statements of the insured without which a policy would not have been issued. The term ‘application’ as there used was intended to include and did include all the...