Parente v. Wall
| Docket Number | 1:16-cv-0055-MSM-PASsw |
| Decision Date | 22 December 2023 |
| Parties | LUTHER PARENTE and ERIC L. STEWART, Plaintiffs, v. ASHBEL T. WALL, DIRECTOR, R.I. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Plaintiffs Luther Parente and Eric Stewart, inmates at the Adult Correctional Institutions (“ACI”), Rhode Island Department of Corrections (“DOC”), entered custody with severe foot injuries as well as documented mental health disorders, and they contend in this lawsuit that the DOC - and its medical staff and its supervisory correctional staff - denied and delayed critical treatment failed to follow the instructions of outside medical personnel, forced them to walk and climb stairs with crippling injuries, and generally met their serious medical needs with deliberate indifference.
Mr Parente had jumped from a second-floor window when being arrested. At his arraignment, his inability to walk was so obvious that he was sent by the presiding judge to Rhode Island Hospital (“RIH”), where he was promptly admitted for four days. He was diagnosed with a calcaneal fracture of the right foot/ankle and additional fractures in his left heel and ankle, having suffered traumatic injuries to both lower extremities. (ECF No. 216-6, at 0023.) He alleges he could not walk on his own: his discharge papers from the hospital recommended crutches or a wheelchair, medication, ice, elevation of his foot, and medication for pain. Among his other complaints, he claims his wheelchair was taken away at the ACI; his crutches were taken away so that he had to crawl from his bed to a toilet; he was assigned to a top tier in the cellblock and was denied use of an elevator so that he had to struggle painfully up and down metal steps several times a day; he was never given ice for the inflammation no matter how often or whom he asked; and he was never given a special elevation pillow and when a correctional officer eventually gave him an extra regular pillow, it was taken away and he was put in disciplinary segregation for having it.[1]His efforts to obtain necessary supportive footwear were, he claims, stymied by the commissary's failure to stock his size and refusal to obtain it for him. (ECF No. 243 ¶ 542.).
Mr. Stewart arrived at the ACI with an ankle sprain suffered while playing basketball, with discharge instructions from Kent Hospital. The instructions admonished him not to put weight on his left foot and to keep his leg elevated, applying ice packs. He asserts he was using crutches and an air cast in the weeks before his arrest. (ECF No. 217 ¶ ¶ 301-307.) He claims he was denied these devices, as well as cold packs, elevation pillows, and supportive footwear. (ECF No. 228 at 2.) Like Mr. Parente, he claims he was denied use of an elevator and was forced to painfully go up and down metal stairways to his top tier cell multiple times per day. (ECF No. 217, ¶ 322.)
Both men also arrived at the ACI with long histories of psychiatric complaints. Mr. Parente, who requested treatment for serious anxiety and insomnia, had a DOC record of psychiatric complaints going back several years. His requests for treatment were refused, as DOC's chief consulting psychiatrist defendant Martin Bauermeister, contended that only diagnoses of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are sufficiently “major” to warrant mental health treatment. The doctor contends that all inmates suffer from anxiety, depression, and insomnia and that those conditions, as well as post-traumatic stress disorder, do not warrant psychological treatment in prisons. (ECF No. 212-46, at 56, 81-82.)
Mr. Stewart's psychiatric history extended back to the age of seven, and the documentation of psychiatric disorders suffered even while at the ACI is extensive. Mr. Stewart alleges he suffers from “post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), severe anxiety, alcohol dependence, opiate dependence, cocaine dependence, cannabis dependence, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), bipolar affective disorder (“BPAD”), and severe depression. (ECF No. 164, ¶ ¶221-22.) He had a history of seizures, hospitalizations, and suicide attempts. (ECF No. 212-52, at 5.)
While the facts of their medical and psychiatric needs, and the particular care each received at the ACI, are different, their legal claims share the same foundation: that the State, top administrators of DOC, and contract and payroll medical staff of DOC failed to adequately treat them and deliberately disregarded their serious medical needs, thereby exacerbating and unnecessarily prolonging their physical pain and, in Mr. Stewart's case, the impact on his mental health of his psychiatric disorders needing treatment. These claims are embodied in eleven counts describing violations of myriad statutory and constitutional provisions.[2]The plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment on liability (“MPSJ”) against all defendants (ECF No. 216). In turn, two groups of defendants have filed motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 218, 220, 222): the parties have collectively denominated those groups the and the “physician defendants.”[3]Separating the defendants into these groups may make logical sense from a representation point of view. From the vantage point of the claims and evidence, however, the Court will refer to the groups as “correctional defendants” and “medical defendants”; the latter group consists of the physicians and other medical providers who treated the plaintiffs, regardless of their status as contract or payroll employees of DOC.
Federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, lies for claims of violation of civil rights brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, and violations of the specific federal statutes listed at n.3, with supplemental jurisdiction of state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine disputes of material fact and when the undisputed facts entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law. Walsh v. North Prov. Primary Care Assoc., Inc., 537 F.Supp.3d 195, 200 (D.R.I. 2021). Santiago-Ramos v. CentennialP.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st.Cir. 1996).
“When evaluating cross-motions for summary judgment, the standard does not change; [courts] view each motion separately and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the respective non-moving party.” Sparkman & Stephens, LLC v. Museum Seaport Museum, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-00029-MSM-LDA, 2023 WL 5290956, at *2 (D.R.I. Aug. 17, 2023) (partially quoting Bonneau v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Loc. Union 51Pension Tr. Fund ex rel. Bolton, 736 F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 2013)).
The starting place for evaluating a claim of inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is still Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court held that “the government's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration,” emanates from the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” contained in the Eighth Amendment. “The infliction of [] unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency . . . [and] deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'” Id. at 103-104 (partially quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Ordinary medical malpractice does not state a constitutional claim for relief. Id. at 106. It is only deliberate indifference to serious medical needs that so offends “evolving standards of decency” as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. When it is officials acting under color of state law who are responsible for such conduct, the claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Leavitt v. Correctional Med. Serv., Inc., 645 F.3d 484, 502 (1st Cir. 2011).
The twin requirements of a “serious medical need” and “deliberate indifference” to a prisoner's condition are the criteria which any successful claim must meet. A showing of serious medical need is an objective prong, while deliberate indifference is a subjective element requiring a particular state of mind on the part of a culpable defendant. Leavitt Corr'l Med. Serv., Inc., 645 F.3d 484, 498 (1st Cir. 2011). Thus, in evaluating the competing claims to summary judgment here, the Court must examine the submissions of the parties to determine whether a genuine dispute of fact exists as to either of those elements: while they may overlap, id., both must be met to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.
A “serious medical need” may be one “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Perry v Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 7879 (1st Cir. 2015). It may be one “that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment.” Martinez, 2015 WL 9315562, at *3. Or it may be one in which the impact of a delay in treatment speaks to the seriousness of the need. Rand v. Simonds, 422 F.Supp.2d 318, 330 (D.N.H. 2006). Both plaintiffs have produced ample evidence of a “serious medical need.” As recounted above, Mr. Parente was hospitalized for four days before arriving at the ACI, and he presented there unable to walk on his own, with a discharge plan recommending...
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