Paradise Homes, Inc. v. Helton, 43811

• Citation: 631 S.W.2d 51
• Decision Date: 15 December 1981
• Docket Number: No. 43811,43811
• Parties: PARADISE HOMES, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Marvin HELTON and Josephine Helton, Kim Kris Development Company, Defendants-Respondents, and David Flagg, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 51

631 S.W.2d 51 PARADISE HOMES, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Marvin HELTON and Josephine Helton, Kim Kris Development
Company, Defendants-Respondents,
and
David Flagg, Defendant-Appellant. No. 43811. Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three. Dec. 15, 1981.

Page 52

Prudence L. Fink, Union, for defendant-appellant.

Thomas J. Briegel, Union, for defendants-respondents, Marvin and Josephine Helton.

SNYDER, Judge.

Appellant, David Flagg, appeals from a judgment denying a mechanic's lien on respondents', Marvin and Josephine Helton's, property on which appellant had installed a septic system. The judgment is reversed and remanded.

Two issues were raised on appeal. First, whether appellant's failure to submit a legal description of the three acre tract subject to the lien prior to the trial justified denial of the lien. Second, did both Mr. and Mrs. Helton ¹ contract with Paradise Homes, Inc. (Paradise), the general contractor, so as to permit appellant, a subcontractor, to be entitled to a lien upon complying with the lien statutes. Both issues are ruled in favor of appellant.

Paradise through its subagent, Kim Kris Development Company (Kim Kris), contracted to build a house for the Heltons on a five acre lot the Heltons owned in unincorporated Franklin County, Missouri. Paradise subcontracted with appellant Flagg to construct and install a jet aeration septic system on the property. Paradise filed a mechanic's lien on the property and sued the Heltons for payment.

Paradise joined appellant as a defendant, appellant having also filed a mechanic's lien against respondents' real property. Appellant filed a cross-claim against the Heltons and a counterclaim against Paradise for payment for the installation of the septic system.

The description of the property in appellant's lien statement stated, "Not more than 3 acres of ..." and then went on to describe the location of the Helton's five acre lot.

At trial appellant's counsel said, "I think the way these things are done is, if the Court would find that we have a mechanic's lien, we would then ask the Court to allow

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us to enter the land and have a survey made to mark out the three acres." The court did not respond to counsel's statement. There is no dispute concerning appellant's compliance with the notice, filing and time requirements of the mechanic's lien statutes.

The trial court entered a judgment in the amount of $1,487 in favor of appellant and against Paradise on appellant's counterclaim, but denied the lien. No findings of fact or conclusions of law having been requested by the parties, the court made none and gave no reason for its judgment.

Appellant first asserts that the trial court erred if it based its denial of appellant's lien on appellant's failure to describe specifically the three acres subject to the lien. Appellant argues that his prejudgment request that the court permit him to survey the property in order to specify the three acres saved the description from indefiniteness. The point is well taken.

The mechanic's lien law authorizes liens on property located outside incorporated areas to the extent of three acres. § 429.010, RSMo 1978. Section 429.080, RSMo 1978 requires that the lien contain a "true description of the property, or so near as to identify the same, upon which the lien is intended to apply ...." Because of the remedial nature of the act, the statute is to be liberally construed. R. L. Sweet Lumber Co. v. E. L. Lane, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 365, 371(5) (Mo. banc 1974); Hertel Electric Co. v. Gabriel, 292 S.W.2d 95, 101(9, 10) (Mo.App.1956). Thus, the description need not be letter perfect.

When the rights of third parties are not involved, the description must only be "definite enough, so as to enable one familiar with the locality to identify the premises intended to be covered by the lien." Hertel Electric Co. v. Gabriel, supra at 99(5, 6). Accord DeWitt v. Smith, 63 Mo. 263 (1876). Appellant's description, therefore, was sufficient to file the lien and commence this action.

Appellant argues that his prejudgment request that the court permit him to survey was the proper procedure to secure a specific description. Although appellant's request was somewhat equivocal, it was sufficient to inform the trial court that appellant stood ready to submit a legal description of the three acre tract prior to judgment. A number of cases support appellant's position in situations, such...