Paquin v. City of St. Ignace
| Decision Date | 19 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 334350,334350 |
| Citation | 909 N.W.2d 884,321 Mich.App. 673 |
| Parties | Fred PAQUIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. IGNACE, Defendant-Appellee, and Attorney General, Intervening Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Patrick, Kwiatkowski & Hesselink, PLLC (by Joseph P. Kwiatkowski ) for Fred Paquin.
Evashevski Law Office (by Tom H. Evashevski ) for the city of St. Ignace.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Laura Moody, Chief Legal Counsel, and Heather S. Meingast, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Beckering and Riordan, JJ.
Plaintiff, Fred Paquin, appeals as of right an order of the Mackinac Circuit Court denying his motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (), declaring him ineligible to run for city council in defendant, the City of St. Ignace, and dismissing his complaint for declaratory relief with prejudice. We affirm.
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. On January 19, 2010, the United States Attorney’s Office filed an indictment against plaintiff and his daughter in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Northern Division. Among the 19 counts, plaintiff was charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States by dishonest means in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. The actions prompting the federal indictment occurred while plaintiff was serving as the chief of police for the Law Enforcement Department (the tribal police department) of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (the Tribe), a federally recognized Indian tribe, and serving as an elected member of the Tribe’s Board of Directors, the Tribe’s governing body. On July 22, 2010, plaintiff signed a plea agreement, in which he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by dishonest means. As the factual basis for his plea, plaintiff admitted to engaging in a conspiracy involving the misuse of federal funds granted to the tribal police department. On December 20, 2010, plaintiff was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and one day.
After serving his prison sentence, plaintiff sought to run for a position on defendant’s city council in the November 2013 general election. On August 15, 2013, the Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, "applies to a person convicted of a crime based on that person’s conduct as a governmental employee or elected official of a federally recognized Indian Tribe." OAG, 2013-2014, No. 7273, p 30, at 30 (August 15, 2013). Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, provides:
The Attorney General concluded that Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, applies to convictions related to a person’s elective office or position of employment in the Tribe’s government. Accordingly, plaintiff was "ineligible for election or appointment to any state or local elective office of this State and ineligible to hold a position in public employment in this State that is policy-making or has discretionary authority over public assets." OAG, 2013–2014, No. 7273, at 36.
Relying on the Attorney General’s opinion, defendant’s city manager informed plaintiff in 2013 and again in 2015 that he could not run for city council. On June 26, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory relief against defendant, seeking a determination regarding the applicability of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, to "a person convicted of a crime based on that person’s conduct as an employee of a federally recognized Indian Tribe." Plaintiff asserted, in relevant part, that he was eligible to run for defendant’s city council because he was not convicted while holding an elective office or a position of employment in a local, state, or federal government. Defendant filed an answer denying that plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief.
Plaintiff moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that defendant admitted that the only authority it relied on in denying his eligibility was the Attorney General’s opinion and that the opinion was flawed "not only in the authority cited within it but within its reasoning for the application of Article 11, Section 8 of the Michigan Constitution." In particular, plaintiff asserted that the Attorney General had cited "no legal authority for its determination that the plain language of local, state or federal government somehow includes a federally recognized sovereign Indian Tribe."
The Attorney General moved to submit an amicus curiae brief and to participate in oral argument in support of defendant, and the trial court granted the motion.1 In the amicus curiae brief, the Attorney General argued that plaintiff’s positions with the Tribe constituted elective or employment positions within local government.
Following oral argument, the trial court took plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition under advisement. In a three-page order entered July 29, 2016, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, declared him ineligible to run for city council, and dismissed his complaint with prejudice. In short, the trial court found persuasive the arguments and rationale proffered by the Attorney General that plaintiff fell under the prohibition of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, as a citizen of Michigan, regardless of his status as a member of the sovereign tribal nation.
The issue before this Court on appeal is whether plaintiff’s employment2 with a federally recognized sovereign Indian tribe constituted employment in "local, state, or federal government" for purposes of Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8. This is an issue of first impression involving the interpretation of a constitutional provision.
The proper interpretation of a constitutional provision is a question of law, which appellate courts review de novo. People v. Hall , 499 Mich. 446, 452, 884 N.W.2d 561 (2016). Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor , 481 Mich. 56, 67–68, 748 N.W.2d 524 (2008). That is, this Court attempts to ascertain "the common understanding of the provision, that meaning which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it." People v. Nash , 418 Mich. 196, 209, 341 N.W.2d 439 (1983) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When constitutional terms are undefined, it is appropriate to consult dictionary definitions to determine meaning. See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. , 481 Mich. at 69, 75–77, 748 N.W.2d 524.
A trial court’s summary disposition decision is also reviewed de novo. Goldstone v. Bloomfield Twp. Pub. Library , 479 Mich. 554, 558, 737 N.W.2d 476 (2007). Plaintiff moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial. Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [ Bank of America, NA v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co. , 316 Mich.App. 480, 488, 892 N.W.2d 467 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
In the present case, it is undisputed that plaintiff is or was seeking to run for a position on defendant’s city council, i.e., a "local elective office of this state." It is also undisputed that plaintiff was convicted of a felony within the immediately preceding 20 years involving fraud; in 2010, he was convicted by guilty plea of conspiracy to defraud the United States by dishonest means, 18 U.S.C. 371. Finally, it is undisputed that plaintiff’s conviction related to his official capacities as the police chief of the tribal police department and an elected member of the Tribe’s board of directors, the Tribe’s governing body. Plaintiff concedes these points on appeal. Therefore, the only question is...
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Paquin v. City of St. Ignace, Docket No. 156823
...with prejudice.On October 19, 2017, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published per curiam opinion. Paquin v. City of St. Ignace , 321 Mich. App. 673, 909 N.W.2d 884 (2017). The Court of Appeals noted that the only issue before it was whether plaintiff’s position of employment in tribal go......