Paraskevopoulos v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 09 August 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2:17-cv-00166-JAW,2:17-cv-00166-JAW
• Parties: LEO S. PARASKEVOPOULOS, Plaintiff v. CENTRAL MAINE MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

LEO S. PARASKEVOPOULOS, Plaintiff v. CENTRAL MAINE MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant

No. 2:17-cv-00166-JAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

August 9, 2019

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In this employment discrimination action, defendant Central Maine Medical Center ("CMMC" or the "defendant") moves for summary judgment as to all claims in Count I of plaintiff Leo Paraskevopoulos's two-count complaint, namely, claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), 5 M.R.S.A. § 4551 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and interference with and retaliation for leave taken pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the Maine Family Medical Leave Requirements law ("MFMLR") 26 M.R.S.A. § 844. See Defendant's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") (ECF No. 69) at 1-2; Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10) ¶ 122. The defendant also seeks summary judgment with respect to any punitive damages requested in connection with those claims. See Motion at 1-2. The plaintiff has filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on an unrelated theory, see generally ECF No. 66, which is the subject of a separate recommended decision.

In the main, the defendant argues that, after duly accommodating the plaintiff's disability, it terminated him because of his poor performance. The plaintiff counters that he was fired because of his disability, either because he sought accommodations for it, or because his unaccommodated disability produced the poor performance cited by the defendant. Because the parties dispute genuine issues of material fact, I recommend that the court deny the Motion, except to the limited extent that it is conceded by the plaintiff.¹ Specifically, I recommend that the court grant the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to (i) the plaintiff's MHRA and ADA claims based on discrete adverse actions that occurred more than 300 days before his MHRC complaint was filed and (ii) any requested punitive damages pursuant to his Rehabilitation Act, FMLA, and MFMLR claims, and otherwise deny it.

I. Applicable Legal Standards

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490, 495 (1st Cir. 2014). "A dispute is genuine if 'the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.'" Johnson v. Univ. of P.R., 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008)). "A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation." Id. (quoting Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008)).

The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. Johnson, 714 F.3d at 52. Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must "produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue." Brooks v. AIG SunAmerica Life Assur. Co., 480 F.3d 579, 586 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the moving party." In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

"This framework is not altered by the presence of cross-motions for summary judgment." Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003). "[T]he court must mull each motion separately, drawing inferences against each movant in turn." Id. (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Cross motions for summary judgment neither alter the basic Rule 56 standard, nor warrant the grant of summary judgment per se. Cross motions simply require us to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed. As always, we resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant].") (citations omitted).

B. Local Rule 56

The evidence that the court may consider in deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist for purposes of summary judgment is circumscribed by the local rules of this district. See Loc. R. 56. The moving party must first file a statement of material facts that it claims are not in dispute. See Loc. R. 56(b). Each fact must be set forth in a numbered paragraph and supported by a specific record citation. See id. The nonmoving party must then submit a responsive "separate, short, and concise" statement of material facts in which it must "admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts[.]" Loc. R. 56(c). The nonmovant likewise must support each denial or qualification with an appropriate record citation. See id. The nonmoving party may also submit its own additional statement of material facts that it contends are not in dispute, each supported by a specific record citation. See id. The movant then must respond to the nonmoving party's statement of additional facts, if any, by way of a reply statement of material facts in which it must "admit, deny or qualify such additional facts by reference to the numbered paragraphs" of the nonmovant's statement. See Loc. R. 56(d). Again, each denial or qualification must be supported by an appropriate record citation. See id.

Local Rule 56 directs that "[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted." Loc. R. 56(f). In addition, "[t]he court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment" and has "no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of fact." Id.; see also, e.g., Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) ("If a party failsto properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion[.]").

II. Factual Background

The parties' statements of material facts, credited to the extent that they are either admitted or supported by record citations in accordance with Local Rule 56, with disputes resolved in favor of the plaintiff as the nonmovant, reveal the following.²

Between July 2011 and January 2014, the plaintiff was a medical resident enrolled in the defendant's three-year family medicine residency, which is accredited by the American Council for Graduate Medical Education ("ACGME"). Defendant's Statement of Material Facts with Opposing Statement ("Defendant's Consolidated SMF"), commencing at page 1 of Parties' Consolidated Statement of Material Facts (Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment) ("Parties' Consolidated SMF") (ECF No. 86), ¶¶ 1, 4, 14; Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts with Defendant's Reply Statement ("Plaintiff's Consolidated SMF"), commencing at page 128 of Parties' Consolidated SMF, ¶ 278.³ The defendant's residency program was headed by Dr. Donald Woolever, who has served as the director since 2009. Id. ¶ 8.

In December 2011, the plaintiff was treated for depression. Id. ¶ 150. In February 2012, he received a letter from Dr. Deborah Taylor, the program's associate director, citing two instances of tardiness. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. In July 2012, the plaintiff met with Dr. Taylor, told her he was "feelingfatigued, depressed[,] and mentally unwell," and asked if he should request a medical leave of absence to seek treatment. Id. ¶¶ 151-52. Dr. Taylor advised the plaintiff not to seek a leave of absence but instead to seek counseling, providing him the contact information for the defendant's "Employee Assistance Program." Id. ¶¶ 29, 152. Later that month, the plaintiff received a memorandum of understanding placing him on probation for an initial term of six months and outlining the terms of his probation. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.⁴ In November 2012, the plaintiff received feedback, both positive and negative, from Dr. Stephanie Youd, his advisor. Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 154-55. She informed the plaintiff that there would be a meeting with Dr. Woolever on December 7, 2012. Id. ¶ 22.

On December 4, 2012, Drs. Woolever, Youd, and Dieter Kreckel, one of the plaintiff's supervising attending physicians, met to discuss the plaintiff's record and whether he should continue in the program. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. On December 6, the plaintiff sent an email to Dr. Youd stating, in part, "I have complained of feelings of anxiety, depression, getting distracted by environmental triggers and fatigue during the last year and a half . . . . I think a medical mental health evaluation would be beneficial because I can certainly say I'm intrinsically motivated and...