Paranteau v. DeVita

• Decision Date: 09 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 13260,13260
• Citation: 208 Conn. 515,544 A.2d 634
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Cherie PARANTEAU et al. v. Frederick DeVITA.

Page 634

544 A.2d 634

208 Conn. 515

Cherie PARANTEAU et al. v. Frederick DeVITA.

No. 13260.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 5, 1988.

Decided Aug. 9, 1988.

Thomas F. Brown, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).

Patty Jenkins Pittman, New Haven, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before PETERS, C.J., CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

HULL, Associate Justice.

The defendant brings this appeal following a grant of certification from an order of the Appellate Court dismissing his appeal to that court as untimely. We granted certification limited to the following question: "Did the Appellate Court err in concluding that the trial court, in an action brought under CUTPA [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes §§ 42-110a to 42-110q], had rendered a final judgment before its determination of the issue of attorney's fees?" A proper analysis, however, requires that we expand the scope of our inquiry beyond claims brought under CUTPA to include any claim where a judgment on the merits is rendered prior to an award of attorney's fees. ¹ See Nardini v. Manson, 207 Conn. 118, 119-20, 540 A.2d 69 (1988); State v. Torrence, 196 Conn. 430, 434-35, 493 A.2d 865 (1985). Thus, the revised first issue in this appeal is as follows: whether a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal where the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded remains to be decided. Furthermore because it is inescapably intertwined with the first issue, we address a second limited issue: whether a trial court's supplemental postjudgment order determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded is separately appealable as a final judgment. Both are issues of first impression for this court.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff tenants, Cherie Paranteau and Michael Warren, brought suit in several counts against the defendant landlord, Frederick DeVita, alleging, inter alia, a CUTPA violation by the defendant. On May 27, 1987, the trial court, Ramsey, J., by way of written decision, rendered a judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs on all counts, including the alleged violation of CUTPA by the defendant. General Statutes § 42-110g(d) grants a trial court the authority to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff(s) on a CUTPA claim. ² In its decision, the trial court stated that "[a] hearing may be scheduled by the Clerk to determine plaintiff's counsel fees." We construe this statement as implicitly granting attorney's fees but delaying the determination of their amount. A hearing was subsequently held on June 18, 1987, and the plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $2580.

On June 26, 1987, the defendant filed an appeal to the Appellate Court. The defendant's preliminary statement of issues for presentation on appeal ³ indicated that he was appealing not only the trial court's May 27, 1987 judgment on the merits, but also the subsequent award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs at the June 18, 1987 hearing. On July 1, 1987, the plaintiffs timely filed with the Appellate Court a motion to dismiss the defendant's appeal on the ground that it was filed more than twenty days after the May 27, 1987 judgment on the merits in violation of Practice Book § 4009. ⁴ On July 23, 1987, the Appellate Court granted the plaintiffs' motion and dismissed the defendant's appeal in toto without opinion. The defendant now seeks review in this court of the Appellate Court's dismissal, as untimely filed, of his appeal of the trial court's judgment on the merits and postjudgment award of attorney's fees. We find error only as to the dismissal of that portion of the defendant's appeal challenging the trial court's postjudgment order determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, and remand that issue to the Appellate Court for further proceedings.

I

Normally, the jurisdiction of this court is limited to appeals taken from final judgments. ⁵ General Statutes § 52-263; Practice Book § 4000. Absent the timely filing of a motion for extension of time under Practice Book § 4040, the party appealing must file his appeal within twenty days of the issuance of notice of the rendition of the judgment. ⁶ Practice Book § 4009. If an appeal is not timely filed, it may be dismissed if the appellee files a motion to dismiss within ten days of the filing of the appeal. Practice Book § 4056; Da Costa v. Gregory, 168 Conn. 665, 337 A.2d 539 (1975).

The defendant's appeal was filed within twenty days after the order determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded the plaintiffs, but more than twenty days after the trial court's judgment on the merits. The defendant contends that the determination of attorney's fees pursuant to the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim was an "integral part" of the case and that judgment on the merits was not final and appealable until the amount was decided. Under this analysis, no final judgment on the merits was rendered until the June 18, 1987 order determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded and, thus, the defendant's June 26, 1987 appeal on the merits was timely filed within the twenty day appeal period. ⁷ The plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that the May 27, 1987 decision on the merits constituted a final judgment for purposes of appeal. They argue that the supplemental postjudgment order regarding attorney's fees was merely collateral to the main cause of action and did not affect the finality of the May 27, 1987 judgment on the merits. Under this view, the defendant's June 26, 1987 appeal as to the merits was untimely, and therefore properly dismissed by the Appellate Court, since it was not filed within twenty days of the May 27, 1987 decision on the merits.

Thus, the first question presented by this appeal is the effect of the June 18, 1987 order regarding the amount of attorney's fees on the finality, for purposes of appeal, of the May 27, 1987 judgment on the merits.

Although there are no reported decisions in Connecticut addressing this precise issue, the federal courts have examined this problem in some depth. Among the United States Courts of Appeals there has been a conflict of authority. The minority view favors analyzing each case individually to determine whether attorney's fees were "collateral" to the main cause of action, in which case they would not preclude the finality and appealability of a judgment on the merits, or whether the fees were an "integral part" of the merits of the case, thus requiring their determination before judgment could be deemed final for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., McQurter v. Atlanta, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir.1984); Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 682 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir.1982). A majority of the Courts of Appeals, however, have adopted a bright-line approach which obviates the need for individual case review through the implementation of a uniform rule stating that an unresolved issue of attorney's fees does not prevent judgment on the merits from being final and immediately appealable. See, e.g., Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757 F.2d 792 (6th Cir.1985); Cox v. Flood, 683 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.1982); Obin v. District No. 9, 651 F.2d 574 (8th Cir.1981).

This federal conflict of authority was recently resolved when the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988), embraced the majority rule in favor of a bright-line approach. In Budinich, the petitioner brought an employment compensation action, which was removed from Colorado state court to the federal District Court of Appeals on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. A jury awarded the petitioner a verdict of $5000 and judgment was rendered on March 26, 1984. The petitioner timely filed new trial motions and a motion for attorney's fees under Colorado law. ⁸ On May 14, 1984, the District Court denied the new trial motions, found the petitioner was entitled to attorney's fees, but requested further briefing before determining their amount. On August 1, 1984, the District Court entered its final order concerning the attorney's fees. Id., 108 S.Ct. at 1719.

On August 29, 1984, the petitioner filed notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, covering all of the District Court's posttrial orders. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the judgment was final and immediately appealable because the order denying the new trial motions was entered on May 14, 1984, and that notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days of that order as required by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. ⁹ The Court of Appeals granted the motion to dismiss as to all issues except the award of attorney's fees. Id.

On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner in Budinich asserted, as does the defendant in the present case, that the District Court's decision on the merits was not final and appealable until the question of attorney's fees was resolved, and that the time for appeal should run from the District Court's August 1, 1984 final order regarding attorney's fees, thus rendering his August 29, 1984 appeal timely. The United States Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument, holding that an "unresolved issue of attorney's fees for the litigation in question does not prevent judgment on the merits from being final." Id., 1721-22. In so deciding, the Budinich court emphasized that the time of appealability, because of its jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear, and that courts and litigants were best served by a bright-line rule that a decision on the merits is a final judgment for purposes of appeal even though the recoverability or amount of attorney's fees for the litigation remains to be determined. Id., 1722. This ruling is in keeping with previous United States Supreme Court decisions that, although not directly ruling on the issue, have been interpreted...