Pardue v. Pardue, BR-345

Decision Date15 January 1988
Docket NumberNo. BR-345,BR-345
Parties13 Fla. L. Weekly 209 Barbara Blake PARDUE, Former wife, Appellant, v. Michael Lassiter PARDUE, Former Husband, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Lauchlin T. Waldoch of Dell, Graham, Willcox, Barber & Henderson, P.A., Gainesville, for appellant.

Martha Ann Lott, Gainesville, for appellee.

ERVIN, Judge.

Appellant/wife appeals the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, raising numerous issues in her appeal. We reverse those portions of the judgment relating to the distribution of marital assets, alimony and child custody, and remand the cause to the trial court with directions.

The wife appeals the order distributing the marital assets and the amount and nature of alimony awarded. Specifically, she assails as error the failure of the trial judge to award her the marital home as lump sum alimony, to treat the family surveying business as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution between the spouses, and to award her either permanent periodic alimony or a greater amount of rehabilitative alimony than that ordered, $200 per month for twenty-four months.

After reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude the court's distribution of marital assets and the amount of rehabilitative alimony to be an abuse of discretion and unfair to the wife. Although it is not the role of this court to prescribe in detail to the trial court what may be an acceptable scheme of distribution, we will briefly describe what we consider erroneous as to the items ordered.

First, the trial court erred in not considering the family surveying business as a marital asset that was susceptible to equitable distribution. The business was developed during the marriage by the labors of both the husband and the wife. In so saying, we do not hold that the lower court necessarily erred in refusing to award the wife a portion of the business as a marital asset. If, however, the wife is deemed not entitled to receive a portion of the marital business as part of her share of the assets subject to distribution, then she must be considered entitled to an additional share of the other marital assets, such as the marital home.

Nor can we agree with the wife's argument that the court's failure to distribute the marital assets equitably requires the outright award of the marital home to her as lump sum alimony. Clearly, this court does not have the authority to restructure a divorce settlement on a piecemeal basis. See Noah v. Noah, 491 So.2d 1124, 1128 (Fla.1986), where the Florida Supreme Court quashed a district court's opinion that had improperly fashioned its own version of an equitable remedy, by directing that a condominium be awarded to the respondent. In the case at bar, the trial court possessed discretion to award the wife the marital home as lump sum alimony in lieu of the award of the business of the husband. See Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So.2d 203 (Fla.1985) (the trial court may, upon the request of either party for the disposition of jointly held assets, order the conveyance of such assets as will achieve an equitable distribution). We must, however, leave the ultimate determination of distribution to the trial court. We only say that the trial court's order of distribution is, under the circumstances, an abuse of discretion, and that the wife is entitled to a greater share of the marital assets in an effort to approximate more equitably her contributions to the marriage. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1201 (Fla.1980).

Appellant also appeals the lower court's failure to award permanent periodic alimony, or, in the alternative, the amount of rehabilitative alimony allowed. We cannot say that the trial court necessarily erred in refusing to award the wife permanent periodic alimony, in view of both her apparent ability to complete her college education and her successful work history. The amount and duration of rehabilitative alimony awarded in the case at bar is nonetheless an abuse of discretion. The wife was awarded $200 per month for a period of two years, an amount less than the $275 per month the husband was ordered to pay as child support for each of the parties' two children. There is nothing in the record disclosing how the trial court arrived at the amount of rehabilitative alimony; nor is there anything in the record suggesting that the cost of living is less for adults than it is for children. The length of the rehabilitative term ordered is apparently the amount of time the mother would require to complete college if she were to return to college as a full-time student. Because the rehabilitative alimony awarded is only $200 per month, the wife may be required to work during the rehabilitative period, thereby making it impossible for her to complete her education within two years. Accordingly, we reverse the amount of rehabilitative alimony awarded, and on remand direct the court to award...

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14 cases
  • Knutsen v. Cegalis
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • December 10, 2009
    ...change of living situation, association with a particular person or choice to pursue a certain career. See, e.g., Pardue v. Pardue, 518 So.2d 954, 956-57 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) (invalidating provision automatically revoking custody in wife if she pursues a musical career); Cook v. Cook, 920......
  • Turner v. Turner
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 20, 1988
    ...Marital assets are those assets which have been created by the parties' work efforts, services, or earnings. Pardue v. Pardue, 518 So.2d 954, 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Keller v. Keller, 521 So.2d 273, 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Szemborski v. Szemborski, 512 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), ......
  • Hallman v. Hallman
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • February 28, 1991
    ...deny alimony, 1 or to make an inequitable distribution of marital assets. Noah v. Noah, 491 So.2d 1124 (Fla.1986); Pardue v. Pardue, 518 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Green v. Green, 501 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. denied, 513 So.2d 1061 (Fla.1987); Crapps v. Crapps, 501 So.2d 661......
  • Eckroade v. Eckroade
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 2, 1990
    ...unless the infidelity depleted the marital assets. Noah; McKinlay v. McKinlay, 523 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Pardue v. Pardue, 518 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Furthermore, the fact that one of the parties was involved in a serious relationship with a third person is not in itself a ......
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